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Abstract
This dissertation investigates the influence of economic integration through trade on 
several aspects of economic activity. The aim is to obtain empirical evidence on whether 
and how trade integration affects economic activity, and to provide theoretical frameworks 
to organise and understand the empirical findings. Since trade liberalization and regional 
integration agreements are the main tools through which the extent of integration can be 
influenced by policy makers, they are of particular interest throughout the analysis.
In the first substantive chapter, I analyse the role of proximity to product markets in 
explaining the variation of regional per capita income in the European Union. Using a New 
Economic Geography model, I derive an econometric specification relating income levels 
to a trade cost and price index weighted sum of the surrounding locations’ GDP. I estimate 
this specification for a sample of 193 EU regions for 1975-1997 and find an important role 
for market access. However, its main benefits seem to come from increased incentives for 
physical and human capital accumulation and not through direct trade cost savings.
In the second chapter, I extend the analysis of the importance of geographic position 
and the extent of market integration to the developing world. In particular, I point out that 
economic geography plays an important role in explaining levels of industrialization in 
developing countries. First, good access to developed countries’ product markets seems 
to be beneficial for industrialization. Second, geographic position also plays an important 
role in determining a country's comparative advantage and thus its sectoral specialization.
Finally, the last chapter shifts the focus of analysis from the macro- to the micro­
level by analysing the impact of trade liberalization on firm-level behaviour. Specifically, 
I use the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement of 1989 as a natural experiment to show that 
trade liberalization leads to an increase in mergers and acquisitions activity. I also provide 
evidence that resources are transferred from less to more productive firms in the process 
and that the magnitude of the overall transfer is quantitatively important.
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Introduction
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Discussions about the benefits and perils of globalization and economic integra­
tion have moved to the forefront of popular and political debates in the recent decade. 
Given the large divergence in opinions and the heated nature of the discussion, a tho­
rough economic analysis of the issues at hand seems to be more needed than ever. This 
dissertation attempts to contribute to this research agenda by trying to deepen our un­
derstanding of some of the consequences of economic integration and the factors that 
influence it.
While the concepts of "globalization" and "economic integration" are very broad, 
the specific aspect that has attracted most attention is increased exposure to international 
trade. Accordingly, the question of how different aspects of economic activity are in­
fluenced by trade integration will be at the heart of the following analysis. Given the 
very large set of possible settings for such a study, some selection had to be made. The 
three main chapters of this thesis will thus each focus on a different variable of interest, 
different geographic settings, and different levels of aggregation. All along, however, 
the starting point of each analysis is the derivation of different measures of integration, 
taking into account both natural and political barriers to trade.
Chapter 2 looks at the impact of access to product markets on regional per capita 
income levels in the European Union. This is motivated by the fact that income levels in 
the EU do not only vary by substantial amounts but also show a clear geographic structure 
- a relatively poor periphery and a rich centre. Lower costs of accessing markets enjoyed 
by more central or better integrated regions might be a potential explanation for these 
observed patterns.
Following Redding and Venables (2004), the first part of the chapter formalises 
this idea in a multi-location model with trade costs. I use this model to derive an econo­
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metric specification relating income levels to a trade cost weighted sum of surrounding 
locations’ market demand. This sum, called "market access", is the central measure of 
trade integration used in this first chapter. I define "trade costs" in a very broad sense 
here to include all barriers that impede the free flow of goods between countries and re­
gions. To derive a measure that captures all such barriers, I estimate a gravity equation 
on trade flows from ithe European Union. Using the resulting coefficient estimates on 
distance, border effects and price indices, I then calculate market access levels for a sam­
ple of 193 European regions over the period 1975-1997. In a final step, I regress regional 
per-income levels on these measures and find a strong positive impact of market access. 
Doubling a region’s access is predicted to raise per capita income by 25%. This result 
proves to be robust across different specifications and to the use of panel data techniques 
and instrumental variables estimation.
In a last section, I then set out to disentangle the channels through which market 
access can influence income levels. As has been argued by other authors (e.g. Redding 
and Schott, 2004), centrality may have positive long-run effects on income levels that 
go beyond the pure reduction in trade costs savings modelled here. In particular, more 
central locations might also enjoy greater incentives for human and physical capital accu­
mulation if skilled labour and capital are intensively used in trade cost and intermediate 
intensive goods (with intermediate goods having to be imported over longer distances in 
more peripheral locations). By including controls for human and physical capital stocks 
of regions, I take a first step towards isolating the direct trade cost related impact of mar­
ket access. As it turns out, this direct effect is much smaller - of the order of 7-8% rather 
than the originally estimated 25% - albeit still highly statistically significant. While bet­
ter integration with large markets for one’s products thus seems to be beneficial, pure 
trade costs savings are probably only a comparatively small part of the story (at least in 
the already well integrated markets of the European Union).
In Chapter 3 of the dissertation, I extend my analysis of the importance of geo­
graphic position and the extent of market integration to the developing world. The goal 
is to demonstrate that relative geographic position plays an important role in explaining 
the variation in levels of industrialization across developing countries. This is in direct 
contrast to many existing studies who focus on either closed or small open economies 
(e.g. Murphy et al., 1989a/b; Matsuyama, 1992).
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The chapter starts out by drawing attention to two stylised facts which I argue can­
not be fully understood in the existing a-geographical settings. First, closed-economy 
models that stress the role of local demand in generating sufficient expenditure on man­
ufacturing goods (e.g. Murphy et al., 1989a/b) are not well suited to explain the remark­
able successes of many smaller economies in industrializing. More generally, cross­
country data reveal a positive correlation between distance to the world’s main markets 
and levels of manufacturing activity in the developing world. Secondly, small open econ­
omy models that emphasise the importance of comparative advantage and are sceptical 
about the pro-industrializing effects of high agricultural productivity (Matsuyama, 1992) 
are at odds with a positive correlation between the ratio of agricultural to manufacturing 
productivity and shares of manufacturing in GDP.
I provide a potential explanation for these puzzles by nesting the above theories in 
a unifying framework and introducing features of economic geography. A multi-location 
model with trade costs is constructed in which industrialization is driven by access to 
markets and comparative advantage patterns. The model is then used to demonstrate 
how costly international trade and relative geographic position can explain the above 
stylised facts.
First, international trade allows countries to access the demand of large foreign 
markets. However, even with low political barriers to exchange international trade is 
costly and geographic proximity is crucial.
Second, a positive correlation between relatively high agricultural productivity and 
manufacturing shares does not necessarily imply that (Ricardian) comparative advantage 
is unimportant. WhaJt the model demonstrates, rather, is that in a world with costly trade, 
measures of comparative advantage need to take into account the relative proximity of 
trading partners. This is since trade declines with distance - or more precisely trade 
costs - and countries further away thus play a lesser role in the specialization pattern 
of a location. Together with the fact that productivity patterns tend to be similar across 
neighbouring locations, this provides a potential explanation for the apparent beneficial 
impact of high relative agricultural productivity on industrialization. First, as an em­
pirical matter of fact, a high relative agricultural productivity is associated with a high 
absolute level of agricultural productivity. High absolute levels in turn have the tradition­
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ally highlighted pro-industrializing effects which work through raising local income and 
demand for manufacturing goods. Second, the similarity of productivity patterns across 
neighbouring locations implies that a high agricultural productivity is not necessarily 
associated with a strong effective or "local" comparative advantage. Its adverse special­
ization effects are thus more muted and may be dominated by the traditional channel just 
described.
In a final section, I confront some of the additional empirical predictions of the 
model with cross-country data on developing countries. I find that a measure of mar­
ket access similar to the one used in Chapter 2 retains substantial explanatory power 
in explaining manufacturing shares in GDP, even after controlling for measures of lo­
cal demand and performing various robustness checks. I also show that controlling for 
absolute levels of agricultural productivity and employing the correct (i.e. trade cost 
weighted) measure of comparative advantage does again yield a significantly negative 
relation between levels of industrialization and comparative advantage in agriculture.
The first two substantive chapters of this dissertation thus look at very broad set­
tings, in terms of geographic scope, the definition of trade costs and the variables of 
interest. In contrast, Chapter 4 substantially sharpens the focus of analysis by analysing 
the micro-level impact of one particular and well-defined trade liberalization episode. 
Specifically, I use the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement of 1989 to show that 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are used by firms as an important but previously ne­
glected form of adjustment to freer trade.
What we know from the existing literature in this field is that trade liberalization 
has a strong and heterogenous impact on firm- and plant-level activity. More precisely, 
it seems that less productive firms contract or exit while more efficient producers thrive 
and expand. However, as I try to argue, the exact channels through which these firm-level 
adjustment processes take place are still not sufficiently well understood. In particular, 
only scarce attention has been paid to adjustment via the market for corporate control, 
i.e. through mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Accordingly, the purpose of this chapter 
is to analyse whether adjustment via M&A is indeed a relevant empirical phenomenon 
and to compare M&A to other adjustment channels previously analysed (in particular, 
firm-internal contraction and expansion, and firm exit by bankruptcy).
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I again start by developing a formal theoretical model to guide the subsequent em­
pirical analysis. Using a framework similar to Melitz (2003), I derive several predictions 
on the impact of trade liberalization on M&A activity. In particular, I show that trade 
liberalization increases the amount of resource transfers via M&A and that the implied 
reallocation goes from less to more productive firms.
I then move on to implement a test of these theoretical predictions using the 
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement of 1989 as a quasi-natural experiment. This time, I 
choose the extent of tariff cuts implemented under this agreement as my proxy for the 
reduction in trade barriers. While this is obviously a narrower measure than those used 
in the previous two chapters, it has the advantage of being a direct policy instrument and 
subject to fewer endogeneity concerns (see sections 4.3 and 4.4 for details). Using the 
cross-sectoral variation in tariff cuts, I show that sectors with larger tariff reductions saw 
stronger increases in M&A activity in the period after 1989. This holds true in partic­
ular for domestic Canadian M&A activity where I estimate a CUSFTA-related increase 
of around 65%. The impact on U.S. M&A activity is found to be much lower, consis­
tent with the notion that the integration shock was substantially smaller for the large U.S. 
market. Finally, cross-border M&A also shows important changes around 1989 but the 
link to tariff reductions is not always clear cut.
In a second step, I examine firm-level characteristics of targets and acquirers in 
order to test the model’s second prediction that resources are transferred from less to more 
productive firms. This is also of interest for a comparison of the M&A channel with the 
previously studied channels of firm-internal adjustment and exit by bankruptcy (both of 
which seem to involve a reallocation towards more productive firms). My results indicate 
that on average, acquirers are indeed bigger, more profitable and more productive.
Finally, I also look at the amount of inter-firm transfers of output and employment 
in North America thait were due to M&A during my sample period 1985-1997. Com­
paring results to resource transfers via exit and contraction, I find that M&A was quan­
titatively important relative to these alternative channels of adjustment. Taken together, 
these results suggest that M&A is an important alternative to the adjustment mechanisms 
of firm and establishment closure and contraction that have been emphasised in earlier 
research.
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The rest of this dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 studies the role of 
market access in determining regional European income levels. Chapter 3 analyses the 
importance of economic geography in industrialization, and Chapter 4 the impact of trade 
liberalization on M&A activity. In view of the diverse topics addressed, I will discuss 
the related literature separately in the introductory sections of each chapter. The final 
chapter of this thesis. Chapter 5, will then summarise the main insights, draw potential 
lessons for economic policy and highlight areas for future work.
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Chapter 2 
The Spatial Income Structure in the 
European Union - What Role for Economic 
Geography?3
2.1 Introduction
Regional income levels in the European Union differ by significant amounts. They also 
show a strong core-periphery gradient, i.e. per capita GDP at the geographic periphery is 
lower than at the centre. These patterns have raised considerable concerns in popular de­
bates as well as in policy circles and have led to the establishment of a number of policies 
aimed at a levelling out of income differences and at allowing a catch-up of peripheral 
regions. Despite these efforts and a significant though uneven convergence process since 
the 1960s, income inequalities and their geographic pattern persist to the present day 
(Tondl, 2001; Baldwin and Wyplosz, 2003; Combes and Overman, 2004). For example, 
in 1999, per capita GDP in the 5% richest NUTS2 regions was more than three times 
higher than that of the 5% poorest regions, with poor regions being predominantly found 
in the European periphery.4 Figure 1 illustrates this fact by plotting per capita GDP in 
1999 against distance from Luxembourg, the approximate geographic centre of the EU.
The theory of economic growth has delivered potential explanations for income 
differences across countries and regions (e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). However, 
they are a-geographical in nature and thus fail to address the observed spatial structure of 
regional income inequalities in the EU. Recently, the so-called "New Economic Geogra­
phy" (NEG) has provided another conceptual framework within which the geographical 
structure of production and income levels can be analysed explicitly. Though this field
3 This chapter is based on a paper accepted for publication in the Journal o f Economic Geography.
4 In this chapter, I use the terms "European", "EU" or "EU15" to refer to the 15 member states of the 
European Union before die 2004 enlargement. ”NUTS” (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) 
is a geographical classification system used by Eurostat, dividing each country into a number of regions at 
different levels of aggregation. This paper works at the NUTS2-level of aggregation which consists of 210 
regions (see appendix 2.A for a list of regions used).
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has experienced rapid theoretical advances in the last one and a half decades, empirical 
evaluation of the different modelling frameworks has only recently started in earnest.5
This chapter applies the NEG framework in an empirical investigation of the re­
gional income structure in the European Union. It is thus part of a small but growing 
number of studies that have used theoretical tools from the NEG to analyse the impact of 
distance from markets on factor remuneration, particularly wage levels. The basic idea 
is that in a world where regions or countries specialise in certain goods and export them, 
firms in locations further away from consumers will incur higher trade costs and earn 
lower net revenues from export sales. An additional access penalty applies if production 
uses intermediate inputs which have to be imported over long distances. Both effects 
tend to lower the value added attributable to the factors of production, where labour as 
the relatively immobile factor is affected most. Besides these direct effects, remoteness 
may hamper the accumulation of human capital, aggravating the wage disadvantage of 
peripheral regions (Redding and Schott, 2004). This is the case if intermediate and trade 
cost intensive goods use relatively more skilled labour. Then, more central locations 
offer higher wages for skilled labour which increases the incentives for human capital 
accumulation.
A first strand of the empirical NEG literature is concerned with the effects of ge­
ography at a national level where labour is mostly assumed to be perfectly mobile and 
real wages are equalised. It focuses on the importance of proximity to consumers, i.e. 
nominal wages are modelled as a function of a region’s so-called market access (usually 
the distance-weighted sum of the GDPs of surrounding locations). Hanson (2005) shows 
for a panel of US counties that the market access of a location has indeed a significant 
positive impact on local nominal wages. Mion (2004) finds similar results for Italy, De 
Bruyne (2003) for Belgium and Brakman et al. (2004) for Germany.6
Redding and Venables (2004) look at the relation between economic geography 
and income on an international level. In their model real wage levels are also influenced
5 See Fujita et al. (1999) for a comprehensive introduction to the theory side of the New Economic 
Geography. Overman, Redding and Venables (2003) provide an overview of the existing empirical literature. 
Combes and Overman (2004) review NEG studies on European regions which are also summarised below.
6 De Bruyne (2003) tests for employment density rather than for wages. Brakman et al. (2004) also 
estimate a specification that does not rely on real wage equalisation for its derivation.
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Figure 2.1: Per Capita GDP and Distance from Luxembourg (1999)
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by the existence of intermediate factors of production as described above. Taking the 
location of demand and production as given, they derive a structural equation relating 
wages to market and supplier access, which measure the proximity of a country to mar-
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investigation of the implications of the underlying model is possible. In these respects, 
the analysis is very much related to Head and Mayer (2006) who - in work done inde­
pendently and concurrently to mine - also apply the Redding-Venables methodology to 
regional European data. However, their sample is fairly different from the one used in 
this chapter in that it has sectoral detail but uses a shorter time period and its geographic 
coverage is more limited.7 Also, the focus of their paper is on determining the relative 
importance of wage and employment responses to market access. In contrast, the final 
contribution of this chapter lies in disentangling the different channels through which 
market access affects income levels. In particular, by including a number of control vari­
ables intended to capture the potential indirect effects of economic geography, I will try 
to isolate its direct effect through trade cost savings for more central locations.
As compared to the papers using national data, the present study has the additional 
advantage of the Redding-Venables methodology that trade costs are derived via a grav­
ity equation rather than being simply assumed to depend in a particular way on bilateral 
distance. Also, this chapter takes detailed account of demand linkages that go beyond 
national borders. This seems to be especially important in the case of the three Euro­
pean economies studied in previous work (Italy, Belgium and Germany) which are more 
economically integrated with their neighbours than the United States are.
The structure o f this chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the theoretical 
framework from which the econometric specifications are derived that are used in the 
subsequent sections. Section 2.3 estimates a trade equation for trade both within the 
European Union and between the EU and the rest of the world. Section 2.4.1 uses the 
results to calculate market access measures for the EU regions in my sample. In sections
2.4.2 and 2.4.3,1 then regress regional per capita income on these measures and undertake 
several robustness checks. Section 2.5 tries to disentangle the different channels through 
which market access impacts upon income levels. Finally, section 2.6 concludes.
7 Head and Mayer’s data set covers the period 1985-2001 for 13 industries and 57 Nutsl regions in 9 EU 
countries. My sample uses aggregate data for the period 1975-1997 for 193 Nuts2 regions (including the 
six EU15 countries excluded from Head and Mayer; of those, Sweden and Finland seem to be of particular 
importance given that they are peripheral but high-income countries).
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2.2 Theoretical Framework and Econometric Specifications
2.2.1 The Model
The theoretical framework underlying the empirical analysis in this chapter is a reduced 
version of a standard New Economic Geography model, similar to the one used by Red­
ding and Venables (2004).8 I consider a world with R  locations, where the focus is on 
the manufacturing industry which produces under increasing returns to scale and product 
differentiation.
Manufacturing goods are used for consumption only. Demand for goods in loca­
tion j  is derived via utility maximisation of the representative consumer’s CES utility 
function:
( R  <T —i \ CT —1 ^
y ;  niXif ) s.t. 
i= 1 J i=1
Where rii is the number of firms in location i and Xij is the amount of consumption in
location j  of a variety produced in i. a  is the elasticity of substitution between varieties
and pij the price of varieties from location i sold in location j .  Prices pij =  piTij consist
of the mill price pi and trade costs Tij > 1 between the two locations. These trade costs
take the "iceberg" form, i.e. for every unit shipped only 1 /T^  units arrive while the rest
melts during transport (Tij =  1 thus corresponds to free trade). Finally, Yj is aggregate
income in location j .  Solving the optimisation problem, I obtain demand facing a firm in
i from location,):
( R  1— \ x/ ±~ uX)n==i nnPnj a J and rewrit­
ing consumption expenditure yields xf?™3 =  p^aP j~ 1Ej where Ej =  Yj is total expen­
8 The full model contains an agricultural sector producing the freely traded numeraire good. It also endo- 
geneously determines expenditure levels and the location of manufacturing firms both of which will be taken 
as exogenous here. See Fuijita et al. (1999), chapter 14, for details.
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diture in location j .  However, in order for xc™s units to arrive, T i j X units must be 
shipped. Thus effective demand facing a firm in i from j  is:
=  T ijpgP f-'E j = p r T ^ P f - ' E j  (2.1)
Turning to the supply side, firms maximise the following profit function with respect to 
prices:
R
Vi =  5 > *  -  wfz. f  Ci[F +  Xi] 
j =l
where w  is the wage rate (or more generally the price of the immobile factors of produc­
tion of which labour is the most important one) and 2  the price of other (mobile) factors 
of production. F  are fixed costs, c* the unit input requirement, and Xi is total production 
of a firm in i. Profit maximisation leads to prices being set at a markup cr/(cr — 1) over 
marginal costs. At this price, profits will be tt* =  ^  (xi — (a — 1 )F). Free entry assures 
that long-run profits will be zero, implying X i  =  x =  (a —  1)F. Inserting this result into 
the total demand facing a firm in location i (equation 2.1 summed over all locations j ), I 
obtain:
R
p t x ^ j 2 Ti f ’ p i ~ l E i  <2 -2 )
j = 1
From this market clearing condition, I can solve for prices pi and use them in equation 
(2.1) and the equation for the price index Pj to derive a gravity-type specification. In 
analogy to Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), I obtain the following system of equa­
tions:
where E  stands for total world expenditure and, as before, Pj and Pi represent the price 
indices of importer j  and exporter i, respectively. Summing over all products produced 
in location i, I obtain the value of total exports from i to j  as:
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E i Ej f T i j y- 7 
THPiXij =  ^ - { - ^ p . )  (2-3)
where Ei =  riiPiX since in this one-sector economy and under the assumption of bal­
anced trade, total expenditure in location i must equal the value of total production there. 
In analogy to Redding and Venables (2004), I call the above equation the "trade equation" 
which will serve as the basis for the gravity equation estimated in section 2.3.
Returning to the market clearing condition (2.2), I insert the profit maximising 
price to obtain:
=f:nr ir 1^
j= i
This expression can be transformed to give the maximum remuneration firms can 
afford to pay the factors of production. Focusing on the immobile factors, I derive what 
Redding and Venables (2004) call the "wage equation":
Wi =  A(M A i)«° aci aj  (2.4)
where A =  x ~ ^  (^rr)~“ subsumes the equation’s constant terms and:
R
M Ai =  J 2  T ^ P j - ' E j  (2.5)
3=1
The terms PJ~l Ej within the summation capture the market capacity of a location j ,  i.e. 
local expenditure Ej adjusted for a "market crowding" effect P J 1- Intuitively, a larger 
number of competitors and thus a lower value of PJ~X will reduce the attractiveness 
of market j  for any firm exporting there. The term M Ai stands for "market access" 
and is a trade cost weighted sum of the market capacities of all regions. It summarises 
how well a location is endowed with access to markets for the products it produces. As 
explained in the introduction of this chapter, firms in locations with higher market access 
incur less overall trade costs and are able to pay higher wages. Note that trade costs 
are defined in a very broad sense here. They include physical transport costs incurred 
during shipment, costs of long-distance communication as well as man-made restrictions 
to trade flows such as tariffs and non-tariff barriers. Thus, while a location’s level of
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remoteness can to some extent be altered through trade liberalization or infrastructure 
projects, other aspects such as a peripheral geographic position are beyond the scope of 
policy intervention.
Note that in this model, the location of firms and demand (n and E) is taken to be 
exogenously given. I thus focus on factor price responses to market access rather than on 
changes in production or employment structure. Indeed, Head and Mayer (2006) com­
pare the two adjustment mechanisms and conclude that wage responses are the dominant 
channel in their sample of EU regions.
2.2.2 Econometric Specifications
The two key relationships that will figure centrally in the rest of this chapter are equations
2.3 and 2.4. Equation 2.3, the "trade equation", can be rewritten as:
Taking logs, I obtain the basis of the econometric specification used in the estima­
tion in section 2.3:
where world expenditure E  is subsumed in the constant. The left hand side will 
be proxied by the value of exports from location i to location j  divided by the product 
of GDPi and GDPj (which serve as proxies for expenditures, E{ and E j).9 Since the 
price indices are not observable, I proxy them with dummy variables for exporters and 
importers. Trade costs Tij will be assumed to depend on bilateral distances and a series 
of dummy variables indicating whether trading partners share a common language or are 
situated in the same country (see section 2.3 for details).
9 Dividing the value of exports by EiEj  implicitly imposes that the coefficients on exporter and importer 
expenditure levels (in logs) are equal to one. This restriction is directly implied by theory and is necessary in 
order to separately identify the effect of price indices and expenditure levels on trade flows. Getting separate 
identification in turn is needed for the calculation of regional market access further below (see section 2.4.1).
TliPi%ij
TLiPiXij
=  a  +  ( l - o )  ln(Ti:,) -  ln(i^1-tr) -  ln (P /-<7) +  etj (2.6)
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Estimation of the trade equation will yield estimates for P j~ a and 7^_cr. These 
in turn can be used to calculate market access according to formula (2.5) from the last 
section, where again expenditure E j  will be proxied by national or regional GDPs (see 
section 2.4.1 for details).
After having obtained estimates for M A i ,  I will estimate the second key equation 
of this chapter, the wage equation (2.4). This equation relates wages to market access. 
Again, by taking logs I get the specification which will be used in section 2.4.2:
ln ^ i)  =  a  +  @1 In {MAi)  +  £i (2.7)
The error term Ei captures both the price of the mobile factor of production (z^ as well as 
unit cost requirements (c*). As Redding and Venables (2004) point out, factor mobility 
should equalise Zi across locations which means that it will be captured by the regres­
sion’s constant. A similar argument is unlikely to hold for unit cost requirements and the 
variables affecting them. To the extent that such variables are correlated with market ac­
cess, this will generate endogeneity problems which I will try to address in a number of 
ways in section 2.4.3.
2.3 Estimation of Trade Equation
In this section, I will estimate the trade equation just derived. The idea is to use the 
information contained in trade flows to get estimates for price indices and bilateral trade 
costs. The obvious problem this approach encounters is that there are virtually no data 
on trade flows at a regional level for the European Union. To circumvent this problem, 
the assumption needs to be made that interregional trade flows are governed by similar 
underlying forces as international ones.10 That is, it is assumed that estimates obtained 
from a gravity equation on an international level can be used with regional data on GDP 
and bilateral distances to calculate market access measures. To make this assumption 
more plausible, a number of adjustments have been made.
10 Studies that estimate gravity equations on trade flows within countries do indeed find a similarly good 
fit as studies on international trade flows and the coefficients on distance are of the same magnitude. See for 
example Combes et al. (2005) for France.
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First, only data on exports within the EU15 and from the EU15 to the rest of the 
world (ROW) have been included in the estimation. This captures the idea that the forces 
governing trade flows (and thus market access) may be of different forms in different 
parts of the world, especially when opposing trade between industrialised and developing 
countries. For example, Debaere (2002) finds that gravity type equations are much less 
suited for explaining trade between developing countries. I focus on exports only since 
this is what is implied by the theory of section 2.2: what matters for the market access of 
location i is how costly it is to export goods to any other location j ,  i.e. T{j and not
Second, numerous studies on the estimation of gravity equations have shown that 
trade costs depend on more factors than just bilateral distance. Particularly important 
in the present context is the finding that trade between regions of the same country is 
usually a multiple of trade between regions with similar bilateral characteristics but in 
different countries (McCallum, 1995; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Evans, 2003). 
To capture this effect, I will include a set of country-specific dummy variables indicating 
whether trade flows of a certain exporter cross a national border. For example, the dummy 
border Austria will take the value one if trade flows involving Austria as the exporter 
cross a national border. Since sharing a common language also proved to be an important 
determinant of EU trade flows, I further introduce a binary indicator for whether exporter 
and importer have an official language in common.11
Finally, another point raised in the existing literature is that the use of capital-to- 
capital distances between neighbouring countries usually overmeasures the true distance 
relevant for trade flows (Head and Mayer, 2002). To address this problem, I use adjusted 
distances calculated as the population-weighted sum of bilateral distances between the 
main cities of the trading partners. That is, the distance between two countries i and j  is 
given by distij =  Ylmei Unej (poPm /pw) (popn/popj) distmn where popm and popn 
denote the populations of agglomerations m  and n in countries i and j ,  respectively, and 
distmn is the great circle distance between m  and n. The same technique is also used to 
calculate the internal distances needed for the estimation of national border effects.
11 I also experimented with other bilateral indicators often used in gravity equations such as contiguity, 
colonial ties etc. However, these variables were either insignificant, showed too little variation in the sample 
used here (e.g. Austria is the only land-locked country among the EU15) or their use for the calculation of 
regional market access levels was problematic (for example, should regions in the same country be classified 
as having a former colonial relationship or not?).
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I now turn to the derivation of the full econometric specification. Following the 
above discussion, I assume that bilateral trade costs between any two countries i and j
expression, border and language are the dummies discussed above and to /32 are 
the elasticities of trade cost with respect to its different components. To take up the ear­
lier example, for exports from Austria to Germany we would have border Austria =  1> 
borderQermany =  0, and languageij =  1. Inserting the above expression for T{j into 
equation (2 .6 ) and introducing a time dimension then yields my econometric specifica­
tion:
where 7 t =  (1  — cr) P t , X ijt denotes the value of exports from i to j  in period t, and 
Eu and Ejt are the trading partners’ GDPs. The coefficients on the included exporter 
and importer dummies will be used to obtain estimates for price indices in accordance 
with equation (2.6). Note that I allow all coefficients to vary over time and do not impose 
a common border effect across countries. This reflects the substantial variation in the 
magnitude of border effects across the EU revealed by the data - which in turn will 
influence the calculation of regional market access below.
Data on manufacturing exports are taken from the NBER World Trade Database 
(Feenstra et al., 1997; Feenstra, 2000), GDP data from the World Development Indicators 
2001. The number of countries present in both data sets is 148. The sample had to 
be reduced further due to missing GDP data, leaving 111 countries. Data on adjusted 
bilateral distances and common languages are taken from CEPII’s distance database. 
Finally, the dummy variable approach used to estimate national border effects requires 
data on aggregate intra-national trade which are not directly available. Following Wei 
(1996), I calculate exports of a nation to itself as domestic production minus exports. 
Appendix 2. A provides more information on the construction and sources of all variables 
as well as a list of the countries used in the estimation of the trade equation.
are given by Tij — distij x (n.ieEUi5 exp (border^ 1^  x exp {la n g u a g e^ 2. In this 
at +  7 it In (d istij) +  ^  7 2 itborderi +  7 ^languageij (2 .8 )
i
+5iitexporterit -I- S2 jtim porterjt +  £ijt
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Period
Regressor 1975-79 1980-1985 1986-1991 1992-1997
Distance
-0.952 -0.820 -0.706 -0.595
(5.63)“ (4.96)** (4.96?* (5.08)**
Common language 1.307
(10.99?*
1.378 1.230 
(10.55)** (11.73?*
1.334
(12.82)**
National border effects
- Average coefficient -1.84 -1.69 -1.66 -1.41
- Average of im plied trade reductions -72% -70% -71% -65%
Exporter and Importer Fixed Effect Y es
Observations 35714
R-squared 0.98
Notes: Table displays -coefficients and t-statistics for OLS (based on standard errors clustered 
on exporter-importer pairs). The dependent variable is the log of normalised exports (the value of 
exports divided by the product of exporter and importer GDPs). Regressors are distance and bin­
ary indicators for common language and national border effects. The regression also includes time, 
exporter and importer fixed effects. All regressors have been interacted with time fixed effects, yiel­
ding the period-specific coefficients displayed. “Average coefficient” is the arithmetic mean of the 
border effect coefficients for a given period. “Average of implied trade reductions” is the arithmetic 
mean of the implied trade reduction, i.e. 1 — ~^'ie£[a5 e*?Sborder' ) (note that Belgium and Luxem­
bourg are grouped as one country for the trade data used here). For data sources see text and appen­
dix 2.A. * and ** signify statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels.
Table 2.1: Results for Estimation of Trade Equation
I estimate specification (2.8) on yearly data for 1975-1997. In order to make obser­
vations comparable over time, all data are expressed in 1995 ECU. I also impose constant 
coefficients across four five to six-year periods (1975-1979, 1980-1985, 1986-1991 and 
1992-1997) to smooth variations introduced by short-run fluctuations in trade flows and 
GDR Table 2.1 presents the corresponding results for OLS pooled across these four peri­
ods. Given that there is a small percentage of zero trade flows in the sample (about 2%), 
I also estimated a Tobit regression but the results were virtually identical to OLS.
As shown in table 2.1, sharing a common language has a strong positive impact 
on EU trade flows. On the other hand, distance and national borders have the expected 
trade-reducing effect, although their impact seems to decrease with time. In 1975-1979, 
crossing a national border in the EU reduced trade by on average 72%, with the same
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effect having declined to 65% in 1992-1997.12 Similarly, the coefficient on distance has 
come down to -0.60 from an initial -0.95.
Falling border effects certainly seem plausible given the increasing economic inte­
gration across the EU over the period under study. The result on the declining importance 
of distance, however, is somewhat unusual in the light of existing studies. These tend to 
find that the impact of distance on trade flows has if anything increased over the last 
decades (see Disdier and Head, 2005, for a recent survey article). The fact that my es­
timates do decrease in magnitude seems to be linked to the set of trading partners used 
here, rather than to the specific estimation method. Indeed, estimating specification (2.8) 
on trade flows between all 111 countries yields a slight increase in distance coefficients 
over time. One factor that might explain these differences is the continuous expansion of 
the share of EU exports to non-EU members found in the original sample. These exports 
are mostly ocean-based - in contrast to much of intra-EU trade - and distance generally 
has a lower impact on this type of trade (Disdier and Head, 2005; Hummels, 2001). Con­
sequently, falling distance coefficients might in part be due to a switch of transport modes 
over time.
2.4 Market Access and Regional Wages
2.4.1 Construction and Summary Statistics
Market access is constructed following equation (2.5) in section 2.2.1, using the results 
of the trade equation estimation. Thus, market access of a NUTS2 region is the trade 
cost and price index weighted sum of GDPs of all surrounding regions and countries, 
i.e. NUTS2 regions in the same country, NUTS2 regions in the rest of the EU15 and 
countries in the rest o f the world. I calculate the access measures separately for all four 
periods defined above (1975-79, 1980-85, 1986-91 and 1992-97). Again, taking five to
12 Also note that there is considerable heterogeneity across countries. For example, the trade reducing effect 
of national borders for the three countries who joined the EU in the 1980s (Greece, Spain and Portugal) is 
of the order of on average 90%. This contrasts with an average of only 39% for Belgium, Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands. While these figures are all very large such magnitudes are commonly found in gravity 
equations - this is the so-called "border puzzle" (see in particular Wei, 1996, who uses the same method to 
construct national trade flows as this chapter).
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six year average will smooth out short-run fluctuations. Formally, the market access of 
region i in period t  to all regions and countries j  is given by:
M Au  =  Y  (e ^ d is tln P ^ t- 1Ej t+  Y  (2.9)
jec tyi jeR O W
where -P^ - 1  and the parameters 7 lt, 7 and 7 3t were estimated in the trade equa­
tion and Ejt is again proxied by a region’s or country’s GDP in period t. Country GDP 
again comes from the World Development Indicators 2001. For regional GDP data, I use 
Cambridge Econometrics’ regional database which has Eurostat’s Regio as its main input 
but has been completed with data from national statistical offices. 13 To my knowledge, 
it is the most comprehensive data set available for regional European data at present (see 
appendix 2.A for a more detailed description). Distances between locations (distij) are 
great circle distances between main cities whenever j  is also an EU15-region. In case j  is 
a country outside the EU15,1 use adjusted distances as described above. Finally, internal 
distances of regions are needed for i =  j .  I calculate them as distu  =  0.66 x ( 2Z^ i ) 0 '5 
where area* is region i ’s area in km2. This formula has been frequently used in the exist­
ing literature and gives the average distance in a circular location under the assumption 
that production takes place in the center and consumers are spread evenly across space.
Note that equation (2.9) assumes that price indices are identical across regions 
within the same country. This is necessary since the trade equation yields only one 
estimate Pjt per period and country. Given the theoretical predictions of section 2.2, this 
is not entirely satisfactory but an inherent limitation of the usage of international trade 
flows for estimating regional characteristics.
As mentioned, the market access of an EU region consists of two parts, corre­
sponding to the two sums in the above equation: national market access (from regions in 
the same country) and rest-of-the-world market access. It is actually instructive to fur­
ther split up the latter part into EU market access (from regions in other EU countries), 
and extra-EU market access (from non-EU countries). Table 2.2 provides some informa­
tion on the average composition of market access and how it has changed over time. As
13 Cambridge Econometrics actually provides data on gross value added (which excludes value added taxes 
but includes subsidies linked to production) rather than GDP because GVA is more readily available. Also, 
Eurostat calculates regional GDP data on the basis of gross value added data, using approximations to dis­
tribute national tax income to regions (Eurostat 1995). Thus, GVA is the more direct indicator of regional 
economic activity.
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1975-1979 1980-1985 1986-1991 1992-1997
Average fraction Dlf 
MA derived from 
own country
75% 70% 67% 61%
Average fraction of 
MA derived from 
EU15
19% 22% 25% 28%
Average fraction of 
MA derived from rest 
of world
6% 7% 8% 10%
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics on Market Access
seen, national market access is still the dominant part of overall access though its impor­
tance has steadily declined over the past two decades. This is in part due to the declining 
importance of distance over the sample period. In addition, there has also been a de­
crease in the relative trade costs of intranational and international trade, as reflected in 
the declining magnitude of border effects in the trade equation.
Figure 2.2 graphs market access relative to Luxembourg as a function of distance 
from that region which is the approximate geographic centre of the EU15. This is done 
separately for the four periods under study. As is apparent from the four panels of the 
figure, peripheral EU regions score considerably lower on the access measure in all years. 
In addition, regions in countries with small home markets and a large home bias in trade 
tend to suffer from a further access penalty (like Greece, Portugal or - more surprisingly 
- Austria). What also shows up in the graphs is that the spread between central and 
peripheral regions has shrunk over the two decades studied here. This is again due to the 
decreasing importance of distance and national borders in international trade which has 
disproportionately benefited the smaller peripheral markets of the EU.
2.4.2 Wage Equation - Baseline Specification
I now proceed to the estimation of the wage equation. The baseline specification is the 
one derived in section 2.2.2 (equation 2.7). I proxy wages (the price of the immobile fac­
tor) by gross value added per head of the working population (lcGVA, measured in 1995
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Figure 2.2: Relative Market Access and Distance from Luxembourg (1975-1997)
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ECU), again obtained from the Cambridge Econometrics regional database.14 Introduc­
ing a time dimension into the estimation equation then yields the following specification:
In( I c G V A i t )  =  a t  +  f a  In( M A i t ) +  e it (2.10)
Table 2.3 reports the results for this baseline specification estimated by OLS for the 
sample pooled across all four periods (also visualised in figure 2.3 for the period 1992- 
97). Since M A a  is a generated regressor, I also report bootstrapped standard errors in 
squared brackets below the OLS estimates.15 Column 1 displays an average coefficient 
on M A u  while column 2 allows the coefficient to vary by period. Market access is both 
statistically and economically highly significant. On average, doubling access increases
14 Gross value added (GVA) equals GDP minus value added taxes plus subsidies linked to production 
(compare footnote 13). Proxying wages in this way will be inoccuous as long as labour’s share in GVA does 
not vary across locations or at least not in a way systematically related to market access.
15 Bootstrapped standard errors are obtained via separate resampling from the set o f  countries used in the 
trade equation and from my 193 NUTS2 regions. The two resulting samples are then used to calculate my 
market access measure in the way described in the main text. All standard errors reported in this chapter are 
based on 200 replications o f  this procedure.
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per capita GVA by approximately 25%. To give an example, moving a region from 
the 5% percentile to the 95% percentile (e.g. letting the Portuguese region of Algarve 
take on the geographic location of the German city of Cologne) would increase its per 
capita GVA by about 70%. Depending on the time period under study, market access 
explains 30-40% of income variations across the 193 EU15 NUTS2 regions used in the 
estimation. 16 Looking across periods, there is no clear trend in the importance of access 
to markets. While access seems to become more important during the 1980s, the 1990s 
show a slight reversal.
For comparison, table 2.3 also reports results for two more ad-hoc measures of 
market access often used in the geography and in the earlier economics literature. The 
first is the so-called Harris market potential (Harris, 1954) which simply uses bilateral 
distances to weight surrounding locations’ GDP:
The second is a somewhat more sophisticated version of Harris’ market potential, 
using road travel times for lorries as weights instead of great circle distances:
Data availability on travel times restricts estimation using these alternative access 
measures to the 1990s and to the area of the EU15. Results are shown in columns 3 
and 4 of table 2.3. In order to facilitate a comparison of magnitudes, I also report the 
effect of a one-standard-deviation change in the respective market potential next to the 
original coefficients. Column 5 in turn shows comparable estimates for my market access 
measure, i.e. using market access for the EU15 and for 1992-1997 only.
16 These figures are obtained from period-by-period regressions (not shown). The estimation for 1992-97 
has an R 2 of 40% and a coefficient on market access of0.262 (see table 2.7, column 1 where this specification 
is estimated). This compares to an R 2 of 55% and a coefficient on market access of 0.51 found by Redding 
and Venables (2004) in (their specification most comparable to mine (the one in table 2, column 3). With 
an assumed labour share of a  = 0.6, the implied elasticity of substitution a  is 6.36 in my specification 
(compare equations 3 and 6  to see that =  ^ ) .  The corresponding figure in Redding and Venables is 
a  =  3.33 which seems reasonable given the presumably higher substitutability of goods produced in the EU 
as compared to goods produced worldwide.
arris,i
“  t r a v e l t i m e ,
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Regressors i(1)ln(cGVA) (2) In(cGVA) (3)ln(cGVA) (4) ln(cGVA) (5) In(cGVA)
IMA 0.253
(10.04)**
[9.72]**
IMA75 0.239
(8.57)**
[7.65]**
IMABO 0.235
(8.18)**
[7.87]**
IMA86 0.277
(11.04)**
[10.87]**
IMA92 0.262
(10.99)**
[10.61]**
IMP_H arris 0.455 {0.198} 
(9.62 y*
IMPJraveltimes 0.436 {0.244} 
(9.86)**
IMA92 0265  {0.241} 
(10.84)** 
[10.52]**
Period dimmies? Yes Yes No No No
Tim e  P eriod 1975-97 1975-97 1992-97 1992-97 1992-97
Observations 772 772 193 193 193
R-squared 0.39 0.40 0.42 0.41 0.40
Notes: Table displays coefficients for OLS estimations, t-statistics in round brackets are based on standard 
errors clustered on NUTS2 regions for columns 1-2 and on Huber-White robust standard errors in 
columns 3-5. t-statistics in squared brackets are based on bootstrapped standard errors (200 replica­
tions). The dependent variable is the log of a region’s gross value added per head of the working 
population (in 1995 ECU). IMA is the log of market access, and lMP_Harris and lMP_traveltimes are 
distance and travel time-based measures of market potential (see text for details of calculation of all 
three measures). Coefficients in swift brackets in column 3-5 are the original coefficients multiplied 
by a one-standard-deviation change in the respective regressor. For data sources see text and appen­
dix 2.A. * and ** signify statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels. Results on the included time 
dummies and constant are suppressed.
Table 2.3: Baseline Results
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Figure 2.3: GVA per Head o f Working Population and Market Access (1992-1997)
M arket a c c e s s  (logs)
Looking across the standardised coefficients in columns 3-5 reveals that the three 
measures yield qualitatively as well as quantitatively similar results. According to the re­
ported R2s they also explain an equal proportion of income variations in the EU15. Note 
however that the theory-based measure derived in this chapter allows a more detailed de­
composition of the determinants of market access into the size and proximity of foreign 
markets, magnitudes of trade impeding border effects, price index variations etc. This in 
turn should be useful in drawing policy implications, to give but one example, since the 
various determinants of market access are likely to be influenced in different ways by a 
given policy intervention.
2.4.3 Robustness Checks
There are a number of concerns with the baseline specification (2.10). These follow 
from the fact that the market access measure is in principal nothing else but a trade cost 
weighted sum of the GDP of surrounding locations (corrected for price index variations). 
Most obviously, M A lt  also includes G D P lt which in turn is increasing in per capita
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Regressor (1) In(cGVA) (2) ln(cGVA) (3) In(cGVA) (4) In(cGVA)
IMA 0.253 0.270 0.129
[9.44]** [7.89]** [2.98]**
IMA7597 0.143
[2.68]**
Time dummies? Yes Yes Yes No
Country dummies? No Yes No No
Region dummies? No No Yes No
Observations 579 772 772 193
R-squared 0.39 0.79 0.97 0.08
Notes: Table displays OLS coefficients and t-statistics based on bootstrapped standard errors (200 replica­
tions). The dependent variable is the log of a region’s gross value added per head of the working popula­
tion (in 1995 ECU). IMA is the log of market access (see text for details of calculation; column 1 uses IMA 
lagged by one period). 1MA7597 is the log-difference in MA taken from 1975-79 to 1992-97. For data sour­
ces see appendix 2.A. * and ** signify statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels. Results on the inclu­
ded constant and on time, country and region dummies are suppressed, suppressed.
Table 2.4: Robustness Checks (Lagged Values, Fixed Effects, First Differences)
income, as captured by cGVAn, the dependent variable. 17 In addition, shocks to cGVAn 
as captured by Eu are likely to be correlated across regions which raises the possibility 
that eu is also correlated with other components of MAn.
I proceed in several steps to address these concerns. First, column 1 of table 2.4 
uses values of M An  lagged by one period, thus avoiding problems arising from shocks 
linked to spatially correlated but intertemporally uncorrelated omitted variables (e.g. na­
tionwide strikes). As shown, results are basically identical to the baseline specification.
Taking longer time-lags would help reducing problems from shocks that are to 
some extent correlated across time. However, there are a number of factors too persistent 
over the time period in question as to be eliminated by such an approach. Examples are 
variables like institutional quality or climatic or other amenities of a region - which are 
also likely to be correlated across space. To the extent that these additional determinants 
of per capita income are similar across regions within a country, they can be controlled
17 One way to control for this would be to calculate market access excluding own region access. However, 
this would introduce measurement error by considerably reducing die access measure of some of the eco­
nomically larger locations (like London or Paris). Since own-access is only part of the general endogeneity 
problems related to market access, I choose to keep it and use other ways to control for the arising com­
plications. Indeed, reestimating the baseline specification while excluding own region market access only 
slightly lowers the coefficient on M A a  from 0.25 to 0.22. Similarly small changes occur across the re­
maining specifications when excluding own region access but qualitative results are unaffected in all cases 
(estimates available from the author upon request).
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for by country fixed effects. Column 2 reports the corresponding results which are again 
very similar to the initial OLS estimates.
Of course, local amenities might vary across regions as well as countries and sim­
ilar arguments have been made for institutional quality and its effects (e.g. Tabellini, 
2005). I thus take advantage of the panel character of my data and introduce regional 
fixed effects. As expected, the coefficient of market access drops markedly but still stays 
both statistically and economically significant (column 3). As a related check, column 4 
shows results of a regression in first differences which are very similar to the fixed effects 
ones. As mentioned in the introduction, low market access affects income levels through 
at least two channels: lower net export revenues due to increased trade costs and disin­
centives for the accumulation of human capital (Redding and Schott, 2004). Since this 
second channel is probably of a more long run nature, only one long difference is taken 
(from 1975-1979 to 1992-1997).
Fixed effects and first differences eliminate or significantly reduce problems aris­
ing from heterogeneity of regions as long as the omitted factors show none or little varia­
tion over the period under study - which can be reasonably assumed for e.g. local climatic 
conditions or institutional quality. They cannot, however, control for the possibility that 
regional income increases are caused by changes in other variables which happen to be 
positively correlated with market access growth. If these changes take place over long 
enough horizons, the initial strategy of using lagged regressors will also fail. The most 
important examples for such variables are probably human and physical capital. Unfor­
tunately, data on these variables are not available for long enough periods to include them 
in the panel specifications estimated here. One way forward would be to restrict estima­
tion to a cross-section and investigate changes in the coefficient on market access after 
inclusion of the above control variables. The next section will indeed proceed in this 
way, although in the light of slightly different considerations. As I will argue there, in­
terpreting such an exercise is not straightforward since human and physical capital levels 
of regions are likely to be endogenous to market access.
Here, I focus instead on isolating variations in market access that can be assumed 
to be exogenous to the different kinds of shocks discussed so far. Geographic variables 
seem to be the most promising candidates for such an instrumental variables estimation.
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Regressor (1)IMA (2)ln(cGVA) (3)IMA
(4)
ln(cGVA) (5) IMA
(6)
ln(cGVA)
IMA
In(distlu) 
ln(totareakm 2) 
In(avgdist) 
In(avgtravel)
-0.905
(12.60)**
0.221
(4.30)**
0.309 
(10.78)** 
[7.1 5]**
-8.633
(13.47)**
0.275
(8.03)**
[7.08]**
-2.484
(27.21)**
0.294
(10.81?*
[6.85]**
F-Stat (and p-value)based 79.45 181.39 740.54
on excluded instruments (0.00)** (0.00)** (o.ooy*
Hansen J statistic, p-value 0.47 Exactly Exactlyidentified identified
Observations 193 193 193 193 193 193
R^squared 0.66 0.39 0.64 0.40 0.77 0.39
Notes: Table displays coefficients and t-statistics for IV estimation based on Huber-White robust stan­
dard errors (round brackets) and bootstrapped standard errors (200 replications, squared brackets). The 
dependent variable in columns 2,4 and 6 is the log of a region’s gross value added per head of the wor­
king population (in 1995 ECU). The independent variable in these columns is the log of market access 
(IMA, see text for details of calculation). Instruments for IMA used are distance to Luxembourg (in km) 
and area size of a region’s home country in km2 (column 2), average distance to other regions and coun­
tries in km (column 4), and average lorry travel times to other regions in minutes (column 6). Columns 1, 
3 and 5 display the corresponding first-stage results. For data sources see appendix 2.A. * and ** signify 
statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels. Results on the included constant are suppressed.
Table 2.5: Robustness Checks (IVE, 1992-1997)
Similar to Redding and Venables (2004), I use distance to Luxembourg as my first in­
strument which captures the market access advantage of locations close to the geographic 
centre of the EU. My second instrument is the size of a region’s home country (in km2), 
capturing the advantage conferred to large national markets by the trade-reducing effects 
of national borders. Columns 1-2 of table 2.5 report results for the corresponding IV es­
timation. Both distance from Luxembourg and area are significant in the first stage, have 
the expected sign and explain 6 6 % of the variation in regional market access (column 1). 
Turning to the second stage results (column 2), market access retains its significance and 
its coefficient is again of similar magnitude as in the initial specifications.
One could object to the above choice of instruments on several grounds. First, 
Luxembourg is a centroid of regional income’s distribution within the EU and distance 
to it might capture other determinants of per capita income besides market access. Like­
wise, the size of a region’s home country could be inversely correlated with the density
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of regional economic activity. Although a test of the model’s overidentifying restrictions 
cannot reject the exogeneity of these variables, I thus use two alternative instruments. 
The first is average distance to all other regions and countries, the second average lorry 
travel times to all other regions (no travel times are available to countries in the rest of the 
world). This second instrument arguably shows a more direct link to the channel mod­
elled in the theoretical section of this chapter - which stresses trade cost savings of more 
central or better linked regions. In practice, both approaches yield similar results which 
are very close to the first IV regression as well as to the original OLS estimates.
Before moving on, let me point out that the results presented so far also shed some 
light on the influence of economic integration on regional income differences. As men­
tioned before, market access of peripheral EU regions has improved over the last decades 
relative to that of central locations. While it is hard to draw any general conclusions in 
the absence of a suitable control group, the fact that this catching-up was mainly due to 
declines in the importance of distance and national borders is at least suggestive of a posi­
tive impact of European integration on market access of peripheral regions. Thus, finding 
significantly positive coefficients on my market access measure across a wide range of 
specifications provides some support for the hypothesis that the integration process has 
benefited peripheral regions economically.
2.5 Disentangling Channels of Influence
The preceding sections showed some variability in the estimated coefficient on market 
access but it always retained both economic and statistical significance. In the light of 
these results, it seems likely that access to sources of demand is indeed an important 
factor in shaping the regional income structure in the EU.
An important question remains however. Recall from the introductory remarks 
of this chapter that at least two channels have been proposed through which market ac­
cess might influence per capita income. Besides the direct trade cost savings that accrue 
to central locations, high market access also provides more long-run incentives for hu­
man capital accumulation by increasing the premium for skilled labour. As Redding and 
Schott (2004) argue, this will be the case if intermediate and trade cost intensive goods
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Figure 2.4: Market Access, Capital Stocks and Educational Attainment (1992-1997)
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are also relatively intensive in that production factor. Since it seems reasonable a pri­
ori that similar conditions hold for capital intensive goods, centrality might also have a 
positive impact on physical capital accumulation.
Indeed, stocks of human and physical capital are highly correlated with market 
access in the EU regions under study here, at least for the period for which data are 
available (1992-1997). The first three panels of figure 2.4 plot the share of the labour 
force with high, intermediate and low levels of education against market access while the 
fourth panel does the same for physical capital stocks (see appendix 2.A for details on the 
construction of these variables). As is already apparent in the figures and confirmed in 
the regression results reported in table 2.6, market access shows a significantly positive 
correlation with physical capital stocks and high and intermediate levels of education.18 
Although naturally there are a large number of alternative determinants of human and
18 Lopez-Rodriguez et al. (2005) report qualitatively similar results for the correlation between educational 
attainment and an adhoc measure o f market access (a distance-weighted sum o f surrounding locations’ pop­
ulation).
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Regressor (l)ln(capstock) (2) highed (3) meded (4) lowed
IMA 0.208 3.178 7.755 -10.938
[6.45]** [7.02]** [7.57]** [10.03]**
Observations 193 193 193 193
R-squared 0.20 0.18 0.20 0.30
Notes: Table displays OLS coefficients and t-statistics based on bootstrapped standard errors (200 replica­
tions). The dependent variables are the log of a region’s capital stock (column 1) and the share (in % points) 
of the working population with high, intermediate and low levels of education (columns 2,3, and 4, respecti­
vely). For data sources ;see text and appendix 2.A. * and ** signify statistical significance at the 5% and 1% 
levels. Results on the included constant are suppressed.
Table 2.6: Market Access and Human and Physical Capital (1992-1997)
physical capital accumulation, this finding is at least supportive of a potential long-run 
impact of market access.
While a more detailed investigation of the role of market access in human and 
physical capital formation is beyond the scope of this chapter, I will try to answer a re­
lated question. Assuming that an important part of the advantages of centrality works 
through accumulation incentives, what is the importance of the direct trade cost advan­
tage central to the theoretical part of this chapter? A straightforward way of testing this 
is by including physical and human capital as additional regressors in the baseline spec­
ification estimated earlier. Table 2.7 shows the corresponding results. It seems that the 
direct influence of market access is much smaller than indicated by the earlier results 
(reproduced in column 1 for the period 1992-1997). The inclusion of both human and 
physical capital measures lowers its coefficient considerably while raising the R 2 of the 
regression to 69% and 80%, respectively. When both measures are included simultane­
ously, the coefficient on market access drops to 0.083, just about a third of the initially 
estimated effect. Still, it is highly statistically significant and remains economically im­
portant. 19 The sign and magnitude of the other coefficients also seem plausible. Doubling 
the capital stock of a region increases GVA per capita by about 50% while raising the 
share of the workforce with high or intermediate education by one percentage point leads 
to an increase of 0.8% and 0.7%, respectively.
19 To take up the earlier example, moving a region from the 95% percentile to the 5% percentile of market 
access in 1992-1997 (e.g. letting the Algarve enjoy the same level of centrality as Cologne) would still raise 
its per capita income by over 20%.
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Regressor (l)ln(cGVA) (2)ln(cGVA) (3) In(oGVA) (4) In(cGVA) (5)ln(cGVA)
IMA 0.262 0.120 0.130 0.083 0.067
[11.61]** [5.20]** [8.71 ]** [6.07]** [4.70]**
highed 0.011 0.008 0.007
[4.11]** [5.13]** [4.21]**
meded 0.014 0.007 0.007
[11.70]** [4.21]** [4.17]**
lcapstock 0.635 0.489 0.490
[9.76]** [7.52]** [7.46]“
ldens 0.021
[1.49]
Observations 193 193 193 193 193
R ^ squared 0.40 0.69 0.80 0.86 0.86
Notes: Table displays coefficients and t-statistics based on bootstrapped standard errors (200 replications). 
The dependent variable is the log of a region’s gross value added per head of the working population (in 
1995 ECU). IMA is the log of market access (see text for details of calculation), lcapstock is the log of a 
region’s per capita capital stock, highed and meded are the share (in % points) of the working population 
with high and intermediate levels of education and ldens is the working population per square kilometre of 
a region (in logs, instrumented with the region’s area in km2). For data sources see text and appendix 2.A. 
* and ** signify statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels. Results on the included constant are sup­
pressed.
Table 2.7: Disentangling Channels of Influence (1992-1997)
A third determinant of per capita income whose influence might potentially be 
picked up by market access measures are density effects. This is because locations with 
high own-region access are mostly cities and are as such densely populated. I thus in­
clude the local density of employment as an additional regressor (see appendix 2 .A for 
details of construction). Indeed, Ciccone (2002) shows for five European countries that 
higher density leads to an increase in productivity which is likely to imply higher per 
capita incomes as well. Following his approach, I instrument density by area size to con­
trol for the endogeneity arising from the fact that high density might be a consequence, 
not a cause of high productivity.20 Column 5 of table 6  shows that doubling density 
increases per capita GVA by 2.1% though the estimated coefficient is insignificantly dif­
ferent from zero. The coefficient on market access drops a bit further but continues to 
stay significant.21
20 As Ciccone notes, area is a good instrument because the original subdivision of the countries under study 
into administrative regions was done for purposes of taxation, making equalisation of local populations a 
sensible demarcation criterion.
21 Dropping market access from the regression yields a coefficient o f0.035 on density which now is signif­
icant at the 5% level. This magnitude is roughly comparable to what Ciccone (2002) finds for productivity.
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2.6 Summary
Regional per capita income levels in the European Union show large differences and a 
strong centre-periphay structure. This chapter asked the question to what extent access 
to product markets could explain these patterns. To this end, I constructed and estimated 
a New Economic Geography model on data for 193 EU regions in 1975-1997 and found 
strong empirical support for a positive impact of market access. However, its main bene­
fits seem to come from increased incentives for physical and human capital accumulation 
and not through direct trade cost savings.
These findings and the particular approach used in this chapter contribute to the 
existing research in several ways. First, by using insights from the New Economic 
Geography (NEG) literature, they provide a new and empirically relevant explanation 
for regional income patterns in the European Union. They also improve on existing a- 
geographic approaches like traditional growth theory by being able to explain the particu­
lar core-periphery structure we observe in the EU. Secondly, this chapter also contributed 
to existing empirical NEG research by applying Redding and Venables’ (2004) frame­
work to a new kind of data - using a large panel of regions rather than a cross-section of 
countries. Finally, I took a first step towards disentangling the different channels through 
which centrality in the sense of good access to product markets influences income levels. 
Interestingly, the direct channel working through trade cost savings for more central re­
gions seems to be only a rather small part of the overall impact of centrality - at least in 
the relatively well integrated markets of the European Union analysed here.
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2.A Data Appendix to Chapter 2 
International Data
Manufacturing trade flows are in current USD are from the NBER World Trade Database 
(Feenstra et al., 1997; Feenstra, 2000).
Internal manufacturing trade flows are in current USD and are calculated as the differ­
ence between domestic manufacturing sector production minus exports. Production data 
are from STAN 98, for Luxembourg and Ireland from UNIDO 2001.
Country GDPs are in current USD from the World Development Indicators 2001.
Data were converted to 1995 ECU by first using the base-year ECU-USD exchange rate 
from the IMF Financial Statistics and then applying the ECU-deflator (calculated by Eu­
rostat as current ECU value series divided by constant 1995 series for the EU12).
Adjusted distances are calculated as described in section 2.3 and were taken from CEPII’s 
distance database which is also the source for data on common official languages.
EU12: Belgium, (West) Germany, Denmark, Spain, France, Greece, Luxembourg, Ire­
land, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom (note that the NBER World Trade 
Database groups Belgium and Luxembourg as one country, so for the estimation of the 
trade equation, the EU12 consists of only eleven member states).
EU15: EU12 plus Sweden, Finland and Austria.
Regional Data
Data on gross value added (GVA), working population and area for the 193 NUTS2 
regions included in this study are taken from Cambridge Econometrics’ regional database 
ERECO. Cambridge Econometrics uses Eurostat’s Regio database as its main source but 
complements it with national sources. GVA is measured in 1995 ECU, using sectoral 
deflators and 1995 exchange rates.
The main regional level used in the empirical analysis is NUTS2 (the underlying NUTS- 
classification is the one of 1999). However, the following adjustments had to be made:
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• The French Overseas Territories and Eastern Germany (including Berlin) have 
been excluded. This is due to data limitations, the geographical position of the 
regions (for the French regions) and structural reasons (the transition from a 
planned to a market economy in Eastern Germany is probably the main influence 
in the development of regional income structures in that area).
•  Denmark consists of three NUTS2 regions in the Cambridge Econometrics data 
set. This corresponds to an earlier NUTS-classification in use from 1985-1991.
•  Due to the lack of education data for the NUTS-classification from 1999, the 
existing NUTS 1995 data had to be converted to NUTS 1999 by hand. This 
was mostly uncomplicated as most regions simply changed codes. However, the 
following aggregations had to be made:
* UKI (London) was available only at NUTS1 since it was only one region 
under NUTS 1995.
* Cornwall and Devon had to be merged (region called UKK3) as it was only 
one region under NUTS 1995.
* Data for Wales and Scotland (UKM and UKN) are at a more aggregate 
(NUTS1) level as there were more complicated changes in the underlying 
NUTS2 level between NUTS 1995 and NUTS 1999.
Distances between regions are great circle distances in km between the main cities 
of the regions. Travel times between EU15 regions are from IRPUD (2000) which also 
provides further details on their construction.
Education data are from table H2 in Eurostat (1999), p.234ff. They state the percentage 
of the population aged 25-59 by three levels of education attainment: low (ISCED 2 and 
lower), medium (ISCED 3), and high (ISCED 5, 6, 7).
Capital stocks are derived from total investment expenditures (in 1995 ECU) taken from 
the Cambridge Econometrics regional database using the perpetual inventory method. 
Investment expenditure data starts in 1975 and I first calculate the initial capital stock 
for 1975 as .K1975 =  > where I1975 is investment expenditure in 1975, 6 is
the depreciation rate (set at 5% p.a.) and g is the geometric average of growth rates of
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investment expenditure from 1975-2000. With this initial capital stock, capital stocks for 
1976-1997 are then calculated as K t =  (1  — 8)Kt- 1  +  It, where K t is the capital stock at 
the end of period t  and It the investment during period t. Note that the initial capital stock 
is not particularly important in determining the capital stocks for 1992-1997 used in my 
regressions given the long time lag (for example, with 8 =  g =  0.05, a 10% increase in 
the 1975 capital stock raises the 1992 stock by less than 2%). The particular depreciation 
rate used here is similar in magnitude to rates estimated for the United States by Katz 
and Herman (1997) (their figures lie in the range 3-11%; also see Unel (2003) for a more 
detailed discussion). I also used depreciation rates of up to 10% but none of the results 
were affected qualitatively.
The density measure is calculated as active population by square kilometre. Population 
and area data are again from Cambridge Econometrics.
List of regions and countries:
Countries included in the trade equation and the calculation of market access
Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria , Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium (incl. Luxem­
bourg), Belize, Benin, Bermuda, Bolivia, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Bu­
rundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Congo (Republic), Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Cyprus, Denmark (includes Faeroe Is­
lands), Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, 
Gambia, Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, 
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia (includes 
Macau), Iran (Islamic Republic), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, 
Korea (Republic, South), Kuwait, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mau­
ritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, 
Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, 
Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swe­
den, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, 
Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay, 
Venezuela, Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo), Zambia, Zimbabwe.
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Codes and names of the 193 EU Nuts2 regions included in the analysis:
a tll (Burgenland), atl2 (Niederosterreich), atl3 (Wien), at21 (Kamten), at22 (Steier- 
mark), at31 (Oberosterreich), at32 (Salzburg), at33 (Tirol), at34 (Vorarlberg), bel (Bruxelles- 
Brussel), be21 (Antwerpen), be22 (Limburg), be23 (Oost-Vlaanderen), be24 (Vlaams 
Brabant), be25 (West-Vlaanderen), be31 (Brabant Wallon), be32 (Hainaut), be33 (Liege), 
be34 (Luxembourg), be35 (Namur), del 1 (Stuttgart), del2 (Karlsruhe), del3 (Freiburg), 
del4 (Tubingen), de21 (Oberbayem), de22 (Niederbayem), de23 (Oberpfalz), de24 (Ober- 
franken), de25 (Mittelfranken), de26 (Unterfranken), de27 (Schwaben), de5 (Bremen), 
de6  (Hamburg), de71 (Darmstadt), de72 (Giessen), de73 (Kassel), de91 (Braunschweig), 
de92 (Hannover), de93 (Luneburg), de94 (Weser-Ems), deal (Dusseldorf), dea2 (Koln), 
dea3 (Munster), dea4 (Detmold), dea5 (Amsberg), debl (Koblenz), deb2 (Trier), deb3 
(Rheinhessen-Pfalz), dec (Saarland), def (Schleswig-Holstein), dkOl (Hovedstadsreg.), 
dk02 (O. for Storebaelt), dk03 (V. for Storebaelt), e s ll  (Galicia), esl2 (Asturias), esl3 
(Cantabria), es21 (Pais Vasco), es22 (Navarra), es23 (Rioja), es24 (Aragon), es3 (Madrid), 
es41 (Castilla-Leon), es42 (Castilla-la Mancha), es43 (Extremadura), es51 (Cataluna), 
es52 (Com. Valenciana), es53 (Baleares), es61 (Andalucia), es62 (Murcia), es63 (Ceuta 
y Melilla), es7 (Canairias), fil3 (Ita-Suomi), fil4 (Vali-Suomi), fil5 (Pohjois-Suomi),fil6  
(Uusimaa), fil7 (Etela-Suomi), fi2 (Aland), frl (lie de France), fr21 (Champagne-Ard.), 
fr22 (Picardie), fr23 (Haute-Normandie), fir24 (Centre), fir25 (Basse-Normandie), fr26 
(Bourgogne), fr3 (Nord-Pas de Calais), fr41 (Lorraine), fr42 (Alsace), fr43 (Franche- 
Comte), fr51 (Pays de la Loire), fir52 (Bretagne), fr53 (Poitou-Charentes), fr61 (Aquitaine), 
fr62 (Midi-Pyrenees), fr63 (Limousin), ff71 (Rhone-Alpes), fr72 (Auvergne), fr81 (Languedoc- 
Rouss.), fr82 (Prov-Alpes-Cote d’Azur), ff83 (Corse), grl 1 (Anatoliki Makedonia), grl2 
(Kentriki Makedonia), grl3 (Dytiki Makedonia), grl4 (Thessalia), gr21 (Ipeiros), gr22 
(Ionia Nisia), gr23 (Dytiki Ellada), gr24 (Sterea Ellada), gr25 (Peloponnisos), gr3 (At- 
tiki), gr41 (Voreio Aigaio), gr42 (Notio Aigaio), gr43 (Kriti), ieOl (Border), ie02 (South­
ern and Eastern), iitll (Piemonte), itl2 (Valle d’Aosta), itl3 (Liguria), it2 (Lombar­
dia), it31 (Trentino-Alto Adige), it32 (Veneto), it33 (Fr.-Venezia Giulia), it4 (Emilia- 
Romagna), it51 (Toscana), it52 (Umbria), it53 (Marche), it6  (Lazio), it71 (Abruzzo), 
it72 (Molise), it8  (Campania), it91 (Puglia), it92 (Basilicata), it93 (Calabria), ita (Si­
cilia), itb (Sardegna), lu (Luxembourg), n lll (Groningen), nil2 (Friesland), n il3 (Dren- 
the), nl21 (Overijssel), nl22 (Gelderland), nl23 (Flevoland), nl31 (Utrecht), nl32 (Noord- 
Holland), nl33 (Zuid-Holland), nl34 (Zeeland), nl41 (Noord-Brabant), nl42 (Limburg),
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ptl 1 (Norte), ptl2 (Centro), ptl3 (Lisboa e V.do Tejo), ptl4 (Alentejo), ptl5 (Algarve), 
pt2 (Acores), pt3 (Madeira), seOl (Stockholm), se02 (OstraMellansverige), se04 (Sydsverige), 
se06 (NorraMellansverige), se07 (MellerstaNorrland), se08 (Ovre Norrland), se09 (Sma- 
land med oama), seOa (Vastsverige), ukcl (Tees Valley and Durham), ukc2 (Northumb. 
et al.), ukdl (Cumbria), ukd2 (Cheshire), ukd3 (Greater Manchester), ukd4 (Lancashire), 
ukd5 (Merseyside), mkel (East Riding), uke2 (North Yorkshire), uke3 (South York­
shire), uke4 (West Yorkshire), ukfl (Derbyshire), ukf2 (Leics.), ukf3 (Lincolnshire), 
ukgl (Hereford et al), ukg2 (Shrops.), ukg3 (West Midlands (county)), ukhl (East An­
glia), ukh2 (Bedfordshire), ukh3 (Essex), uki (London), ukj 1 (Berkshire et al.), ukj2 (Sur­
rey), ukj3 (Hants.), ukj4 (Kent), ukkl (Gloucester et al.), ukk2 (Dorset), ukk3 (Cornwall 
and Devon), ukl (Wales), ukm (Scotland), ukn (Northern Ireland).
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Chapter 3 
Economic Geography and Industrialization
3.1 Introduction
Industrialization, that is the decline of agriculture’s share in GDP and the corresponding 
rise of manufacturing, is generally viewed as an essential part of a successful develop­
ment strategy.22 It is accompanied by strong rises in per capita income levels and the 
accumulation of factors of production. Although the direction of causality is open to dis­
pute, it is generally considered to run both ways (Chenery et al., 1986). Indeed, virtually 
every country that has experienced steep increases in living standards over the last 2 0 0  
years has done so by industrializing. Yet despite the evident gains and the success stories 
of some emergent market economies, many other countries still remain predominantly 
agricultural and poor. This fact is even more astonishing nowadays as one would ex­
pect that in an ever more integrated world, where modem communication technologies 
allow for a free exchange of ideas, the adaptation of advanced technologies necessary for 
industrialization should be fast and widespread.
Economists have proposed a number of explanations for this apparently puzzling 
observation. One train of thought has argued that prosperous economies have better 
institutions or cultures more attuned to the requirements of modem life, encouraging 
the accumulation of human and physical capital and the adaptation of new technologies 
(e.g. Parente and Prescott, 2000). A second strand in the literature has focused on local 
demand as the crucial determinant of industrialization. In a closed, low income econ­
omy, the main part of individual income goes into subsistence agricultural consumption, 
implying very low levels of manufacturing demand. Thus, even with supply-side char­
acteristics favourable to industrialization such as high skill levels of the labour force, 
high capital stocks and knowledge of advanced production techniques, the manufactur­
22 See Chenery et al. (1'986); or Murphy et al. (1989a).
49
ing share in GDP will be low. This consideration is even more important if there are 
increasing returns to scale in manufacturing production: the high initial investment re­
quired for the adaptation of advanced technologies needs a minimum level of demand to 
be profitable. Accordingly, factors determining local demand for manufacturing such as 
agricultural productivity, population size or levels of income inequality have been exten­
sively analysed in the existing literature (see in particular Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943, and 
Murphy et al., 1989a/lb).23
However, from the point of view of theories stressing the importance of a large 
local market, there are a number of puzzling empirical observations. Why is it that 
relatively small countries such as Belgium and Switzerland were among the first to in­
dustrialize and not populous India or China? How come it was the small economies of 
Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan that led the wave of industrialization in South-East 
Asia? This chapter will argue that these observations do not necessarily imply that the 
role of demand has been overstated. Rather, it will be shown that international trade plays 
an important role in industrialization by enabling small countries to access the demand 
of foreign markets. However, even with low political barriers to exchange international 
trade is costly and geographic proximity is crucial. For example, a common feature of 
Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan is the combination of export-oriented trade policies 
with close proximity to the large Japanese market. Indeed, a cursory look at the rela­
tion between manufacturing shares and geographic location suggests that this argument 
has more general relevance (see figure 3.1). Developing economies close to one of the 
world’s main markets in the U.S., the European Union and Japan show proportionately 
higher levels of industrialization.24
The role of costly international trade also sheds new light on another debate in 
demand-driven development. As traditional approaches argue, increases in agricultural 
productivity can be of crucial importance for industrialization (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943, 
Murphy et al. 1989b). The additional income they generate lifts people out of subsistence 
consumption and enables the creation of a market for manufacturing goods. However,
23 Other contributions include Fleming (1955), Fafchamps and Helms (1997), Skott and Ros (1997), Tem­
ple and Voth (1998) and Ciccone (2002b).
24 Developing countries are defined as countries belonging to the income categories ’’low”, ’’lower middle” 
and ’’upper middle” published by the World Bank (corresponding to less than 9,265 USD in 1999). The 
simple OLS regression underlying the regression line in figure 3.1 yields a coefficient on minimum distance 
of -0.0015 that is statistically significant at the 1% level.
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Figure 3.1: Manufacturing share in GDP (%) and minimum distance to the U.S., the 
European Union and Japan. Figures for developing countries in 1990. Source: World 
Development Indicators (2001). Country codes: see appendix 3.C.
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so the critics of this view, in an open economy, agricultural productivity shocks may 
actually lead to de-industrialization as a country gains a comparative advantage in the
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Figure 3.2: Manufacturing share in GDP (%) and relative labour productivity in agri­
culture and manufacturing. Figures for developing countries in 1990. Source: World 
Development Indicators 2001. Country codes: see appendix 3.C.
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Costly international trade may again provide an explanation. It is not that coun­
tries can still be seen as isolated locations or that (Ricardian) comparative advantage 
is simply unimportant. Rather, as productivity patterns are fairly similar across neigh­
bouring countries, a relatively high agricultural productivity does not necessarily imply 
a comparative advantage over surrounding locations. And as trade declines with dis­
tance, countries further away play a much lesser role in the specialization pattern of a 
location. With the impact of high agricultural productivity on comparative advantage 
thus effectively being much lower, the traditional channel of influence through rising lo­
cal manufacturing demand may again dominate. This logic is closely related to what 
Deardorff (2004) - in work done concurrently and independently of mine - calls ’’local 
comparative advantage”. What matters for the pattern of local trade flows (or production 
structure) is the comparative advantage over proximate locations. On this point, also re­
consider the examples Matsuyama (1992) himself provides (see footnote 29), which all 
involve neighbouring regions or countries and thus local comparative advantage.
The contribution of this chapter will be to formalise the ideas just expressed in 
a model of economic geography. Using specifications implied by theory it will also be
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demonstrated that these ideas stand the test of a more thorough empirical investigation. 
It will thus be shown how economic geography can be used to deepen our understanding 
of how international trade and geographic position are related to development.27
It should be pointed out that while the above criticisms apply most directly to theo­
ries that approach the phenomenon of industrialization from the demand side, the stylised 
facts presented are also not easily explained by models that focus on supply-side deter­
minants. Be it contributions from the barriers-to-modem-growth literature (e.g. Parente 
and Prescott, 1994, 2000; McGrattan and Schmitz, 1998; Goodfriend and McDermott, 
1995; Galor and Weil, 2000) or approaches from traditional international trade theory 
(e.g. Learner, 1987; Schott, 2003): the a-geographical nature of these approaches makes 
them unsuited to explain phenomena like the ones described here that have an inherent 
geographic component. Thus, while not denying the importance of these models and 
theories for many aspects of industrialization, the present chapter draws attention to ge­
ographic proximity as a new and potentially important factor in explaining the dramatic 
differences in levels of industrialization across the world 28
The remainder o f this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 develops a multi­
location model with trade costs. This model is then used to shed light on the puzzles 
raised in this introduction (section 3.3). I also derive more precise empirical predictions 
which are put to a test in section 3.4. Finally, section 3.5 summarises the main findings 
and concludes.
3.2 The Model
In this section, I develop a theoretical model in which levels of industrialization are driven 
by access to markets and by comparative advantage. The model nests a key element
27 This chapter focuses on economic geography, in particular on the proximity to foreign markets. This 
is in contrast to a related hut separate literature on the effects of physical geography on standards of living 
(e.g. Gallup et al., 1999). For expositional ease, the terms geography and economic geography will be used 
interchangeably.
28 Some theories from the New Economic Geography - which delivers most of the methodological tools 
for this chapter - have also touched upon the phenomenon of industrialization. Most importantly, Puga and 
Venables (1996) use a New Economic Geography model to shed light on industrialization in South-East Asia. 
Their focus, however, is on the implications of intermediate goods usage for the forming of agglomerations 
and the sequential spread of industries across countries. Also, the presence of multiple equilibria (absent 
from the model presented below) makes a thorough empirical test of their theory much harder.
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of theoretical models of demand-driven industrialization - non-homothetic preferences - 
within a multi-location framework similar to that of contributions from the New Trade 
and New Economic Geography literature (for an overview, see Krugman and Helpman, 
1985; and Fujita et all., 1999).
In particular, I analyse a world with R locations. Locations can trade with each 
other but incur trade costs in doing so. Within each location, a representative consumer 
maximizes a utility function displaying non-homotheticity which is generated by the ex­
istence of subsistence level agricultural consumption (similar to Murphy et al., 1989b). 
On the supply side, there are a large number of agricultural and manufacturing firms in 
each location. Agricultural production takes place under constant returns to scale and per­
fect competition and every location produces one differentiated variety. Manufacturing 
production has increasing returns to scale and operates under monopolistic competition 
with an endogenous number of varieties in every location.
I start with a description of preferences (section 3.2.1) and production structures 
(3.2.2) and then derive the general equilibrium (3.2.3). In the analysis, the following 
notational convention will be used: 1 will index producer/exporter location, j importer 
location, and i manufacturing varieties. The order within indices is producer/exporter, 
importer, variety (1, j, i).
3.2.1 Preference Structure
The representative consumer in location j maximizes a Stone-Geary utility function over 
consumption of an agricultural and a manufacturing composite good. Both are repre­
sented by a CES-sulbutility function.
Mj is location j ’s consumption of the composite manufacturing good which consists of 
a large number of varieties produced by a continuum of firms in the different locations.
Uj =  a  In (Mj) +  (1 — a) In (Aj — A)
—1)
0 a / ( ? a -  1)
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The mass of firms active in any location I is i =  [0, i{\, where ii >  0 . 1 use mm  to denote 
the amount of the ith variety produced in location I and demanded in j .  The elasticity of 
substitution between all varieties is assumed to be constant at <jm  >  1 .
Aj is consumption of the agricultural composite and aij is the amount of the va­
riety produced in I that is consumed in j .  Every location produces one differentiated 
variety. The elasticity o f substitution between these varieties, a a > 1, is constant but not 
necessarily equal to &m - Rather, given the generally assumed greater substitutability of 
agricultural goods for each other, one would expect a a > &m  (see e.g. Rauch, 1999). 
A denotes minimal consumption of agricultural goods, i.e. the subsistence level. This 
preference structure guarantees that the expenditure share of agricultural goods declines 
with rising per capita income once the minimum level A is reached - this is the so-called 
Engel’s law which has strong empirical foundations (see Crafts, 1980). In the follow­
ing, I assume that A< Qai for all I, where Oai is agricultural productivity in location I. 
This assumption guarantees that per capita income in each location is sufficient to reach 
the subsistence level Thus, at least some expenditure will be devoted to manufacturing 
products.
The budget constraint in location j  is given by PAjAj A PmjMj =  Yj, where Yj 
is income in j .  Pmj and PAj are price indices for the manufacturing and agricultural 
composite goods defined as:
(
R  i t \ !/(!— / R  jj \ l/(l-crM )j  = ( y J (PMiiTij) M di
/ R  \  1 / { 1 ~ (7 a )  / r  vl/(l-crA )
PM =  J = ( p  J
Prices paid for the different products in the importing location j ,  pMiji and pAij, consist 
of the mill price charged in location I plus iceberg trade costs Ty > 1 (compare section 
2 .2 .1 , Chapter 2).29
29 In the following, I assume that trade costs in both agricultural and manufacturing trade are identical. 
None of the following results is qualitatively affected by this assumption. For empirical evidence on the 
relative magnitude of these transport costs see Davis (1998) and Evans (2003).
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Utility maximisation yields total demand for manufactured good variety i pro­
duced in I and for agricultural goods produced in I:
R
m i= p - M7 T , Ti 7 u p w ~ lE ^
1 = 1
R
« i = p 7 i * Y , T7 Ap°A r lE *
1 = 1
where E mj =  oc (Yj — P ^A ) and Eaj =  (1 — oc)Yj +  Pa j Act denote total expenditures 
on manufacturing and agricultural goods in location j ,  respectively. Aggregate income 
in location j ,  Yj, consists of income from labour only as in equilibrium zero profits are 
made in both the agricultural and manufacturing sector (see section 3.2.2). I assume 
perfect labour mobility between sectors (though labour is immobile between locations) 
and thus equalization of wages within countries, i.e. wmu =  wai =  wi for all i. Of 
course, since agricultural prices and productivity levels can vary between locations, wage 
differences across countries need not be zero, i.e. wi ^  Wj in general. Wage equalisation 
within countries in turn implies that aggregate income levels can be written as 1 / =  
wi(Lai +  Lm i) =  m , where I haven chosen units such that the total labour force is unity 
and made use of a fiill employment condition:30
Li =  Lai +  Lmi =  1 (3-1)
3.2.2 Production Structure 
Agricultural Sector
Each location produces a differentiated variety of the agricultural good. This can be 
justified either by a simple Armington-type assumption (the same type of product from 
different locations is in fact seen as a different good) or by appeal to a comparative advan­
30 Note that standardising employment to unity abstracts from standard "home market" effects where the 
size of a location also influences specialisation patterns. However, the assumption of equally-sized locations 
is not crucial here since I will define "home markets" more generally to also include trade cost weighted 
demand spillovers from neighbouring locations (see the second part of section 3.3.3). In the present model, 
one can think of a larger "location" as two locations which can trade completely costlessly with each other.
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tage argument (i.e. a country has a Ricardian comparative advantage in the production 
of a certain agricultural good) .31
The agricultural sector in each location is perfectly competitive, operates under 
constant returns to scale and uses labour as its only input. The amount of labour em­
ployed in agriculture in location I is Lai and agricultural labour productivity is denoted 
by Oai- Thus, supply of the local variety is given by z f  =  9 aiLai• Recall from the above
discussion that demand for agricultural goods produced in I is given by:
R
^ = p~ A iAY . Tri ,,Api r 1EAi
1 = 1
In order to satisfy this demand, Tij units must be shipped for every unit demanded,
yielding an effective agricultural demand for goods from I of:
R
*p=p~ma e  T!rApir iEAi 0.2)
i=i
Profit maximisation under perfect competition implies that prices equal the cost of pro­
ducing one unit of output:
wl (1 'X\VM  =  ^  (3.3)
Inserting this result into the demand equation (3.2), setting supply equal to demand {zf  =  
zf>) and solving for the output level z\ we get:
*1 =  ( E (3.4)
From z f  =  6aiLai, the corresponding labour demand in agriculture is thus:
La, =  r j - ' w r *  fE Tt f Ap°A rlE Ai j (3.5)
Manufacturing Sector
Production in the manufacturing sector takes place under increasing returns to scale with 
a fixed input requirement. As in agricultural production, labour is the only factor used.
31 This comparative advantage would have to be in addition to the overall comparative advantage in agri­
culture a location has. The latter is formally modelled below, the former is not.
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Formally, the production technology takes the form:
(xli +  F) =  OmuLm U
where xf{ is production of variety % in location I, F  is the fixed cost requirement which is 
identical across locations and varieties, and 6 m u  is a productivity parameter (indicating 
labour productivity o f manufacturing production of variety i in location I). L m u  denotes 
labour employed in the production of variety i in location I.
Effective demand for manufacturing variety i in I is derived analogously to effec­
tive agricultural demand as:
R
*U =  P~Mli E T? r UPM j~lE Mi (3-6>
1 = 1
Love of variety in manufacturing demand and increasing returns to scale imply that every 
new firm will choose to produce a different variety of the manufacturing good. Firms 
set prices to maximize profits, which results in a fixed mark-up over marginal costs of 
v m l i p m  — 1). In the following, I assume that manufacturing productivity is equal across 
varieties and locations and I choose it to be equal to the mark-up, that is 6mu =  @m — 
gm U pm  — I ) -32 This implies that the resulting profit maximizing price is the same 
across varieties in a location I and equals the wage rate:
° M  Wl W  m xPMli = -------- —  =  W1 (3.7)
(T M — 1 VMli
Profits at this price will be 11^  =  (xf{ — (<t m  — 1 )F ). I assume free entry in manu­
facturing so that IIu is pushed down to zero in the long-run. This implies that output per 
firm will be (ctm — 1 )F. Note that this output level is identical across varieties and loca­
tions. From the implied total labour demand in manufacturing in location I, L m i > I can 
solve for ii, the equilibrium number of active varieties:
k  = P ^ ) F  <M>
The full employment condition (3.1) can be used together with labour demand in agri­
culture (3.5) to solve for L m i  as a function of wi:
L m i  = 1 — L M =  05T V"" ( E  T i f ° APAj ~1 (3 9)
32 This assumption is innocuous insofar as my interest in the following will be on changes in agricultural 
productivity and the relative productivity of agriculture and manufacturing only.
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3.2.3 Equilibrium
The equilibrium in this model is fully determined by the (R  x 1) vector of wage rates 
(w i , ..., w r ). All other variables are functions of this vector. To compute wi, I turn to the 
clearing condition in the manufacturing goods market. As shown, free entry implies that 
output of every variety i will be xu =  (am — 1)F. Setting this equal to total demand for 
variety i evaluated at the profit-maximizing price pmu =  wi yields (compare equation 
3.6):
cmW. ( e  Ti r u p t * T lE * } \ =(*** -  i >f  (e i)
Equations (El) for each of the R  locations form a system of R  non-linear equations, 
determining wi and thus all other variables of the model.33 As the focus of this chapter 
is on industrialization, I also introduce the share of manufacturing in GDP as a further 
variable which in the following is also referred to as the level of industrialization of a 
location:
H/TCU Pm & i -  1)-F X iiMShare&DP,l = --------- ;-------- = -----------  ttt: -r -   (MS)
PMlXl +  PAl*l P M l{°M  -  1 )F  X H +  p AiZi 
where xi and zi are total output levels of manufacturing and agricultural goods varieties 
in I. Using the expressions for ij, p m i , Pa u  and zi defined in (3.8), (3.7), (3.3) and (3.4), 
respectively, M S h a r e c D P  can also be expressed as a function of w i  only.
Proposition 1 For infinitely high or zero trade costs, or for the case o f identical para­
meter values and bilateral distances across locations, the model has an analytic solu­
tion and the share o f manufacturing in GDP is uniquely determined as a function of the 
model’s parameters.
Proof. See appendix 3.A. ■
Proposition 1 shows that the model has a unique equilibrium in three important 
cases. Of particular interest is the uniqueness of equilibrium for the case of identical 
locations and bilateral trade costs. This is because models of the New Economic Geog­
raphy (NEG), the setup of which is very similar to the model presented here, usually have
33 Since both wages and productivities are the same for all varieties in a given location I, (El) holds for any 
variety i produced there. In effect, we thus have only one equation per location - which pins down the last 
remaining variable (the wage rate, wi). Note that my earlier assumption that A< 9a  is sufficient to ensure 
that manufacturing demand is positive in all locations and (El) is thus well-defined.
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multiple equilibria for intermediate levels of trade costs, even with symmetric locations 
(see, for example, Fujita et al., 1999). The reason this is not the case here is the absence 
of both labour mobility between locations and intermediate goods, the existence of either 
of which can introduce multiple equilibria into NEG models. For the case of positive 
trade costs with asymmetric locations, there are no analytic results, but simulations show 
that there is a unique solution for a large number of parameter values.
To summarise, the crucial features of this model which will drive the results in the 
remaining sections of this chapter are as follows. First, there are varying levels of agri­
cultural productivity across locations which together with non-homothetic preferences 
will drive industrialization and de-industrialization through comparative advantage and 
Engel’s law. Second, positive trade costs render relative geographic positions important, 
both by conferring a market size advantage to more central regions and by softening the 
impact of comparative advantage across space.
3.3 Analysis
This section analyses the properties of the model just developed and uses it to shed light 
on the puzzles raised in the introduction to this chapter. As will become clear, the present 
model nests many of the existing approaches in the literature on demand-driven indus­
trialization as the two special cases of infinite and zero trade costs (’’closed economy” 
and ’’free trade”). For these cases, analytic results are available which are presented in 
sections 3.3.1 and 33.2, respectively. Section 3.3.2 also helps building intuition for the 
general case with positive but finite levels of trade costs (section 3.3.3). I will demon­
strate that this case is mot just a combination of the two extremes of free trade and autarky 
but that new results arise that help resolve our two puzzles. For this part, no analytic re­
sults are available so simulation analysis will be used.
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3.3.1 Closed Economy
With infinitely high levels of trade costs, i.e. autarky, the expression for the share of 
manufacturing in GDP simplifies to (see appendix 3.A):
MShareQDP,i =  a  ^1 — (M S a u t )
As is apparent from { M S a u t ), the manufacturing share in GDP increases with agri­
cultural productivity. The existence of non-homothetic preferences (which is due to a 
positive subsistence consumption level in agriculture, A >  0) is crucial for this result. 
Intuitively, the increases in per capita income resulting from higher values of 9a lead to 
a decline of the share of subsistence consumption in total expenditure. As every unit of 
income above the subsistence level is spent in fixed proportions on agricultural and man­
ufacturing varieties, the expenditure share of the latter rises. In a closed economy, this in 
turn leads to a shift of labour into manufacturing and an increase in MSharecDP  • In the 
following, I will refer to this positive impact of agricultural productivity on industrializa­
tion as the ’’income effect” of agricultural productivity shocks.34 Very similar effects are 
obtained in the existing literature (e.g. Matsuyama, 1992; or Murphy et al., 1989b).
3.3.2 Free Trade
Under free trade, Ricardian comparative advantage emerges as an additional factor for 
the determination of the level of industrialization. With costless trade, the share of man­
ufacturing in GDP can be expressed as follows (see appendix 3.A):
Aa
M SharecDPj — 1 — [(1 — a)CAi x R] — 
where:
9 m  ‘
(M  Sf t)
c m  =  \ Y S e Ali e Aj)1-
This expression has a straightforward economic interpretation. Starting with the first set 
of brackets, the higher the share of manufacturing in non-subsistence expenditure, and
34 Of course, the change in agricultural productivity also brings a substitution effect with it as prices and 
wages change and agricultural goods become relatively cheaper. As this effect is overcompensated in the 
closed economy version of the model, I do not analyse it here. However, it plays a crucial role in the open 
economy (see next section) where it determines changes in comparative advantage.
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thus the lower (1 — a ), the higher the manufacturing share in GDP. Next, the term CAi 
captures the Ricardian comparative advantage in agriculture of a location I as compared 
to the rest of the world. As in standard models of international trade, being relatively 
productive in agriculture means a lower share of manufacturing in GDP as the location 
specialises accordingly (recall that manufacturing productivity is normalised to equal the 
constant mark-up ova* marginal cost so that agricultural productivity alone determines 
comparative advantage). This comparative advantage effect is the stronger the larger the 
number of locations, jR.
The terms in the second set of brackets in expression (M S f t )  capture the effect 
of subsistence consumption in agriculture. Most straightforwardly, the manufacturing 
share of all locations declines if subsistence consumption of agricultural varieties, A, 
increases. A higher expenditure share of manufacturing, a, has the same effect. As a  
rises, the share of subsistence consumption in total agricultural consumption increases, 
making the last summand in (M S f t )  quantitatively more important. Third, a higher 
comparative advantage again leads to de-industrialization. Being relatively productive in 
agricultural production increases subsistence demand from all other locations and lowers 
MShareQDP• Finally, rises in agricultural productivity ( 6 a i )  have the opposite effect 
once we control for comparative advantage. Intuitively, a higher productivity means that 
a given level of subsistence demand can be produced with less labour.
Given these offsetting effects, the question arises what the net effect of posi­
tive agricultural productivity shocks will be (keeping manufacturing productivity un­
changed). As can be easily shown by differentiating (M S f t )  with respect to 6 a i ,  this net 
effect is unambiguous: increases in agricultural productivity will lead to a de-industriali­
zation of location I (i.e. a decline in MSharecDP,i)• Higher agricultural productiv­
ity still leads to higher local demand for manufacturing goods due to consumers’ non- 
homothetic preferences (the "income effect" described in the previous section). How­
ever, this effect is overcompensated by adverse changes in comparative advantage so that 
locations experiencing rises in O a i  will specialise in agriculture and increase net man­
ufacturing imports from abroad. In the following, I will refer to this de-industrializing 
impact of agricultural productivity increases as the ’’comparative advantage effect”.
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3.3.3 Positive Trade Costs
I now move on to the general case with positive but finite levels of trade costs. As ana­
lytic results are unavailable here, the use of numerical methods becomes indispensable.35 
Two main findings emerge from the different simulations. First, the results on agricul­
tural productivity and comparative advantage from sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 carry through 
qualitatively but with one important qualification: proximity plays a role now, i.e. the ef­
fects of productivity shocks stay geographically limited. Similar to Chapter 2, the terms 
"proximity" and "geography" should be understood in an economic geography rather 
than a physical geography sense. That is, they take into account both the transport costs 
of accessing remoter locations as well as politically determined costs such as tariff and 
non-tariff barriers. Thus, even if  the location experiencing the productivity shock is at 
short physical distance to other locations, high political barriers to trade might still con­
siderably dampen the shock’s impact. As will be shown, this new role for proximity can 
help explain why empirically one might observe a positive correlation between relative 
labour productivities in agricultural and manufacturing, on the one hand, and the share 
of manufacturing in GDP on the other hand. Second, the presence of intermediate levels 
of trade costs creates a role for centrality in the sense of proximity to product markets. 
I will show that under certain empirically relevant conditions, being more central than 
other locations leads ito higher shares of manufacturing in GDP. This is reminiscent of 
the home market effect in trade theory as described by Krugman (1980) and Krugman 
and Helpman (1985).36
For the simulations that follow, I will concentrate on the case with three locations 
(R =  3). This is the minimum number of locations needed to demonstrate the role of 
costly international trade and geographic location for levels of industrialization, as will 
become apparent below. Trade costs (TC) between locations are given by a 3x3-matrix, 
where the element (£, j )  contains trade costs between i and j .  As I use iceberg-type trade 
costs, diagonal elements are equal to one, off-diagonal elements bigger than or equal to
35 All simulations in this paper are performed on Matlab 6.1 using Broyden’s algorithm for non-linear 
equation systems.
36 A difference to the models of these authors arises from the fact that rather than considering two locations 
of unequal size, I analyse settings with more than two locations (as do Behrens et al., 2004). In this case, 
home market effects may arise even for locations that are identical except for relative geographical position 
(see the subsection "Centrality and Levels of Industrialization" below for details).
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one. I also assume that TCij =  TCji so that the matrix is symmetric. Appendix 3.B to 
this chapter contains the exact trade costs matrices used in the simulations, as well as the 
other parameters’ values.
Comparative Advantage with Costly Trade
The first important change as we move to a world with positive but finite trade costs 
is that besides the relative labour productivity of a location relative to all others, it also 
matters where that location is situated geographically. For example, having a comparative 
advantage in agriculture over a location close by has a larger de-industrializing effect than 
having the same advantage over a location further away.
To demonstrate this role of economic geography, assume that initially all three 
locations have identical parameter values. Then consider an increase in agricultural pro­
ductivity in location 3, i.e. a decrease of the comparative advantage in agriculture of 
locations 1 and 2. The results from sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 tell us that we should expect 
an increase in the level of industrialization in locations 1 and 2, whereas the direction of 
the effect on location 3 should depend on the level of trade costs. Figure 3.3 shows that 
these insights do indeed carry through qualitatively. It plots the level of M SharecDP  as 
compared to the initial situation against the general level of trade costs.
For very high levels of trade costs we approach the autarky case and the results 
from section 3.3.1 apply: whereas nothing happens in locations 1 and 2, location 3 expe­
riences an increase in the level of industrialization due to the income effect of agricultural 
productivity shocks.. However, as trade costs drop, the comparative advantage effect be­
comes active. As predicted in section 3.3.2, location 3 de-industrializes and locations 1 
and 2 industrialize. The effect is strongest for zero levels of trade costs as specialization 
is no longer hampered by costly trade. For intermediate trade costs there is also another 
important feature. Location 2 which is set closer to location 3 and thus has lower bilat­
eral trade costs experiences stronger increases in M S h areoop • This holds both for the 
timing of the onset of industrialization and its extent at intermediate levels of trade costs.
How do these findings help us to explain the upward sloping form of the relation 
between relative labour productivity and manufacturing shares in GDP shown in figure
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Figure 3.3: Increase in agricultural productivity in location 3 (see appendix 3.B for para­
meter values)
Increase in 8,
Local ion 1 
Local ion 2 
Localion 3
3.2? The intuition in this model is the same as the one presented in the introduction to this 
chapter. If relative productivity levels tend to be similar across neighbouring locations 
and if the influence of more distant countries is less important due to trade costs, high 
levels of agricultural productivity do not necessarily imply a strong effective comparative 
advantage in agriculture. In such a case, the income effect of agricultural productivity 
might eventually dominate the comparative advantage effect and the manufacturing share 
will rise.
To show that this intuition holds in the model, consider the two following simula­
tion examples, again using three locations. In both simulations, multilateral trade costs 
remain unchanged at an intermediate level. Locations 2 and 3 are close geographic neigh­
bours while location 1 is further away. I first consider a gradual increase in agricultural 
productivity in location 3. Then, I simultaneously increase the productivity of locations 
2 and 3, representing the similarity in relative productivities across neighbouring loca­
tions. Figure 3.4 shows the results. In the first case (left panel), the effects are similar to 
figure 3. Location 3 de-industrializes and locations 2 and 1 industrialize, although the ef-
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feet on location 2 is much stronger due to its close proximity to location 3. Note that the 
income effect is still present but is overcompensated by the adverse change in compar­
ative advantage. Thus, as manufacturing productivity is identical in all three locations, 
these results would imply a negative correlation between the share of manufacturing and 
relative productivity. Now consider the second case. As shown in the right panel of fig­
ure 3.4, all three locations experience a relative expansion of the manufacturing sector. 
This is due to the fact that locations 2 and 3 now do not have a comparative advantage 
over each other. They are more productive in agriculture than location 1 which explains 
why the latter shows a slight increase in levels of industrialization as well (it gains a 
comparative advantage in manufacturing). But as location 1 is further away, this effect 
is dominated by the rise in local manufacturing expenditure following the rise in income 
levels. That is, the income effect overcompensates the comparative advantage effect. In 
this second case, relative productivity is positively correlated with manufacturing’s share 
in GDP. Note that for this effect both positive trade costs and similarity in relative pro­
ductivity patterns across neighbouring locations are needed. With zero trade costs it does 
not matter where a location is situated (compare figure 3 at free trade) and increases in 
agricultural productivity in both 2 and 3 would still lead to de-industrialization in these 
locations. However, simply having positive trade costs does not necessarily imply the 
positive correlation observed in the data, as has just been shown via the differences be­
tween the two panels of figure 3.4. This emphasises the point that it is not sufficient 
to simply look at the level of openness of a location to gauge the impact of agricultural 
productivity on industrialization, as suggested by Matsuyama (1992). What matters, 
rather, is how agricultural productivity influences the effective (or "local") comparative 
advantage of a location and whether the resulting specialization effects overcompensate 
changes in local manufacturing demand linked to non-homethetic preferences (the in­
come effect).
This last point leads us back once more to the positive correlation between levels 
of industrialization and relative productivity levels presented in the introduction to this 
chapter. From above considerations, it should be clear that such a finding does in no way 
imply that comparative advantage in agriculture has no or even a positive causal impact 
on industrialization. Even in a model in which comparative advantage has a negative ef­
fect - as the one presented here - one can easily generate the positive correlation found
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Figure 3.4: Relative productivity and manufacturing share in GDP (see appendix 3.B for 
parameter values)
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in the data as has just been demonstrated. In fact, the simple regression implicit in figure
3.2 suffers from at least two sources of bias. First, higher relative productivity in agri­
culture relative to manufacturing could be associated with higher absolute agricultural 
productivity.37 Second, measures of comparative advantage that do not take into account 
relative geographic position will suffer from measurement error. Both sources lead to an 
upward bias which might explain the positive correlation between relative productivity 
and manufacturing shares observed in the data.38 To see this formally, we first need to 
obtain the data generating process implied by the model presented here. Since there are 
no analytical results for the case with intermediate trade costs, I rely on the above simu­
lations for guidance. The key insight just obtained is that relative bilateral productivities 
have to be weighted by trade costs. That is, the free trade formula for comparative ad-
37 Empirically, this does indeed seem to be the case (see Gollin, Parente and Rogerson, 2000).
38 In this section, I use the terms relative productivity and comparative advantage interchangeably. Strictly 
speaking, this is not correct as comparative advantage is a measure comparing a country’s productivity to all
other countries’ (CAi  =  ( f ^ 1)  ) whereas relative productivity (6ai/Qmi) is not. However,
a ranking o f  countries along both variables gives an identical ordering if  comparative advantage is not trade 
cost-weighted. Thus, log-regressions involving these variables give almost identical results (see section 3.4.2 
for an illustration).
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vantage (M S f t )  has to be adjusted to give more distant locations lesser weight. In the 
following, I work with the formula:
to which I will refer as trade cost-weighted comparative advantage.39 Thus, the true data 
generating process is o f the form:
M S h a r e c D P j  =  oc +  CA* +  P 2 0 a i  +  £ i (M l)
where C A * and 0Ai capture the comparative advantage and income effect, respectively. 
From the earlier discussion, it follows that P1 <  0 and (32 > 0- However, the model 
implicitly estimated in the introduction is:
M S h a r e c D P j  =  ct +  P\CAi +  vi (M2 )
where CA { =  ^ £  ( f ^ )  ^  and^ =  CAf -  C A t) +  /320Ai +  eh
Proposition 2 The probability limit o f the OLS estimate for  /3X derivedfrom estimating
model (M2) is given by: plim ^1 =  /31 —/?1B i +  (32B2, where B \, B2 >  0.
Proof. See appendix 3.A. ■
The bias /32B2 results from the omission of agricultural productivity, the bias 
—fiiB i from using non-trade-cost-weighted comparative advantage. Since /31 in (M l) is 
negative, both biases are positive.
In summary, this section has provided an explanation for the observed positive cor­
relation between comparative advantage in agriculture and the share of manufacturing in 
GDP that is consistent with standard international trade theories of Ricardian compara­
tive advantage. Implicitly, it has also pointed out an additional empirical prediction: once 
one controls for agricultural productivity and trade cost-weights comparative advantage, 
the corrected comparative advantage measure should again display a significantly nega­
tive coefficient. Section 3.4.2 will investigate whether the model passes this additional 
test.
39 This is the equivalent of what Deardorff (2004) refers to as ’’local comparative advantage”. The above 
expression is obviously an approximation. However, the values one obtains for MShareGDP,i by using 
CA* instead of CAi in (M S f t ) from section 3.3.2 track the numerical results for the general model closely.
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Centrality and Levels of Industrialization
Let me now turn to the second observation made in the introduction, i.e. the apparent 
positive impact of proximity to foreign markets on the manufacturing share in GDP. It is 
a long standing theoretical result in international trade theory that the size of the home 
market matters for industrial structure (Krugman, 1980, Krugman and Helpman, 1985). 
Recently, Davis and Weinstein (1998) found empirical support for home market effects in 
a study on OECD countries. However, their finding depended crucially on taking into ac­
count demand linkages across locations, indicating the importance of foreign demand.40 
In models of industrialization, the role of access to foreign markets has been ignored so 
far, even though its inclusion seems to be a logical extension of the existing literature. In 
a world with positive trade costs, central locations have effectively a larger market size as 
they are closer to sources of demand, ceteris paribus. Note that this holds in addition to 
any size advantage the domestic economy may have and depends on its position relative 
to other locations.
There are several theoretical reasons why one would expect central locations with 
better access to foreign markets to have a higher manufacturing share than peripheral 
ones. First, being a more central location increases demand for both agricultural and 
manufacturing goods and raises wages 41 With non-homothetic preferences, this leads 
to an expansion of domestic manufacturing expenditure which with positive trade costs 
will translate into a higher domestic manufacturing share. Second, higher wages lead to 
higher prices for both types of goods relative to prices charged in other locations. That 
is, both P M i/P M j  and PAi/PA j  go up while the ratio of local prices (p a i / p m i ) does not 
change. However, if agricultural goods are more homogenous than manufacturing goods, 
i.e. if  they have a higher elasticity of substitution (<7,4  >  om  in the model), central 
locations will specialise in manufacturing. This is since demand for locally produced 
manufacturing varieties will be less sensitive to higher relative prices (P M i/PM j)  than 
demand for the location’s agricultural variety. Finally, if manufacturing uses increasing 
returns to scale production techniques, central locations will be the first, ceteris paribus,
40 Indeed, in an earlier version of the same paper (Davis and Weinstein, 1996) that interpreted local demand 
as purely domestic and ignored linkages across borders, the authors were unable to detect home market 
effects.
41 Compare Redding and Venables (2004) for empirical evidence on the positive effect of centrality on 
income levels.
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Figure 3.5: Impact of Centrality at different levels of trade costs and relative elasticities 
of substitution (see appendix 3.B for parameter values)
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to reach the critical level of demand that makes IRS production profitable. Note that this 
last factor is absent from the model presented here as there is no integer constraint on 
the number of active firms, i i .  However, the empirical section of this chapter will define 
home market effects broadly enough to take potential scale effects into account.
I now present some simulation results which demonstrate that above intuition 
holds in the model analysed here. Again return to the case of three locations where 
location 2 is situated at equal distance in between locations 1 and 3 and thus is more cen­
tral than the other two. Productivity levels are identical across locations. Furthermore, I 
assume that there is subsistence consumption (A > 0) but I set g a  =  & m - I thus switch 
off any effects of centrality operating through different elasticities of substitution and 
focus on the subsistence consumption channel only. Figure 3.5a shows relative manu­
facturing shares of location 2 as compared to any of the two other locations for different 
levels of per distance unit trade costs. The effect of centrality is strongest for interme­
diate levels of trade costs. For both very high and zero trade costs, demand patterns are 
identical everywhere and so are wages and manufacturing shares.
To show that different elasticities of substitution are also sufficient to obtain ef-
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cialises in agricultural goods as demand for them is less affected by the higher prices 
due to centrality. For the same reason, the picture reverses for cra >  &m - Then, as 
a a !&m  continues to increase, the centrality effect disappears. This is the analogue of 
this multi-location model to Davis (1998): with identical trade costs in agriculture and 
manufacturing, where agricultural output is homogenous and manufacturing output dif­
ferentiated, there is no home market effect. Transferring manufacturing production into 
the central location is not profitable given that agricultural goods would have to be im­
ported from the periphery.42 On this point, note that the present model addresses Davis’ 
(1998) critique that home market effects will disappear once one allows for trade costs 
in agriculture. In fact, Davis only analyses the special case of completely homogenous 
agricultural goods. Once one moves to more general settings, the home market effect 
reappears again even with identical trade costs in agriculture and manufacturing trade 43
To summarise, a higher level of centrality and the resulting better access to other 
markets’ demand can increase levels of industrialization for two reasons in this model. 
First, the presence of subsistence consumption means that the higher wages enjoyed by 
more central locations translate into higher local manufacturing demand. Second, higher 
wages lead to higher relative prices for both types of goods. But if the elasticity o f sub­
stitution is higher in agriculture than in manufacturing {a a  > &m ), demand for the local 
agricultural variety decreases by relatively more and central locations specialise in man­
ufacturing. Considering the available empirical evidence, it seems likely that centrality 
in the sense of proximity to foreign markets will indeed lead to industrialization even in 
the absence of scale effects. That preferences on agricultural and manufacturing goods 
are indeed non-homothetic is suggested by empirical studies of Engel’s law (e.g. Crafts, 
1980), for evidence on elasticities of substitution see Rauch (1999).
42 See Davis (1998), p. 1273 for details.
43 A final remark is in order here. Behrens et al. (2004) show that in a multi-country world, centrality brings 
both a competition effect and a market access effect. Since the latter may be dominated by die former in 
their model, being located centrally can lead to lower levels of industrialization than being at the periphery. 
However, this result seems to depend crucially on the existence of a freely traded and perfectly competitively 
produced numeraire (’’agriculture”) which obviously eliminates any role for market access or competition 
effects in this second sector. In the present chapter, by contrast, competition and access increase in parallel 
in both manufacturing and agriculture as a location becomes more central. The only effect of centrality then 
runs through increased wages in the two ways described above (i.e. either positive subsistence consumption 
or different elasticities of substitution are needed to obtain any effect of centrality on industrialization at all).
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3.4 Empirical Evidence
In the preceding sections of this chapter, I constructed a model of economic geography 
to demonstrate how costly international trade can help explain the apparent importance 
of proximity to foreign markets for levels of industrialization, as well as the positive 
correlation of relative productivity levels and manufacturing GDP shares. This section 
puts the different predictions implied by the model to a more thorough empirical test.
3.4.1 Empirical Specifications and Data
In the absence of analytic results for the general case with intermediate levels of trade 
costs and asymmetric locations, I use the previous simulation results to guide my empir­
ical analysis. These simulations, together with the analytic results for free trade, reveal 
that industrialization is driven by three forces in my model: comparative advantage, agri­
cultural productivity (as the determinant of local demand) and centrality or access to 
foreign product markets. Thus, the basic econometric specification I will work with is
ItskareMi =  a  +  P^APi +  +  {35C E N i +  ei (3.10)
where where CAi denotes comparative advantage, APi agricultural productivity and 
CENi centrality. The dependent variable is the logistic transformation of a country’s 
share of manufacturing value added in GDP. I use a logistic transformation to take ac­
count of the fact the manufacturing share is limited to a range between 0 and 1. Con­
cerning the three regressors, I discuss the choice of suitable empirical proxies in turn. 
Additional details on the data and their sources, as well as the list of countries used in 
the regressions below are contained in appendix 3.C.
Starting with a choice of proxy for comparative advantage (CAi), a number of 
issues arise. First, we have to keep in mind that for expositional ease, manufacturing 
productivity had been standardised in the model to equal the mark-up over marginal cost, 
making comparative advantage a function of agricultural productivities only. Of course, 
when taking the model to the data, one has to use relative productivities in agriculture 
and manufacturing. Second, the simulation results for the case of intermediate trade costs 
showed that what mattered was relative productivity as compared to proximate locations. 
I thus modify the free-trade results from section 3.2 to give neighbouring countries more
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weight in the calculati on of the overall comparative advantage of a location. This yields 
the following measure of trade cost-weighted comparative advantage:
where 6a i and 9 mi are the agricultural and manufacturing productivity of country I, 
respectively, and the inverse of bilateral distance (distij) is used as a proxy for trade 
costs (the exponent o f —1 on distij was chosen in accordance with standard results from 
estimations of gravity equations on international trade flows).44
For comparison and as a test of the additional prediction proposed in section 3.3.3, 
I also calculate a similar but non-trade-cost-weighted measure of comparative advantage:
The final issue is what empirical proxy to use for the parameters 6a i and 6m i - Theory 
does not give clear indications here. Indeed, Qai stands for both labour productivity and 
total factor productivity in the model due to the assumption of only one factor of pro­
duction. Keeping in line with existing studies on Ricardian comparative advantage (e.g. 
Golub and Hsieh, 2000), I use labour productivity as my proxy. This also has the addi­
tional advantage of considerably increasing the number of available observations. This 
is not only a matter of increasing estimation precision. More importantly, it is essen­
tial to achieve a maximum coverage of countries in a given year so that the measure 
used captures the aggregate comparative advantage of a country and is not biased due to 
the exclusion of important trading partners. Unfortunately, even when using labour pro­
ductivity, existing sources for the manufacturing sector only provide limited coverage, in 
particular for developing countries 45 Thus, I will proxy manufacturing labour productiv­
ity by labour productivity in industry, taken from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (WDI), which is available for a much larger number of countries. The Devel­
44 An alternative approach would have been to actually estimate a gravity equation from scretch, e.g. using 
a specification on bilateral trade flows derived from the earlier model (similar to Chapter 2). However, since 
no closed form solution Cor C A d .i is available, it is not clear how the estimated distance elasticities would 
map into weights for relative productivities. Since both approaches will thus to some extent be adhoc, using 
the inverse of bilateral distance has the advantage of simplicity.
45 Sources I considered are: the World Bank’s ”World Development Indicators 2001”, the United Nations’ 
’’Industrial Statistics Database 2001” (which also underlies the World Bank’s Trade and Production Data­
base), the Groningen Growth and Development Centre, and the International Labour Organization’s ”Key 
Indicators of the Labour Market”.
i /  Oa i /O m i
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opment Indicators also provide data on labour productivity in agriculture which are used 
for both the parameter 9 ai in CAi and CA* as well as for the regressor APi =  9 ai- Note 
that for the observations for which data on both manufacturing and industrial productivity 
are available, the correlation between the two measures is in excess of 80%. The results 
presented below also proved to be robust to a number of modifications, such as replac­
ing industrial productivity with manufacturing productivity where possible or excluding 
primary resource abundant states (results available from the author upon request).
Moving on to the last regressor of specification (3.10), I measure access to foreign 
markets (or centrality, CENi), as the sum of all other countries’ GNP, weighted by the 
inverse of bilateral distances which are again taken to proxy for trade costs between 
locations:
CENi =  CN Pj x distjt1 
j #
This specification reflects the basic intuition of the simulation results on the role of cen­
trality (see figure 3.5 in section 3.3.3.). What mattered there - as in Chapter 2 - was 
centrality in an economic geography sense, that is proximity to product markets. Of 
course, the above centrality index is nothing else but a measure of market potential first 
proposed by Harris (1954) and frequently used in both geography and - more recently - 
in economics. As shown in a number of existing studies, this approach has strong ex­
planatory power and yields results very similar to more complex approaches that estimate 
trade costs from trade flow gravity equations (see for example Head and Mayer, 2005).46
As an additional control variable, I will also include population size (PO P) as a 
proxy for the extent of the domestic market.47 All in all, I have data for the required vari­
ables for up to 113 countries for the years 1980 and 1990. Keeping in line with the focus 
of this chapter on the industrialization of developing countries, however, I exclude high- 
income countries from my regression sample (although of course all available countries 
are used to calculate the comparative advantage and centrality measures) 48
46 Also note that unlike in Chapter 2 or in Head and Mayer (2005), no closed-form solution for the de­
pendent variable (manufacturing shares) is available from the model. Thus, any alternative approach will 
necessarily be to some extent adhoc as well.
47 Inclusion of per capita GDP would have been desirable as a control for the purchasing power of the 
local population and as a proxy for skill levels etc. However, per capita GDP is very highly correlated with 
agricultural productivity (correlation coefficient: 82%). This correlation makes a separate identification of 
the influence of the two variables very difficult. However, including GDP per capita instead of agricultural 
productivity does not change any of the finding presented below.
48 I use the World Bank’s income classification and exclude all countries with gross national income per
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In order to demonstrate the importance of taking into account proximity in the cal­
culation of comparative advantage, I will estimate three different equations, all including 
population levels and my centrality measure. First, I use the non-trade-cost-weighted 
measure defined earlier { C A ^ p i )  and exclude agricultural productivity from the regres­
sion:
ltshareM GDpjt = a t + /31 log( C A NDtit ) +  log( PO Pu)  +  /34 log( C E N u )  +  £it
Next, I include agricultural productivity in order to determine how strong the omitted 
variable bias on the comparative advantage coefficient is:
ltshareM GDP,u =  +  £ 1  log ( C A NDj t ) +  fi2 log (A p it) +  £ 3  log ( PO Pu)
+/^4 1°S (OENu) +  eit
Finally, I replace CA n d j by my trade cost-weighted measure of comparative advantage 
(1CAd ,i). This should eliminate or at least reduce the measurement error bias arising from 
ignoring the importance of relative geographical position for specialization patterns:
ltshareM GDp,u =  +  0 i log ( C A D)u) +  /32 l°g (A p it) +  (33 log (P O P u )
+^4 log(CENit) + sit
Given the theoretical predictions and the positive correlation between relative productiv­
ity and industrialization presented in the introduction, the estimate fix should be biased 
upwards as long as anon-trade-cost-weighted measure of comparative advantage is used. 
However, I expect that including agricultural productivity and trade cost-weighting com­
parative advantage will make negative. The coefficient estimate on agricultural pro­
ductivity, /32, is expected to be positive, capturing the income effect of agricultural pro­
ductivity increases. Similarly, being more central and having a larger domestic market 
should imply higher shares of manufacturing in GDP (i.e., /*?3 and /?4 should be positive).
capita in excess of 9,265 USD in 1999 (”high income countries”). Robustness checks including all countries 
yield lower estimates on centrality and non-trade-cost-weighted comparative advantage. The lower coef­
ficient on centrality is consistent with the notion that richer countries have significantly higher values for 
centrality although their manufacturing sector is in decline due to reasons not considered in my model (in 
particular, the general shift towards services in the later stages of economic development - see Abegaz, 2002, 
and Syrquin and Chenery, 1989). Also, subsistence consumption effects are much weaker in developed coun­
tries, which is consistent with the lower coefficient on non-trade-cost-weighted comparative advantage (the 
omitted variable bias is mow smaller since the true coefficient /32 will be smaller for developed countries - 
compare equation (Ml) and proposition 2.
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3.4.2 Baseline Results
Table 3.1 presents results for the baseline OLS regressions. I start by regressing ItshareM cd p  
on the logs of the ratio of agricultural to manufacturing productivity, population size and 
centrality (Column 1). This specification is very similar to the one underlying figure
3.2 from the introductionary section of this chapter. As we see, including the two control 
variables and using a larger sample does not change the basic finding presented there: de­
veloping countries with a higher relative productivity in agriculture have a higher share 
of manufacturing in GDP. Column 2 presents results with replacing relative productiv­
ity with my non-trade-cost-weighted measure of comparative advantage, C A n d , i  (this 
is the first of the three specifications listed above). As expected from the construction 
of these two measures, the results are practically identical.49 Moving on to the second 
specification, I include agricultural labour productivity as an additional regressor (col­
umn 3). As predicted, A P  has a significantly positive coefficient and its inclusion lowers 
the coefficient on CA/vd.z-
So far, the evidence is consistent with both the model presented in this chapter and 
more traditional theories of demand-driven industrialization. However, results from esti­
mating my third estimation equation (column 4) show that using the trade cost-weighted 
measure of comparative advantage ( C A d j )  leads to a further large drop in the coefficient 
estimate which now becomes significantly negative. This provides an indication that 
comparative advantage does matter after all once we use the correct measure.50
At the same time, centrality and population size enter significantly positive in all 
four regressions. This provides evidence for the importance of both the domestic and 
export markets. To provide some notion of the economic significance of access to foreign 
markets, consider moving a country from the 10th to the 90th percentile of the
49 The log-correlation between these two regressors is very high (99%). Intuitively, the sorting of countries 
along both variables implies an identical ordering. This is since a high relative agricultural productivity 
as compared to other countries also implies high values in the sum of relative productivities used in the 
non-trade-cost-weighted comparative advantage variable.
50 A necessary condition for these results to provide evidence in favour of the theory proposed here is that 
relative productivities are indeed similar across neighbouring countries. To verify that this a priori plausible 
assumption holds in the data, I estimated the following regression: Aprijt = at + /3 x  Idistij +  eijt , where 
t is a time-dummy, Idistij is the logs of the bilateral distance between I and j  and where Aprij =  1 /relprij 
if relprij <  1 and relprij otherwise (relprijt =  {6a i / Qm i ) / {9A j / O M j ) ) -  This definition of Aprij assures 
that it takes on a value of unity for countries with identical relative productivities and is larger otherwise. A 
simple OLS regression yields a coefficient on Idistij of 0.30 which is significant at the 1%-level. This result 
is robust to the inclusion of dummies for reporter and/or partner countries.
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Dependent Variable
Reqressor (1) Its h a re M gdp (2) It share Mg dp (3) It share Mg dp (4) ItshareMcDP
log(RELPR)
log(CAND)
log(CAo)
log(AP)
log(POP)
log(CEN)
0.190
(3.20)**
0.152
(4.51)**
0.312
(2.73)**
0.183 p. 178] 
(3.08)**
0.151
(4.49)**
0.290
(2.45)*
-0.027 [-0.026] 
(0-41)
0.308 
(5.77)** 
0.173 
(5.58)** 
0.200 
(1.93) +
-1.984 [-0.114] 
(2.15)* 
0.305 
(7.60)** 
0.165 
(5.59)** 
0.254 
(2.31)*
Year dummies 
for 1980/1990 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 163 163 163 163
R-squared 0.29 0.28 0.46 0.47
Notes: Table displays coefficients and t statistics (based on robust standard errors clustered on coun­
tries) for OLS estimations. Coefficients in square brackets represent the impact of a one standard 
deviation change in the corresponding variable (see section 3.4.3 for details). The dependent variable 
is the logistic transformation of a country’s share of manufacturing in GDP. RELPR is the quotient 
of a country’s agricultural labour productivity and its labour productivity in manufacturing. CA n d  
and CAd  are the non-trade-cost-weighted and trade cost-weighted comparative advantage of a country 
(see text for a definition). POP is a country’s population size, AP its labour productivity in agriculture 
and CEN its centrality measure (defined in the text). All regressors in logs. Results on the included 
constant are suppressed. For data sources see appendix 3.C. +, *, and ** signify statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Table 3.1: OLS Results for Small Sample
distribution of centrality (this would correspond to moving Brazil to the geo­
graphic position of Ireland). According to the estimates from my preferred specification 
(column 4), this would raise its manufacturing share by about a third.
3.4.3 Robustness Checks
There are a number o f concerns with these basic specifications. The first two arise from 
the trade cost-weighting used in the second comparative advantage measure (C A p j). 
First, the weighting implies much lower values for both mean and standard deviation in 
this second measure than in the non-trade-cost-weighted measure. Accordingly, regres­
sion coefficients on the two measures are not directly comparable. Columns 3 and 4 thus 
display the impact on the dependent variable of a one standard deviation change in the 
corresponding comparative advantage measure in square brackets next to the original co­
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efficient. As seen, above results stay qualitatively intact, although the adjustment makes 
clear that the bias introduced by not performing trade cost-weighting is similar in size to 
the one due to omitting agricultural productivity. Second, trade cost-weighting also re­
duces the values of comparative advantage measures of remote countries relative to more 
central ones. However, the inclusion of my centrality measure in all regressions should in 
principle pick up differences in the level of industrialization that are related to the degree 
of remoteness of a country. Also note that any remaining bias would tend to be positive 
as long as peripheral countries are at a disadvantage in industrializing, thus strengthening 
my results.
Finally, there are a few potential econometric problems. Starting with reverse 
causality, increases in the share of manufacturing in GDP could lead to increases in 
both output per worker in manufacturing and agriculture. The former might be due to 
leaming-by-doing effects on productivity or increased incentives for physical and human 
capital accumulation. The latter could be expected to arise from better availability of fac­
tors of production such as fertilizer or machinery and technological spillovers from the 
manufacturing sector.51 These considerations suggest biases on the coefficient on agri­
cultural output per worker and possibly comparative advantage. Second, omitted variable 
bias is an obvious problem. For example, the quality of local institutions might influence 
the incentives for technology adaptation or human and physical capital accumulation and 
influence both comparative advantage and agricultural productivity and the size of man­
ufacturing’s share in GDP.
I try to address these issues by instrumental variables estimation. As instruments 
for comparative advantage, I use the fraction of a country’s land area situated within 
different climate zones, its mean elevation and indices of soil- and irrigation suitability. 
For agricultural productivity, I additionally include the prevalence of malaria, and for 
population, land area is used.52 Finally, I instrument centrality with the m inim um dis­
tance to one of the world’s three main markets (Japan, the U.S. and the Netherlands as 
the approximate centre of the EU). Appendix 3.C provides more details on the different 
instruments.
51 See Gallup (1998) on determinants of agricultural output.
52 Malaria prevalence is supposed not to matter for comparative advantage as it is not clear whether its 
detrimental influence on productivity is biased in favor of agriculture or manufacturing (Gallup et al., 1999).
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Dependent Variable
Regressor (1) ItshareMGDP (2) ItshareMGDP (3) ItshareM cD P
log(CAwD) 0.160 |D. 137] -0.133 [-0.114]
(0.90) (0.83)
log(CAo) -7.357 [-0.384]
(2.60)**
log(AP) 0.355 0.281
(4.80)** (4.79)**
log(POP) 0.175 0.177 0.157
(3.82)** (2.90)** (3.24)**
log(CEN) 0.452 0.243 0.427
(1.69)+ (1.35) (2.47)*
01D test, p-value based 
on Hanson's J 0.17 0.37 0.69
First-stage F-stats^p- 6.04/0.00 (CAnd) 7.514100 (CAND) 7.21 (CAo)
value based on 11.80/0.00 (POP) 12.744D.00 (AP) 12.74 (AP)
excluded instruments 37.23/0.00 (CEN) 10.8043.00 (POP) 10.80 (POP)
42.3443.00 (CEN) 42.34 (CEN)
Year dummies for 
1980/1990
Yes Yes Yes
Observations 127 127 127
Notes: Table displays coefficients and z statistics (based on robust standard errors clustered on coun­
tries) for instrumental variable estimations. Coefficients in square brackets represent the impact of a 
one standard deviation change in the corresponding variable (see section 3.4.3 for details). The depen­
dent variable is the logistic transformation of a country’s share of manufacturing in GDP. CAjvz? and 
CAd  are the non-trade-cost-weighted and trade cost-weighted comparative advantage of a country (see 
text for a definition). POP is a country’s population size, AP its labour productivity in agriculture and 
CEN its centrality measure (defined in the text). See appendix 3.C for details on data sources. Instru­
ments are the fraction of a country’s land area situated within different climate zones, its mean eleva­
tion, indices of soil suitability, the prevalence of malaria, land area and the minimum distance to the 
world’s main markets (see text and appendix 3.C for details). All regressors in logs. Results on the inclu­
ded constant are suppressed. +, *, and ** signify statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Table 3.2: IVE Results for Small Sample
As reported in table 3.2, a test of the model’s overidentifying restrictions based on 
Hanson’s'J statistic does not reject the instruments’ validity. Table 3.2 also presents the 
results for the corresponding 2SLS regressions. The main changes as compared to the 
OLS specification aire a strong increase in the magnitudes of the coefficient on the trade 
cost-weighted comparative advantage measure and a general drop in the precision of the 
coefficient estimates (which is partly due to the reduction in the number of observations 
necessitated by instrument availability). The overall qualitative impression from the OLS 
regressions, however, stays intact: the non-trade-cost-weighted measure of comparative 
advantage is positive but drops considerably once agricultural productivity is included. 
Applying trade cost-weighting reduces the coefficient further, though the large magnitude 
of the coefficient on the trade cost-weighted measure is again misleading. As
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Reqressor (1) ItshareM (2) ItshareM
log(CEN) 0.445 0.512
(3.38)** (2.97)**
log (POP) 0.184 1 2 8 0
(8.11)** (13.33)**
log(GDPpc) 0.235 0.365
(5.01)** (10.67)**
Year dummies? Yes Yes
Country dummies;? No Yes
Observations 2142 2142
R-squared 0.40 0.15 (within)
Notes: Table displays coefficients and t statistics (based on robust standard errors clustered on coun­
tries) for OLS estimations. The dependent variable is the logistic transformation of a country’s share 
of manufacturing in GDP. POP is a country’s population size, GDPpc its per capita income (in 1995 
USD) and CEN its centrality measure (defined in the text). All regressors in logs. Results on die in­
cluded constant are suppressed. For data sources see appendix C. +, *, and ** signify statistical sig­
nificance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Table 3.3: OLS results for Large Sample (1980-1999)
the standardised coefficients (reported in square brackets) indicate, the reduction in 
bias induced by trade cost-weighting is again similar to that induced by including agricul­
tural productivity. The findings on the role of domestic and foreign market size also seem 
to be robust to instrumentation. The coefficients on both log (PO P) and log (C E N ) are 
of similar magnitude as in the OLS specifications. Levels of significance are somewhat 
reduced but again this is probably partly due to the reduction in sample size.
As a final piece of evidence, I provide some further results on the importance of 
centrality for industrialization. As already alluded to, data availability problems lead to 
a significant reduction in sample size when working with agricultural productivity and 
comparative advantage. Excluding these two regressors increases the sample size more 
than tenfold since I can now use observations for every year from 1980 to 1999. The 
exclusion of agricultural productivity also allows the use of per capita GDP as an ad­
ditional regressor without running into problems of multicollinearity (compare footnote 
51). Besides controlling for the purchasing power of the local population, this variable 
also partly captures supply-side characteristics such as human and physical capital per 
worker and production technologies. Column 1 of table 3.3 reports results for an OLS 
regression pooled over the period 1980-1999 with a full set of year dummies. Column 2 
takes advantage of the panel character of this enlarged sample by including country fixed 
effects, thus controlling for potential problems arising from unobserved time-invariant
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heterogeneity across countries. Both regressions give a similar picture as the results for 
the smaller sample: Iboth the size of the domestic market and access to foreign markets 
seem to matter for levels of industrialization. If anything, controlling for country specific 
effects implies an even stronger role for centrality.53
3.5 Summary
This chapter started out by drawing attention to two empirical observations that are puz­
zling from the point of view of existing theories of industrialization: the apparent im­
portance of proximity to foreign markets and the surprising positive correlation between 
traditional measures o f comparative advantage in agriculture and the share of manufac­
turing in GDP. A formal model was developed that combined a key element of theories of 
demand-driven industrialization - non-homothetic preferences - with a richer geographi­
cal structure by introducing multiple locations and trade costs. It was then demonstrated 
how such an approach can help explain the above empirical correlations. A more careful 
test of the model’s predictions found further support for the importance of costly inter­
national trade and relative geographic location for levels of industrialization.
A couple of important insights arise from these findings. First, it seems that cen­
trality in the sense of better economic integration with the rest of the world is beneficial 
for industrialization in developing countries. Secondly and more subtly, economic ge­
ography also seems to matter crucially for local specialization patterns. In essence, my 
findings imply that traditional measures of comparative advantage do not do justice to 
the more complex interactions between locations - which are shaped to a large degree 
by the existence of trade costs. The empirical results of this chapter show that this is 
not only a theoretical consideration. Indeed, it is only the use of the correct (i.e. trade 
cost-weighted) measure of comparative advantage that yields results consistent with the­
oretical predictions. In this sense, economic geography helps to significantly improve 
our understanding of the fundamental determinants of industrialization and of global 
trade and production patterns more generally.
53 Given that my preferred instrument for centrality (distance to main markets) is time-invariant, instru­
mental variables estimation is not feasible for this larger sample (fixed effects are generally ruled out and 
even in the year-dummy-only case, all identificaton would come from cross-sectional variation in distances 
- so we are basically back to the results presented in table 3.2).
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3. A Proof of Propositions
Proof of Proposition One
-„M I =  (<TM -  1 )F  (E l)
For convenience, I restate the manufacturing goods market clearing condition (El):
/  R-n w  I  1
wi .
y ' = i
As the right-hand side of this equation is identical across locations, I obtain the equilib­
rium conditions:
V ™  ^ E Ti r M fM T lE ^  =  VI,m (E2)
In the following, I take the price of the agricultural good in location I as the numeraire. 
This pins down the wage rate in that location at wi =  9ai since pai =  Now consider 
in turn the three cases proposed:
1. Infinitely high trade costs (’’closed economy”). For Ty —> oo for all I ^  j ,  all terms 
involving T ^ (™ with T  >  1 drop out (since <jm  > 1 by assumption) and (E2) 
simplifies to:
w r - P Z r ' B m  =  VI,m
As can be easily verified, this holds for any combination of wi and Wm- Similarly, 
(El) holds as am identity in each location. Intuitively, we are back to the case of 
R  closed economies. This implies that we are effectively examining R  general 
equilibria in which as usual only relative prices are determinate. However, the 
manufacturing share in GDP is uniquely determined from equation (MS) which 
simplifies to:
MShareQDP,i =  ~
Intuitively, a share a  (the share of manufacturing in non-subsistence expenditure) 
of all labour not used on the production of the subsistence level will be employed in 
manufacturing.
2. Zero trade costs (’’free trade”). For Ty =  1 Vi, j  the second set of brackets on 
each side of (E2) are identical across locations and cancel out, yielding the solution
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W\ =  u>2 — ... =  w r  =  9Ai• The share of manufacturing in GDP is now given by: 
MSharectDPji =  1 -  (1 -  a)CAz x #  -  x
VAl
where:
o*-(g(£H)"
3. Identical parameters and bilateral trade costs across locations: Again, the second set
of brackets is identical across locations and cancels out and we obtain once more 
w\ =  u>2 =  ... =  w r =  9Ah The share of manufacturing in GDP can now be 
expressed as:
M SharecDPi =  1 -  R ^ T ^ - ^ l  -  a) -
vA
Proof of Proposition Two
From the standard OLS-formula for the case of a constant and one (stochastic) regressor 
we have:
R R
^2 (C A i -  C A )  (M S h a re G D P j ~  M S h a re c D P ,i) ^  J2 ~  (v i ~  *>)
K  = — ----------------- 5 -------------------------------------------=  P i + - ^ T t ------------------------
E  (CA, -  CA)2 £  E  (CA, -  CA)2
1 = 1  1 = 1
Under the usual regularity conditions, Khinchine’s law of large numbers and Slutzky’s
theorem apply. Thus, as R  becomes large the above expression converges in probability
t0 £ i  +  variCAt) -54 f a l l i n g  that vt =  (PiCAJ -  /31 CA{) +  $ 29Ai +  £t and expanding
the latter term yields
,  , 01-® [CA, (CA) — CA,)] 0 2E [C A t8Al] E  [CA,e,] 
ph m 01 =  fi1+  — ^ ----------+  var{C A l) + ^ ( C A r i  =
where for the last step I assumed that the measurement error (CA* — CAi) is uncorre­
lated with si and that the usual OLS assumption E  [CAfei] =  0 holds. Furthermore, 
since var (CA{) >  0 and E  [CAi9Ai] >  0, we have that > 0. Finally, as T ^ aA < 1 
for all foreign locations, we have that CA*[ — CAi <  0 and that 9 C^qI ^ A  ^ <  0. Thus 
E  [CAi (CA* — CAi)\ < 0. It follows that B \ >  0 which completes the proof.
54 The second step below requires the assumption E{v{) =  0 which is innocuous since the regression 
contains a constant.
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3.B Simulation Parameters
In the simulations of this chapter, trade cost matrices take the form:
/ l  +  d ( l , l ) x T  l  +  d ( l , 2 ) x T  1 +  d(l,  3) x T  \
1 +  d(2,1) x T 1 +  d(2,2) x T l  +  d ( 2 , 3 ) x T
\  1 +  d(3,1) x T 1 +  d(3,2) x T  l  +  d ( 3 , 3 ) x T /
where d(i, j )  stands for distance from i to j  and T  for per distance unit trade costs. The
remaining parameters are as follows:
Figure 3.3: Increase in agricultural productivity in location 3
Initial position: a a =  &M =  5, R  =  3, A =  [0.2 0.2 0.2], a  =  [0.7 0.7 0.7], 0^ =  [1 1 
1], 0M =  [1.25 1.25 1.25], dist =  [0 1 2; 1 0 1; 2 1 0]
Change in agricultural productivity in location 3 from 1 to 1.2. Per unit trade costs as in­
dicated in figure 3.3.
Figure 3.4: Relative productivity and manufacturing share in GDP
Initial position: a a =  &m  =  5, R  =  3, A =  [0.2 0.2 0.2], a  =  [0.7 0.7 0.7], 6 a =  [1 1 
1], 0M =  [1-25 1.25 1.25], dist =  [0 3 4; 3 0 1; 4 1 0].
Then increase in agricultural productivity in location 3 (left panel) and locations 2 and 3 
(right panel). Increases in percentages of initial productivity values as indicated in fig­
ures.
Figure 3.5: Impact of Centrality at different levels of trade costs and relative elas­
ticities of substitution
Figure 3.5a: a A =  &m  =  5, R  =  3, A =  [0.5 0.5 0.5], a  =  [0.7 0.7 0.7], 6A =  [ 11 1],
dM =  [1 1 1], dist =  [0 1 2; 1 0 1; 2 1 0]
Figure 3.5b: cta/ vm  =  as indicated in figure {ctm =  5), R  =  3, A =  [0 0 0], a  =  [0.7
0.7 0.7], 6a =  [ 1 1 II, 6m  =  [ 111],  dist =  [0 1 2; 1 0 1; 2 1 0]
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3.C Description of Data used in Section 3.4
Dependent variables and regressors
V ariable Source
Gross domestic/national productin 199.5 USD 
Per capita GDP in 1995 USD 
Share of manufactuting value added in GDP 
(1995 USD)
Population size
Bilateral distances between countries
V eiue added per worker in agriculture and 
industry(1995 USD)
V elue added per worker in manufacturing (1995 
USD)
WarldDevelcpment Indicators 2001 
World Development Indicators 2001 
World Development Indicators 2001
World Development Indie ators 2001 
NBER World Trade Database (Feenstra et 
al., 1997, Feenstra, 2000)
Wcdd Development Indie ators 2001
Unite d N ations Industrial Stati sti cs 
Database 2001
Instrumental variables
V ariable Description Explanations
mindist Minimum distance to main 
markets
soilsuil Mean soil suitability 1, very 
suitable (%) 
soil sui2 Me an soil suitability 2, 
moderately suitable (%) 
irrsuitl Mean irrigation suitability, very 
suitable (%) 
irrsuit2 Me an irri gation suitability 
m oderately suitabl e (%) 
elev Mean elevation 
malfa!94 Malaria index, 1994
area Areai(sqkm) 
zpolar P olar re g  ons (% land ar ea) 
zboreal B ore al re gons (% land ar ea) 
z de sttemp T emperate de serts (% 1 and ar ea) 
z drytemp DryT emperate (% land are $ 
z wettemp WeltT emp erate (% 1 and ar ea) 
zsubtrop Subtropics (% land area) 
ztropics Tropics (% land area) 
zdesttrp Tropical deserts (% land area)
Minimum distance (inkm) to either of 
N etherlands, USA or J apan 
Soil suitability is an estimate of the 
percentage of each soil type thatis very 
suitable, moderately suitable and unsuitable 
for each of six rainfed crops 
Irrigation suitability is an estimate of the 
percentage of soil that is very suitable, 
moderately suitable and unsuitable for two 
irrigated rice crops
Mean elevation (meters above sea level) 
Index of malaria prevalence based on a 
global map of extent of malaria in 
1994 (WHO, 1997), and Hie fraction of 
falciparum malaria 
Land area
Fraction of land area stuated in the specified 
dimate zone
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List of country codes used (World Bank Income Group in brackets 
after country name)
ALB (Albania, LM), DZA (Algeria, LM), AGO (Angola, L), ATG (Antigua and Bar­
buda, UM), ARG (Argentina, UM), ARM (Armenia, L), AUS (Australia, HOECD), AUT 
(Austria, HOECD), BUR (Bahrain, UM), BGD (Bangladesh, L), BRB (Barbados, UM), 
BLR (Belarus, LM), BEL (Belgium, HOECD), BLZ (Belize, LM), BEN (Benin, L), 
BTN (Bhutan, L), BOL (Bolivia, LM), BWA (Botswana, UM), BRA (Brazil, UM), BRN 
(Brunei, HNO), BFA (Burkina Faso, L), BDI (Burundi, L), KHM (Cambodia, L), CMR 
(Cameroon, L), CAN (Canada, HOECD), CPV (Cape Verde, LM), CAF (Central African 
Republic, L), TCD (Chad, L), CHL (Chile, UM), CHN (China, LM), COL (Colombia, 
LM), COM (Comoros, L), ZAR (Congo, Dem. Rep., L), COG (Congo, Rep., L), CRI 
(Costa Rica, LM), CIV (Cote d’Ivoire, L), HRV (Croatia, UM), CYP (Cyprus, HNO), 
DKF (Denmark, HOECD), DJI (Djibouti, LM), DMA (Dominica, UM), DOM (Domini­
can Republic, LM), ECU (Ecuador, LM), EGY (Egypt, Arab Rep., LM), SLV (El Sal­
vador, LM), GNQ (Equatorial Guinea, LM), ERI (Eritrea, L), EST (Estonia, UM), ETH 
(Ethiopia, L), FJI (Fiji, LM), FIN (Finland, HOECD), GAB (Gabon, UM), GMB (Gam­
bia, The, L), DEU (Germany, HOECD), GHA (Ghana, L), GRC (Greece, HOECD), 
GRD (Grenada, UM), GTM (Guatemala, LM), GIN (Guinea, L), GNB (Guinea-Bissau, 
L), GUY (Guyana, LM), HTI (Haiti, L), HND (Honduras, LM), HKG (Hong Kong, 
China, HNO), HUN (Hungary, UM), IND (India, L), IDM (Indonesia, L), IRN (Iran, 
Islamic Rep., LM), ITA (Italy, HOECD), JAM (Jamaica, LM), JPN (Japan, HOECD), 
JOR (Jordan, LM), KAZ (Kazakhstan, LM), KEN (Kenya, L), KIR (Kiribati, LM), KOR 
(Korea, Rep., UM), KWT (Kuwait, HNO), KGZ (Kyrgyz Republic, L), LAO (Lao PDR, 
L), LVA (Latvia, LM), LTU (Lithuania, LM), MDG (Madagascar, L), MWI (Malawi, 
L), MYS (Malaysia, UM), MDV (Maldives, LM), MLI (Mali, L), MLT (Malta, UM), 
MHL (Marshall Islands, LM), MRT (Mauritania, L), MUS (Mauritius, UM), MEX (Mex­
ico, UM), MAR (Morocco, LM), MOZ (Mozambique, L), MMR (Myanmar, L), NAM 
(Namibia, LM), NPL (Nepal, L), NLD (Netherlands, HOECD), NCL (New Caledonia, 
HNO), NZL (New Zealand, HOECD), NIC (Nicaragua, L), NER (Niger, L), NGA (Nige­
ria, L), OMN (Oman, UM), PAK (Pakistan, L), PLW (Palau, UM), PAN (Panama, UM), 
PNG (Papua New Guinea, LM), PRY (Paraguay, LM), PER (Peru, LM), PHL (Philip­
pines, LM), PRI (Puerto Rico, UM), RWA (Rwanda, L), WSM (Samoa, LM), STP (Sao
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Tome and Principe, L), SAU (Saudi Arabia, UM), SEN (Senegal, L), SYC (Seychelles, 
UM), SLE (Sierra Leone, L), SGP (Singapore, HNO), SVN (Slovenia, HNO), SOM (So­
malia, L), ZAF (South Africa, UM), LKA (Sri Lanka, LM), KNA (St. Kitts and Nevis, 
UM), LCA (St. Lucia, UM), VCT (St. Vincent and the Grenadines, LM), SUR (Suri­
name, LM), SWZ (Swaziland, LM), TZA (Tanzania, L), THA (Thailand, LM), TGO 
(Togo, L), TON (Tonga, LM), TTO (Trinidad and Tobago, UM), TUN (Tunisia, LM), 
TUR (Turkey, LM), UGA (Uganda, L), UKR (Ukraine, L), ARE (United Arab Emi­
rates, HNO), URY (Uruguay, UM), UZB (Uzbekistan, L), VUT (Vanuatu, LM), VEN 
(Venezuela, RB, UM), VNM (Vietnam, L), YEM (Yemen, Rep., L), ZMB (Zambia, L), 
ZWE, Zimbabwe, L)..
Key: L: low income, LM: lower middle income, UM: upper middle income, HOECD: 
high income, OECD; HNO: high income, non-OECD.
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Chapter 4 
Trade Liberalization and Industrial 
Restructuring through Mergers and 
Acquisitions55
4.1 Introduction
Recent economic research on the effects of trade liberalization has highlighted the im­
portance of studying the firm- and establishment-level adjustment processes triggered by 
freer trade (a short and inexhaustive list of contributions includes Tybout et al., 1991; 
Tybout and Westbrook, 1995; Pavcnik, 2002; and Trefler, 2004). A central insight from 
these studies is that a substantial part of the impact of freer trade works through a reallo­
cation of resources across individual plants and firms. In particular, the contraction and 
exit of low productivity establishments and the expansion of more productive ones can 
explain a sizeable share of aggregate productivity increases found in the wake of trade 
liberalizations (see Pavcnik, 2002; and Trefler, 2004).
While this literature has thus demonstrated the general importance of micro-level 
resource reallocation in understanding the effects of freer trade, the central issue of how 
resources are transferred between individual firms is still not sufficiently well understood. 
In particular, only scarce attention has been paid to resource transfers through the mar­
ket for corporate control, i.e. through mergers and acquisitions (M&A). This is despite 
the fact that M&A can, in principle, play a similar role as the adjustment processes high­
lighted in the existing literature. Instead of closing down establishments, reducing output 
or exiting altogether, firms also have the option to search for buyers interested in parts 
or the whole of their operations. Similarly, expanding firms can buy and integrate other 
firms rather than expand production at existing plants or open new ones. Establishment- 
level studies which focus on plant-level contraction, exit or expansion implicitly ignore
55 This chapter is based ran my job market paper of the same title. I am grateful to Stephen Redding, Keith 
Head, Anthony Venables, Henry Overman and seminar participants at the London School of Economics, the 
University of Nottingham, the University of Bristol and the NEG Spring School 2005 in Cagliari for helpful 
comments and suggestions.
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this potential margin o f adjustment since they do not look at changes in ownership at 
continuing plants.56
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate empirically whether M&A does indeed 
play a role in industrial restructuring in the face of trade liberalization. This is important 
for a number of reasons. First, studying M&A is necessary to obtain a more complete 
picture of the mechanisms firms use to adjust to freer trade and of the extent of inter-firm 
resource transfers involved in this adjustment. Second, M&A is not just another way of 
transferring resources but is likely to be qualitatively different from the other adjustment 
forms in that it is swifter and potentially more efficient. Instead of workers and capital 
becoming unemployed for some period before being rehired, acquisitions allow for an 
immediate transfer into new ownership. Also, M&A allows the takeover of entire pro­
duction structures which may be most efficient if preserved as a whole. Finally, knowing 
whether or not M&A plays an important role in firm adjustment to freer trade might also 
shed new light on results from previous plant-level studies. For example, reallocations 
of control rights at existing establishments and ensuing restructuring undertaken by the 
new management might be part of the reason for the important within-plant increases in 
productivity found in many studies (e.g. Tybout and Westbrook, 1995; Pavcnik, 2002).
The particular liberalization episode I will study in this chapter is the Canada- 
United States Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) of 1989. As will be argued in more 
detail, CUSFTA provides an ideal setting for the purpose of this study. Most importantly, 
it represented a clear-cut and unanticipated policy experiment which was not introduced 
in response to macroeconomic shocks nor accompanied by other major economic re­
forms. Furthermore, the main policy instrument used (tariff cuts) is easily quantifiable 
and shows a large variation across sectors. Finally, the large size difference between the 
treaty partners and ithe implied variation in expected responses to the integration shock 
further increases the potential for convincing econometric identification.
Against this background, I will present three main sets of findings. In a first step, 
I examine whether there is evidence that CUSFTA led to more M&A activity. Using a
56 Similarly, a smaller group of papers that use firms rather than plants or establishments as their unit of 
analysis focus on exit by bankruptcy as the principal form of adjustment and do not consider M&A (see 
for example Gu et al., 2003; or Baggs, 2004). Note that throughout this chapter, I will use the words 
’’establishment” and ’’plant” interchangeably to denote a unit of production within a firm.
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diflference-in-differences approach, I find a substantial increase in the number of domes­
tic Canadian transactions which is positively correlated with the magnitude of tariff cuts 
across sectors. There is also an effect on domestic U.S. M&A activity but one that is 
much less pronounced than in Canada, consistent with the idea that CUSFTA presented 
the bigger shock for the smaller Canadian market. Cross-border transactions show sub­
stantial changes around the implementation of CUSFTA as well, although the link to 
tariff cuts is less clear cut.
In a second step, I examine firm-level characteristics of targets and acquirers in or­
der to investigate whether acquisitions involve a transfer of resources from less to more 
productive firms, as seems to be the case for the previously studied channels of adjust­
ment (exit and contraction). This is indeed what I find: acquirers tend to be bigger, more 
profitable and more productive.
In a final step, I look at the amount of inter-firm transfers of output and employ­
ment in North America that were due to M&A during my sample period 1985-1997. 
Comparing results to resource transfers via exit and contraction, I find that M&A was 
quantitatively important relative to these alternative channels of adjustment. Taken to­
gether, these results suggest that M&A is an important alternative to the adjustment 
mechanisms of firm and establishment closure and contraction that have been empha­
sised in earlier research.
A number of recent theoretical contributions in International Trade have also stud­
ied firm-level reallocation processes triggered by trade liberalization (Melitz, 2003; Bernard 
et al., 2003; Bernard et al., 2004; and Falvey et al., 2004). Similar to the empirical liter­
ature on plant- and firm-level adjustment by which they were motivated, however, they 
do not examine M&A as a form of resource transfer. Another group of papers in Interna­
tional Trade does look at M&A but mostly in the form of cross-border transactions and 
in the context of foreign direct investment (e.g. Gorg, 2000; Horn and Persson, 2001; 
Nocke and Yeaple, 2004; di Giovanni, 2005). Rather than analysing M&A as a means of 
industry restructuring, they examine its role as an alternative form of foreign market ac­
cess in addition to greenfield investment and exports. Bertrand and Zitouna (2005) and 
Neary (2005) present models in which M&A is a way of restructuring industries after 
trade liberalization, but they also restrict their analysis to cross-border mergers. In con­
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trast, several theoretical contributions in Industrial Organisation have directly focused on 
M&A as a mechanism for transferring resources between domestic firms. In particular, 
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002, 2004) use models with heterogenous firms to show how 
M&A can serve as a complement to exit and internal adjustment to firm- and industry- 
specific shocks. However, they restrict their attention to closed-economy settings and 
only analyse domestic shocks.
On the empirical side, contributions in Corporate Finance and Industrial Organi­
sation have since long pointed out that M&A can play a substantial role in restructuring 
industries and that its consequences go far beyond a mere change in ownership (e.g. 
Jensen, 1993; Kaplan, 2000; Copeland et al., 2003). Specifically related to the question 
at hand, authors like Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) or Andrade and Stafford (2004) 
have shown that M&A is indeed frequently used as a way of firm expansion and comple­
ments or replaces internal investment in that respect. Comparisons of empirical studies 
also show that acquisitions perform very similarly to other forms of investment in terms 
of abnormal stock market returns (Andrade et al., 2001). On the target’s side, takeovers 
usually bring large abnormal gains in share prices and most acquired assets show signif­
icant increases in productivity (Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001; Andrade et al., 2001). 
Finally, a number of recent studies have succeeded in directly linking increases in M&A 
activity to domestic shocks like deregulation and financial innovation (Mitchell and Mul- 
herin, 1996; Mulherin and Boone, 2000; Andrade and Stafford, 2004). The question of 
whether M&A also plays a role in the industrial restructuring necessitated by trade lib­
eralization, however, has not yet been addressed in a rigorous way. While there is some 
descriptive and anecdotal evidence to the affirmative (Chudnovsky, 2000; OECD, 2001), 
no clear econometric results have been presented so far.57 This is the gap that I will try 
to fill in this last thesis chapter.
57 An earlier study by Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and a recent working paper by Greenaway et al. (2005) 
present (mixed) evidenoe on the link between import penetration rates and M&A. However, since there is 
no exogenous variation in this measure of exposure to trade, it is not obvious whether their results can 
be interpreted in favor or against a link between trade liberalization and M&A. For example, any negative 
productivity shock that triggers restructuring of a given industry is likely to involve M&A (see Andrade et 
al., 2001). At the same itime, the decline in the sector’s relative productivity as compared to the rest of the 
world will lead to more imports and a higher import penetration rate. Such issues are reminiscent of the 
problems which plagued earlier studies on the link between trade and mark-ups, firm size or productivity (as 
discussed in Tybout, 2001, or Fernandes, 2003).
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The remainder of Chapter 4 is structured as follows. Section 4.2 presents a simple 
model of trade liberalization and resource transfer via M&A. This section is intended to 
highlight the principal economic mechanisms at work and to give some guidance for the 
subsequent empirical analysis. Section 4.3 provides additional background information 
on CUSFTA and section 4.4 describes the data. Section 4.5 proceeds to an empirical in­
vestigation of changes in M&A activity in the wake of CUSFTA, section 4.6 compares 
characteristics of targets and acquirers and section 4.7 provides evidence on the quanti­
tative importance of M&A as a form of resource transfer. I conclude with a summary of 
findings in section 4.8,
4.2 Theoretical Framework
How might trade liberalization lead to increases in M&A activity? This section presents 
a simple model of M&A as a means of resource transfer between firms in order to il­
lustrate one potential mechanism. The model’s underlying idea is that all firms possess 
assets that are of interest to other firms, like specific production skills, marketing capa­
bilities or physical capital (in the following I will simply talk of capital). Changes in 
demand and supply conditions will lead to changes in firm-specific demand for these as­
sets, with expanding firms wanting to increase their stocks and contracting firms looking 
for potential buyers. The M&A market then provides a channel through which the nec­
essary transfer can take place. Against this background, I study the effect of the demand 
shock arising from bilateral trade liberalizations such as CUSFTA. The crucial feature of 
this shock is its differential effect across firms with different levels of productivity. As a 
number of studies have shown, setting up export activities is costly and requires an initial 
investment (see Roberts and Tybout, 1997; Bernard and Jensen, 2004). Thus, only more 
productive firms that can afford these fixed costs will benefit from liberalization through 
increased exporting opportunities. Low productivity firms, in contrast, will suffer lower 
profits due to more intense product market competition from foreign firms while at the 
same time being unable to benefit from better access to the foreign market.58 Thus, while 
exporters need additional capital in order to expand operations, non-exporters attach less
58 This differential effect o f bilateral trade liberalizations across firms is also analysed in Melitz (2003).
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value to their existing capital stock. The presence of an M&A market then allows the 
two parties to engage in a mutually beneficial transfer of capital.
The model presented below tries to capture this intuition in the simplest possible 
framework, building on the earlier contributions by Melitz (2003) and Jovanovic and 
Rousseau (2002). I analyse a setting with two symmetric countries in which M&A is 
used to transfer capital between firms with different productivity levels. I start in an 
initial steady state equilibrium in which firms have already acquired the optimal capital 
stocks associated with the prevailing level of trade costs. I then shock this equilibrium by 
an unanticipated lowering of trade barriers which triggers a transfer of capital via M&A 
from non-exporters to exporters (i.e. from less productive to more productive firms).
4.2.1 Model Setup and Initial Equilibrium
Following Melitz (2003), I analyse a setting with two symmetric countries, home and 
foreign. In each country, firms produce differentiated varieties under monopolistic com­
petition. Constant per-period demand in the initial steady state is generated by standard 
CES preferences:
where T is the set of varieties available (both domestically produced and imported) and 
q(7 ) is consumption of any given variety. Utility maximisation by consumers yields 
demand (q) and expenditure levels (r) of any variety 7  as q(7 ) =  p ^ ^ P ^ ^ E  and 
r(7 ) =  p('y)1~aP a~1E. In these expressions, ^(7 ) is the price of variety 7 , a >  1 the 
elasticity of substitution between any two varieties and P  the CES price index defined 
as P  =  [I1£rP('y)1<T<^ 'y\ 1  ^• Total expenditure E  consists of aggregate profits only 
which I normalise to one in the following.
Turning to the supply side, I assume for simplicity that varieties are produced using 
non-depreciating capital (k) as the only factor of production. Firms are heterogenous in 
productivity levels {ip) and the amount of capital required to produce a given amount of 
output (q) is given by k =  ^ +  F. This production function implies a minimum capital 
stock of F  which firms need to acquire in order to enter the market.
<7 — 1
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Both economies are endowed with a fixed capital stock of K  which is owned by 
firms. Capital is traded on an M&A market at a price of i / ( l  — 5) where 6 is the exoge­
nously given and time-invariant discount factor (and i is thus the amortized per-period 
cost of acquiring one unit of capital). Writing the M&A price in this way facilitates the 
comparison of lifetime revenues and costs needed below for the firms’ optimisation prob­
lem. Capital acquired on the M&A market takes on the acquirer’s productivity <p after 
acquisition but I assume that the target’s variety cannot be used.59 Note that it would be 
straightforward to allow for internal investment or a market for used capital as additional 
channels through which firms can adjust their capital stocks. Since none of the princi­
pal findings would be changed by these extensions, however, I prefer to stick to the more 
tractable model outlined here.60
As said, I consider an initial steady state equilibrium in which no firm has an 
incentive to exit or enter the market or change its capital stock level. First consider 
the determination of the optimal capital stock of active firms in this equilibrium. With 
every unit of capital firms hold in addition to F, they can generate per-period revenues 
of pp  but face opportunity costs of i / ( l  — 5) since they could also offer their capi­
tal for sale on the M&A market. Since every firm is a monopolist for its variety, it 
chooses a price-output combination that maximizes total discounted profits, given by 
ttt(p ) =  -j^j — +  F1)  The optimal levels of prices and per-period output
are thus p(p)  =  and q(p) =  P a~l , requiring a capital stock of
kd(v) = |y=i i — cr ^ p U — l  p a —1 +  F
In addition to selling domestically, active firms can also export to the foreign mar­
ket. However, they incur variable iceberg-type trade cost in doing so, i.e. for every unit 
they ship only 1 / r  units arrive (compare Chapter 2, section 2.2.1). The corresponding ex-
59 The assumption thait productivity is owner-specific is standard in the theoretical literature on M&A to 
assure the profitability of mergers (e.g. Bjomvatn, 2004; Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002). It is consistent with 
empirical observations for the U.S. that plant productivity increases after acquisitions by more productive 
owners and decreases if the acquirer’s plants are less efficient on average (Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001). 
On the other hand, ruling out use of a target’s variety eliminates incentives for the most productive firm to 
take over all remaining firms. This should be thought of as the limiting case of a model where firms face 
increasing costs for integrating new products or varieties into their operations.
60 Internal investment could be introduced, for example, by allowing firms to employ labour from an addi­
tional sector to produce new capital. Distinguishing a market for used capital from the M&A market would 
be possible by introducing variable costs for adapting capital for sale on the former market (see Jovanovic 
and Rousseau, 2002). These additional forms of adjustment would put upper and lower bounds on the M&A 
price but would not eliminate resource transfers via M&A in reaction to trade liberalization.
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port price is thus px(p) =  ^  and per-period exports are qx (p) =  ^  P a~l .
In addition to incurriijng the variable trade costs measured by r, exporters also have to 
make a one-time capital investment of Fx in order to serve the foreign market. Thus, to­
tal capital demand for export production is kx(p) =  p a~l P a~1 +  Fx. Note
that the investment Fx is needed in addition to the domestic setup capital F  and can 
be thought of as adapting products to foreign standards, establishing local distribution 
networks etc. (see Roberts and Tybout, 1997).
Given active firms’ optimal capital stocks, it remains to determine the set of ac­
tive firms. In each market, there is a large number (Me) of potential entrants. Firm 
productivities are mitially drawn at random from a cumulative distribution V(p)  but all 
firms acquire knowledge about their productivity parameter p  before entry, i.e. before 
acquiring the minimum capital amount F  or any additional capital.61 Thus, only those 
firms will produce for which the sum of discounted future operating profits given by 
is at least equal to the setup costs Fi/(1  — 5). Similarly, only firms that 
can cover the fixed exporting cost Fxi / (  1 — 6) through future exporting profits will en­
ter the export market. These two entry conditions can be used to obtain expressions 
for the threshold productivities at which production for the domestic and foreign market 
becomes profitable (denoted p* and p x, respectively). Appendix 4.A to this chapter pro­
vides the corresponding derivations and results but my interest here is on the resulting 
levels of capital demand for domestic and export production.
Demand for capital for domestic production (kd) comes from all firms with ip >  p* 
while firms with p  >  tp* need additional capital (kx) to produce for the export market. 
To obtain explicit solutions for p*, p*, kd, and kx, I choose a specific distributional 
form for V(p). In line with other contributions in the heterogenous firm literature (e.g. 
Melitz and Ottaviano, 2005), I let <p be Pareto-distributed, i.e. with cumulative density 
V(p)  =  l -  , where k >  0, a >  a — 1 > 0 ,  and p  > k . With these assumptions, I 
can determine the market clearing price i / (1 — 6) and derive total capital stocks used for
61 Introducing uncertainty of potential entrants about their future productivity levels combined with an 
exogenous probability of firm death as in Melitz (2003) would allow generating continuous entry and exit of 
firms and steady state M&A activity (in the sense that entrants with insufficient productivity would want to 
immediately resell their assets). However, the basic intuition of trade liberalization leading to a reshuffling 
of resources to more productive firms can equally well be captured in the simpler model presented here.
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exporting and domestic production (see appendix 4. A for details):
a  — 1 —a H — 1
Kd =f  kd (ip) Mev (ip) dip =  K  1 + r (4.1)
J <?=<?•
(4.2)
where ^a\ a <  0  since by assumption a >  a — 1 > 0 .
4.2.2 Bilateral Trade Liberalization
Now consider an unanticipated decline in variable trade costs r. Similar to Melitz (2003), 
I focus on a comparison of the old and the new steady state equilibrium and in particular 
on the changes in capital allocation between the two equilibria. It is clear from (4.1) and
(4.2) that the amount of capital used for domestic and export production will be differ­
ent in the new equilibrium, with K x increasing and K d decreasing. Intuitively, increased 
presence of foreign exporters will lower revenues for local firms from production for the 
domestic market, implying lower returns to a firm’s existing capital stock. Consequently, 
import-competing firms offer part of their capital stock for sale on the M&A market and 
any firm with ip below the new entry threshold ip* will use M&A to exit the market al­
together. While trade liberalization thus leads to an increase of supply in M&A capital, 
it also increases capital demand for export production. This is since lower costs for ac­
cessing the foreign market imply larger market shares for exporters who in turn demand 
additional capital. Better access to foreign markets also lowers the minimum productiv­
ity level required for profitable exporting (<£*), leading to an increase in the number of 
exporters.
Since the total capital stock per country is fixed at AT, the price of capital will 
adjust such that any increase in export capital demand is offset by an equal decrease in 
capital demand for domestic production. Thus, the total amount of reallocation of capital 
into export production can be determined by differentiating either of expressions (4.1) or
(4.2) with respect to x. Opting for (4.1), I obtain:
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J — 1 — q
where I defined A =  r~a (^f) a_1 > 0 as an overall measure of initial trade costs.
The total amount of capital transfers is simply the absolute value of this derivative, i.e. 
T  =  \dKd\. Since a, K ,  A and r  are all positive, T  can be written as:
T  =  aXK.  \dr\ (4.3)
[1 +  A] r 1
That is, the amount of resource transfer via M&A is increasing in the magnitude of trade 
liberalization (as captured by |dr | ) .62 Also note that capital is channelled from non­
exporters to exporters. Since the presence of fixed exporting costs means that only the 
most productive among the active firms will export, the transfer of capital is in effect 
from less to more productive firms (see appendix 4.A for a formal derivation). Finally,
note that revenues (r) and per-period profits net of capital costs (that is, ( 1  — <5) •kt) are
increasing functions o f productivity p  in this model. This implies that acquiring firms 
are also larger (in terms of sales) and more profitable than targets.
4.2.3 Extensions and Questions for the Empirical Analysis
Although the model just presented is highly stylised, its central intuition holds much 
more generally: trade liberalization has asymmetric effects across firms which in turn ne­
cessitates a redistribution of resources via M&A. In the within-industry setting analysed 
here, this leads to the prediction that decreases in bilateral trade barriers lead to a transfer 
of resources from import-competing firms to new and existing exporters. While a within- 
sector analysis will be part of the empirics, it is however useful to be aware of whether 
and how the theoretical results would have to be modified in a more general setting.
First, while the model assumes two symmetric trading partners, the U.S. market is 
about ten times the size of the Canadian market. This suggests that trade liberalization 
should have a much stronger effect on M&A activity in Canada since increases in both 
import competition and exporting opportunities will be substantially bigger there.63
62 Note that interpreting the whole of T  as M&A assumes that the export and domestic production unit 
of a firm sell or acquire all of their capital through the M&A market. Alternatively, one could assume that 
exporters reallocate capital internally from domestic to export production and acquire only the shortfall on 
the M&A market. While this assumption considerably complicates the analysis, the principal results on 
which I will rely for my empirical analysis will remain unchanged: M&A is increasing in \dr\ and \dr\ 
enters the reallocation volume T  multiplicatively (results available from the author upon request).
63 This intuition can be formalised by extending the above model to asymmetric countries. This requires a 
freely tradable numeraire good to fix the price of capital and to allow the derivation of closed form solutions 
(results available from the author upon request).
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Second, extending the model to multiple sectors raises the possibility of diversi­
fying or conglomerate M&A transactions that go across industry boundaries. The basic 
intuition of the model will still apply, however: firms want to acquire production capacity 
in other industries through acquisitions both because of improved exporting opportuni­
ties there or because increased import competition has made assets cheaper. Since the 
target’s capital is likely to be sector specific in the vast majority of cases, this argument 
also makes clear that the relevant reductions in variable trade costs in such a multi-sector 
model are the ones facing the acquisition target. This is because the acquirer will have to 
use the new production capacity to produce the target industry’s goods.64
Finally, acquisitions might also be cross-border in nature, e.g. expanding foreign 
exporters may want to acquire import-competing domestic firms. While the decrease in 
the latter firms’ reservation price for their assets will encourage acquisitions, there will 
also be a counterbalancing effect for horizontal M&A arising from tariff-jumping con­
siderations: decreases in variable trade costs make it easier to serve the foreign market 
via exports and thus reduce the incentives to establish production capacity there via ac­
quisitions.65
The second key implication that arose from the theoretical model was that resource 
transfers will be from less to more productive firms (since exporters are more productive 
than non-exporters). Again, a similar prediction should hold for acquisitions across both 
national and industry borders since M&A will only create value for the buyer if the 
acquired assets can be put to a more profitable use. The productivity advantage of the 
acquiring firm and the ensuing selection into exporter status is what allows this increase 
in profitability in my model.
To summarise, the model and the above discussion suggest addressing the follow­
ing questions in the empirical analysis:
64 An easy way of formalising this intuition would be in a two sector model in which firms can use produc­
tion capacity in the other ;sector at their own productivity level </p but first have to make an investment I  to 
acquire the necessary sector-specific production know-how (this would be addition to F). If the productiv­
ity of an acquirer from Ihe non-liberalizing sector is high enough to be an exporter in the liberalizing sector, 
a lowering of trade costs might raise its potential profits above the threshold I  and trigger entry.
65 Both Bertrand and Zitouna (2005) and Bjomvatn (2004) formalize this trade-off between declining reser­
vation prices of potential targets and better export access to the foreign market.
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1. Do reductions in variable trade costs (tariff cuts) lead to more takeovers of firms in 
the affected sector? Is this effect stronger in industries with larger tariff cuts (as 
predicted by equation 4.3)?
2. Is the effect similar for within- and cross-industry acquisitions? Is it similar for 
domestic and cross-border transactions? Is there a stronger impact on M&A activity 
in the smaller Canadian market?
3. Are acquirers more profitable and more productive than targets? Again, does this 
effect vary across the different M&A categories (within- vs. between-industry and 
domestic- vs. cross-border)?
Answers to these questions will shed light on the qualitative characteristics of 
M&A as an adjustment mechanism in the face of trade liberalization. A further inter­
esting question that arises is whether resource transfers via M&A are also quantitatively 
important. While the nature of my data set does not allow a definitive answer to this ques­
tion, I will provide some evidence that the overall amount of transfers is indeed likely to 
be large (section 4.7).
4.3 The Case of CUSFTA
The particular liberalization episode I will use for my empirical investigation is the 
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) of 1989. The idea of abolishing 
trade barriers between Canada and the U.S. had been around for some time before CUS­
FTA but strong opposition in Canada had led to the eventual failure of all prior attempts 
at implementing free trade. Against this background and again against substantial politi­
cal opposition, negotiations for CUSFTA started in May 1986, were finalized in October 
1987 and the treaty was signed in early 1988. The agreement came into effect on 1 Janu­
ary 1989 which was also the date of the first round of tariff cuts. Tariffs were then phased 
out over a period of up to ten years with some industries eventually opting for a swifter 
phase-out.
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In terms of economic analysis, CUSFTA presents several advantages over other 
trade liberalizations. First, the main instrument of liberalization - tariff cuts - is easily 
quantifiable and shows a large variation across sectors which allows for the implementa­
tion of a difference-im-differences estimation strategy. Secondly, CUSFTA was a clearly 
defined policy experiment in the sense that it was neither part of a larger packet of mar­
ket reforms nor was it introduced in response to a macroeconomic shock, two factors that 
have made the identification of trade reform effects extremely difficult in other settings 
(Rodriguez and Rodirik, 2001; Trefler, 2004). In this sense, the reductions in tariff rates 
triggered by CUSFTA can to a large extent be regarded as exogenous - indeed, Trefler 
(2004) performs formal statistical tests for a wide range of specifications and dependent 
variables but finds little evidence to the contrary.
In the context o f studying the impact of trade liberalization on M&A, CUSFTA 
has two additional advantages. First, it was largely unanticipated since its ratification 
by the Canadian parliament was considered highly unlikely as late as November 1988.66 
The fact that its eventual implementation thus came very much as a surprise to all par­
ticipants considerably reduces concerns about anticipatory M&A activity and makes the 
years before 1989 a suitable control period. In addition, CUSFTA was a liberalization 
agreement between industrialized countries with developed financial markets and few re­
strictions on mergers and acquisitions, at least in comparison to most other developing 
and developed countries. Indeed, although there exists, to my knowledge, no economet­
ric evidence to date, there is some anecdotal evidence that CUSFTA has led to an increase 
in M&A activity (OECD, 2001). Given that a number of existing studies have shown that 
there has also been a substantial impact on economic variables other than M&A activity 
(e.g. Trefler, 2004, on productivity and employment; or Head and Ries, 1999, on plant 
scale and number of plants), it does thus not seem unreasonable a priori to expect an 
effect of CUSFTA on the acquisition behaviour of firms.
66 See Morck et al. (1998) for a chronology of the events leading up to the eventual ratification of CUS­
FTA. During the entire process, ratification was considered unlikely given both the prior history of failed 
ratifications of already negotiated free trade agreements with the U.S. and the strength of the opposition to 
CUSFTA. Indeed, John Turner, the opposition leader and a strong opponent of free trade with the U.S., pub­
licly vowed as late as October 1988 that he would dismantle CUSFTA in case of victory in national elections 
scheduled for November 1988. Since his Liberal Party had a lead of at least 10% in opinion polls until right 
before the election, ratificaition did indeed seem unlikely. However, against all odds, the Canadian Conser­
vative Party emerged as the surprise election winner and the government was returned with a parliamentary 
majority sufficient to ratify CUSFTA.
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4.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
In line with existing studies, my empirical analysis of CUSFTA’s impact on M&A activity 
focuses on the manufacturing sector which still represents the bulk of tradable goods in 
an economy and is thus the sector most directly affected by trade liberalization. The time 
frame for my analysis is 1985-1997, the period for which I have data on tariffs, M&A 
activity and firm-level characteristics of targets and acquirers.
Tariffs and M&A Activity. I use annual three-digit U.S. and Canadian tariff data 
(140 industries) as my measure of the extent of trade liberalization.67 While CUSFTA 
also included a few provisions on non-tariff barriers, reductions of tariffs were the main 
instrument of liberalization. As has been pointed out among others by Trefler (2004) and 
Topalova (2004), tariff cuts also have the advantage of being a direct policy instrument 
and are as such less susceptible to endogeneity problems. This is in contrast to other 
more indirect measures like import penetration rates which are the result of a complex 
interaction process with a large number of additional factors.68
Data on M&A activity in the manufacturing sector comes from Thomson Finan­
cial’s Worldwide M&A database. The principal sources of information used by Thomson 
are over 200 English and foreign language news sources, SEC filings and their interna­
tional counterparts, tirade publications and proprietary surveys of investment banks, law 
firms and other advisors. The database includes all corporate transactions involving at 
least 5% ownership of a company and a transaction value of one million USD or more or 
where the value of the transaction is undisclosed. In line with the discussion in the previ­
ous sections, I use all M&A deals involving acquisitions of U.S. or Canadian manufactur­
ing targets by other U.S. or Canadian firms, yielding approximately 23,500 transactions 
in the period under study (1985-1997).
67 The data are the same as those described in Head and Ries (1999). I would like to thank Keith Head for 
making them available to me. Appendix 4.B provides some additional details on their construction.
68 Compare footnote 58 and Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) for a more general discussion of the pitfalls of 
various other indirect measures. Of course, tariff rates are at the discretion of policy makers and as such 
subject to different endogeneity problems. However, as argued in the previous section, such concerns have 
less weight in the case of CUSFTA where tariff cuts were unexpected and largely exogenous (at least once 
one controls for the variation in.initial tariff levels - as I will do by using industry fixed effect, see below).
Total No. of Acquisitions 1985-1997
U.S.- (5) (6) (7) Avg. U.S. (8) Avg. Can.
SIC87 (1) U.S. by (2) U.S. by (3) CAN by (4) CAN by #Establishments #Establishments import tariff in import tariff in
(2-digit) Industry Name U.S. CAN U.S. CAN (U.S.) (Canada) 1988 1988
20 Food and kindred products 1497 46 52 219 20,749 3,440 3.9% 5.9%
21 Tobacco manufactures 40 0 0 2 119 20 20.7% 14.4%
22 Textile mill products 385 11 16 37 6,035 757 8.7% 13.5%
23 Apparel and other textile products 478 8 11 18 23,224 2,804 9.4% 15.8%
24 Lumber and wood products 257 15 14 90 22,665 3,110 2 .2% 4.5%
25 Furniture and fixtures 314 3 2 32 11,796 1,927 2 .2% 10.7%
26 Paper and allied products 531 30 19 125 6,401 818 3.4% 8.8%
27 Printing and publishing 1873 69 30 209 63,179 5,425 0.5% 2 .0%
28 Chemicals and allied products 2550 70 65 135 12,138 1,204 3.8% 6 .2%
29 Petroleum and coal products 216 9 8 21 2,168 140 0.7% 0.8%
30 Rubber and misc. plastics products 819 27 31 64 15,774 1,607 4.5% 8 .8%
31 Leather and leather products 121 0 3 4 2,026 320 7.5% 12.6%
32 Stone, clay, glass, and concrete products 389 15 20 42 16,279 1,612 1.8% 3.9%
33 Primary metal industries 749 21 38 73 6,479 515 3.4% 4.5%
34 Fabricated metal products 1076 38 38 82 36,835 3,236 2.2% 7.0%
35 Industrial machinery and equipment 2843 72 98 189 54,143 4,635 2 .6% 5.2%
36 Electrical and electronic equipment 2657 71 87 162 16,649 988 3.5% 6.3%
37 Transportation equipment 999 24 36 87 11,393 1,256 0.9% 5.5%
38 Instruments and related products 2254 30 39 53 11,091 987 4.2% 7.0%
39 Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 612 17 15 21 17,217 1,720 3.8% 6.2%
Total (sum or mean) 20660 576 622 1663 356,362 36,320 4.5% 7.5%
Notes'. Columns 1-4 show the total number of takeovers of firms with primary activity in manufacturing (SIC 20-39) during 1985-1997. The columns give figures by two-digit industry for four different M&A 
categories: 1) Takeovers of U.S. firms by other U.S. firms; 2) takeovers of U.S. firms by Canadian firms; 3) takeovers of Canadian firms by U.S. firms; and 4) takeovers of Canadian firms by other 
Canadian firms. Acquirers can have primary activity within or outside manufacturing (see table 4.2 for a breakdown of acquirers' primary industries). Columns 5 and 6 display the average number of 
establishments in 1985-1997 for the U.S. and Canada. Columns 7 and 8 show two-digit average import tariffs levied by the U.S. and Canada on each other’s manufacturing products in 1988.
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics on Target Industries
United States Canada
(4) at least one (8) at least one
(2) % of total (3) secondary 3-digit SIC-code (6) % of total (7) secondary 3-digit SIC-code
manufacturing SIC in manuf. in common with manufacturing SIC in manuf. in common with
Sector (1) Number M&A (%) target (%) (5) Number M&A (%) target (%)
Manufacturing firms (SIC 2-3)
- Same 3-digit industry
- Same 2-digit Industry but not sam e 3-dlglt Industry
- Different 2-digit industries
14878
7168
2808
4902
70.1%
33.8%
13.2%
23.1%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
55.0%
100.0%
13.0%
8.5%
1583
831
303
449
69.3%
36.4%
13.3%
19.6%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
58.5%
100 .0%
15.9%
4.7%
Non-manufacturing firms
- Agriculture, Fishing & Hunting (sic 1)
- Mining (sic 10-14)
- Construction (sic 15-17)
- Transportation, communications, and utilities (sic 4)
- Wholesale trade (sic 50-51)
- Retail Trade (sic 52-59)
- Finance, insurance, and real estate (sic 60-67)
- Services industry (sic 7/8)
- Government (sic 9)
3555
69
260
96
417
713
206
693
1078
23
16.7%
0.3%
1.2 %
0.5%
2 .0%
3.4%
1.0%
3.3%
5.1%
0 .1%
26.1%
50.7%
29.7%
32.3%
28.1%
36.7%
17.5%
10.1%
27.6%
0 .0%
3.0%
5.8%
1.1%
2 .1%
2.4%
6 .2%
3.9%
0 .1%
3.1%
0 .0%
472
10
65
8
62
77
24
140
86
14
20.7%
0.4%
2 .8%
0.4%
2.7%
3.4%
1. 1%
6 .1%
3.8%
0 .6%
22.6%
50.0%
10.6%
50.0%
45.2%
24.7%
20 .8%
1.4%
43.0%
0 .0%
2.7%
10.0%
0 .0%
0 .0%
0 .0%
5.2%
4.2%
0 .0%
8 . 1%
0 .0%
Investors, n.e.c (sic 67991
Total number of manufacturing M&A
2803
21236
13.2%
100.0%
0 .0% 0 .0% 216
2285
9.5%
100.0%
0 .0% 0 .0%
Notes: Columns (1) and (5) show the total number of M&A transactions involving manufacturing targets in the U.S. and Canada with acquirers having their principal activity in the SIC-code listed on the 
left. Columns (2) and (6) express these numbers as % of the total number of manufacturing M&A transaction in the respective country. Columns (3) and (7) list the fraction of acquirers from a given SIC- 
code that have a primary OR secondary three-digit SIC-code in manufacturing. Columns (4) and (8) similarly list the fraction of acquirers that have at least one three-digit manufacturing SIC-code 
(primary or secondary) in common with the target.
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics on Acquirer Industries
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I define ”M&A” broadly to include sales of individual business segments and divi­
sions as well as of entire companies. This is consistent with the idea from the theoretical 
model that M&A cam both be a form of contraction and total firm exit. I further con­
sider acquisitions of both majority and minority interests since there is strong evidence 
that significant influence for the acquirer is already given at participation rates well be­
low 50%.69 Transactions are classified into three-digit industries and matched with the 
tariff data according to the primary activity of the target company or the acquired busi­
ness segment (see appendix 4.B for details). For the purpose of this study, I will use 
the number of mergers and acquisitions in a given period as my principal indicator for 
M&A activity. Using numbers rather then aggregate deal volumes has two principal ad­
vantages. First, it is the much more readily available indicator since for the majority of 
deals, transaction values are not published (this is the case for 55% of deals in my data 
set). Second, value measures are extremely sensitive to the treatment of very large deals 
which often make up significant proportions of the total deal volume despite representing 
only a few out of several thousand transactions every year. In my sample, for instance, 
the three biggest deals on average make up about 2 0 % of the aggregate deal volume in 
a given year. Within three-digit industries (the aggregation level of my empirical analy­
sis), the biggest transaction alone accounts on average for over 30% of the entire industry 
volume during 1985-1997.70
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 provide some descriptive statistics on M&A activity and manu­
facturing tariffs in North America over the period 1985-1997. I start with an analysis of 
target firms. The first four columns of table 4.1 show the number of M&A transactions 
in the U.S. and Canada at the two-digit level of the U.S. Industrial Classification of 1987. 
As seen, domestic M&A activity (columns 1 and 4) is more common than cross-border
69 Morck et al. (1998) cite evidence that the threshold for effective control lies on average at about 20% in 
the U.S. Similarly, the Canadian Competition Bureau (2002) considers all acquisitions of more than 10% of 
control rights as potentially anti-competitive, with the corresponding figure for the U.S. being 15% (Brealey 
and Myers, 2000, chapter 33). In any case, minority acquisitions comprise only about 12% of transactions 
in my sample. See section 4.5 for robustness checks excluding this category.
70 Robustness checks using value data despite these problems yield qualitatively similar results for domes­
tic Canadian M&A activity as the count data estimates presented below (a "raw" regression with neither 
imputation of missing transaction values nor deletion of outliers yields an estimated per-percentage point ef­
fect of tariff cuts on M&A activity of 14.6% - compared to 8.3% for the count results). For domestic U.S. 
transactions, these raw regressions yield a negative coefficient on tariff cuts but this can be linked to just 
two to three massive outliers (in particular, the 20 billion USD acquisition of RJR Nabisco by Kohlberg, 
Kravis and Roberts in 1988). In any case, the qualitative picture that will emerge later on - a strong impact of 
CUSFTA on domestic Canadian M&A activity and a mostly insignificant one on the U.S. and cross-border 
categories - stays intact in these value regressions.
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transactions (columns 2 and 3), even for the smaller Canadian market. Looking across 
industries, it becomes apparent that there is substantial variation in the number of deals. 
One simple reason for this is probably that different industries have very different num­
bers of firms and establishments and thus more or less ’’potential” for takeovers. Sectors 
with more players usually also have lower concentration ratios and face less scrutiny 
by antitrust authorities. Columns 5-6 which list the average number of establishments 
per industry confirm these conjectures: industries with more establishments have more 
M&A activity - the correlation coefficient between the number of establishments and to­
tal M&A transactions is +52% for the U.S. and +55% for Canada.71 More subtly, there 
also seems to be a connection between M&A activity and initial tariff rates (columns 
7-8): industries with higher import tariffs in 1988 also experience less takeovers during 
the entire period 1985-1997 (the correlation coefficient is -32% for the U.S. and -48% 
for Canada). This seems in part to be a direct consequence of the relation between M&A 
activity and the number of establishments: highly protected industries are usually in­
dustries in decline which already have experienced shake-outs and have relatively few 
remaining players.
The next question is who the buyers of U.S. and Canadian manufacturing firms 
are. Table 4.2 provides some information on this by listing the principal field of activity 
of acquiring firms. As the figures show, roughly 70% of acquirers are also manufacturing 
firms, both in the U.S. and in Canada. Moreover, about 35% of transactions occur within 
the same three-digit sector and another 13% within the same two-digit sector, so that 
within-industry reallocation via M&A seems to be an important phenomenon. Around 
17% of acquirers of U.S. firms (21% for Canada) have their principal field of activity 
outside manufacturing (SIC-codes 2-3), although this figure probably overestimates the 
incidence of diversifying or conglomerate M&A. This is since about one quarter of non­
manufacturing acquirers actually possess secondary fields of activity in manufacturing, 
with the figure being as high as 50% in some categories (see columns 3 and 7) . 72
71 The sources for the number of establishments are the U.S. Census Bureau and Statistics Canada. I use 
the number of establishments rather than the number of firms since my definition of M&A includes both 
acquisition of entire firms and of individual subdivisions and possibly plants.
72 Looking at secondary fields of activity also increases the numbers of transactions that are potentially of 
within-industry nature. Columns 4 and 8 show the fraction of acquirers that have at least one manufacturing
3-digit SIC code that maitdhes the primary or any secondary manufacturing SIC code of the target. If one 
counts all these transactions as intra-industry, the share of this reallocation type rises to 40% which represents 
only a modest increase of about 5%-points. Since this is clearly an upper bound, classification according to
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The second to last line of table 4.2 lists a category of acquirers that deserves spe­
cial attention. The group ’’Investors, n.e.c.” (SIC 6799) represents an amalgamation of 
different types of acquirers that are not easily classifiable elsewhere. The main subgroups 
of SIC 6799 are private equity and venture capital firms, investor groups, and individual 
investors. In all cases, it seems likely that acquisitions by these groups represent signif­
icant reallocations of resources in the sense that targets will be exposed to substantial 
changes in management practices, restructuring etc. Also, among investor groups, al­
liances of different manufacturing firms are not uncommon so that part of SIC 6799 are 
indeed within-manufacturing acquisitions. For these reasons, I keep transactions involv­
ing SIC 6799 as part o f my sample although I will present robustness checks excluding 
this category.
Target and Acquirer Characteristics. For the comparison of target and acquirer 
characteristics in section 4 .6 ,1 match the transaction parties from the Thomson M&A 
database to Compustat North America and Compustat Global using the CUSIP-identifier 
common to both data sets. Thomson Financial itself also provides financial data on a 
small number of targets and acquirers which I use to complement the information from 
Compustat. My indicators of firm performance will be net sales, pre-tax income, the 
number of employees, net capital stocks, and productivity and profitability measures 
based on these variables.73 The four indicators net sales, income, employees and net 
capital stocks are available for between 7,500 to 12,500 out of the 47,000 company-year 
combinations in my data (some companies are involved in several transactions in the 
sample period).
The use of Compustat implies that my sample for comparing target and acquirer 
characteristics consists mainly of publicly traded firms (although about 5% of firms are 
privately held). I believe that this does not pose major problems for the analysis. First, 
publicly traded firms make up a substantial fraction of the full sample of transaction 
parties used to analyse changes in M&A activity (about 35%, with private companies and
primary fields of activity seems to be a good approximation in determining the within- or between-industry 
nature of M&A.
73 The exact sources for Compustat North America are data items 12 and 117 (net sales), 122 and 170 
(pretax income), 29 and 146 (employees), and 8 and 141 ("net property, plants and equipment", used as 
proxy for net capital stocks). For Compustat Global, data are contained in items 1 (net sales), 21 (pretax 
income), 162 (employees), and 76 ("net tangible fixed assets", used as proxy for net capital stocks). I use
4-digit sectoral deflators to convert nominal values to 1987 values. I then convert entries in Canadian dollars 
to US dollars by using the exchange rate for the base year 1987.
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firm subsidiaries making up the remaining 65% in the Thomson M&A database). Second, 
as I will show in the next section, the impact of CUSFTA on publicly traded firms was if 
anything slightly stronger than for the full sample of firms. Third, although the number 
of publicly traded firms is small relative to the overall number of companies in Canada 
and the U.S., their overall share of output and employment is above 80%.74 Thus, even if 
target-acquirer differences for non-publicly traded firms were very different, the findings 
presented in section 4.6 would still have strong economic relevance.
Quantitative Importance of M&A: For the comparison of the amount of firm- 
level resource transfers via M&A, contraction and exit (section 4.7), I will again rely 
on information for publicly traded firms from Compustat Global and Compustat North 
America. In addition to data on output (net sales) and employment, I use information on 
the reason for deletion of companies from the Compustat files.75 I include all manufac­
turing firms listed as active in either Compustat North America or Compustat Global at 
some point during the period 1985-1997. After dropping some smaller Canadian firms 
for which no exit information is available, this yields a sample of 331 Canadian and 5827 
U.S. firms which again represent over 80% of manufacturing output and employment in 
North America.
4.5 Trade Liberalization and M&A
4.5.1 A First Look at the Figures
How has M&A activity in North America evolved over time and what was the impact of 
CUSFTA? Figure 4.1 plots the number of yearly manufacturing M&A transactions over 
the period 1985-1997 for four different categories, all expressed as indices relative to 
1988: domestic U.S. transactions, domestic Canadian transactions, acquisitions of U.S. 
firms by Canadian firms and acquisitions of Canadian firms by U.S. firms. The graphs
74 This figure is based on a comparison of aggregate production and employment in Compustat North 
America and Compustat Global with comparable data from the UNIDO database.
75 The relevant Compustat North America data items are 12 and 117 (net sales) and 29 and 146 (employees). 
Date and reason for deletion are provided in data footnotes AFTNT33-AFTNT35. For Compustat Global, 
sales and employee data are contained in items 1 and 162, and reason and date of deletion in the variables 
INCO and INCOD.
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also indicate the start date of CUSFTA (1 January 1989) by a vertical line and have linear 
splines fitted to the data points pre- and post CUSFTA.
The figures do not reveal any clear effect for both U.S. domestic activity and 
Canada-U.S. takeovers. Takeovers of Canadian firms, however, both by other Canadian 
and U.S. firms, show a marked increase in 1989, the first year after the implementation 
of CUSFTA. At the same time, all graphs display a general strong upward trend in the 
number of M&A deals over the entire period. This provides some first evidence on the 
problems of descriptive studies that comment on M&A activity in the wake of CUSFTA 
(such as OECD, 2001): the strong increases in transactions in the 1990s might simply 
reflect an underlying long-run trend. The before-after comparisons undertaken here do 
not have this problem although it could still be that changes around 1989 were due to 
other economy-wide factors contemporanous to the first round of tariff cuts (for exam­
ple, CUSFTA also contained a general liberalization agreement on cross-border capital 
flows).
To provide stronger evidence that the observed changes in M&A activity are in­
deed due to the tariff cuts implemented through CUSFTA, I thus split transactions within 
each of the four categories into two groups (figure 4.2). Those from the 50% of target 
industries that faced the steepest tariff cuts and those from the remaining 50%. I choose 
tariffs levied by the target’s country for this classification. In practice, U.S. and Canadian 
tariff cuts are very highly correlated so that results are similar when using the other tariff 
measure. From these figures, a slightly different picture emerges. For the two domestic 
categories, the index of M&A activity is very similar across the two groups in the pre- 
CUSFTA period. From 1989 onwards, however, M&A activity in Canada increases by 
substantially more in the most affected group. For the U.S., there is also a slightly more 
pronounced increase for this group although the difference to the least affected group is 
much smaller than in Canada. It thus seems that the impression from the initial graphs 
holds up to this difference-in-differences analysis. M&A activity in Canada rose sharply 
after 1989 and the magnitude of this increase seems to be related to the extent of tariff 
cuts across sectors. The impact on the U.S. is much smaller, consistent with the notion
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Figure 4.2: Aggregate Numbers of M&A Transactions, Most vs. Least Affected Industries
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that the liberalization shock was substantially bigger in Canada which integrated with a 
market ten times her own size.
Turning to the cross-border categories (the two right hand side panels), the graphs 
show slightly more volatility than in domestic M&A activity, reflecting in part the smaller 
number of transactions across the U.S.-Canadian border. Still, it seems that effects on 
cross-border M&A went in opposite directions. While Canadian acquisition activity in 
the U.S. shows a slightly stronger increase in the group of most affected industries, the 
opposite holds true for takeovers of Canadian by U.S. firms. This last finding is consis­
tent with tariff-jumping motives as an additional determinant for horizontal cross-border 
M&A transactions. That is, in industries with stronger Canadian tariff cuts, U.S. firms 
were less dependent on acquiring local production capacity to serve the Canadian mar­
ket. Increasing returns to scale may have reinforced this trend by inducing U.S. firms 
to concentrate production in their larger domestic market. Such a home-market-type ef­
fect may also explain the stronger increases in Canadian acquisitions in the U.S. in the 
most-affected group, which took place despite easier export access to this market.76
4.5.2 Econometric Specification and Baseline Results
This section evaluates whether the impressions from the graphs of the last section carry 
over to a formal econometric analysis. Among other things, the results obtained so far 
have drawn attention to two potential pitfalls such an analysis faces. First, M&A activity 
shows strong inter-industry variation and is negatively related to initial tariff levels (see 
section 4.4). Since ail tariffs were eventually eliminated under CUSFTA, higher initial 
levels also meant stronger subsequent cuts, implying a potentially spurious correlation 
of tariff changes and M&A activity. Second, the strong increase in the number of merg­
ers and acquisitions over the whole period 1985-1997 suggests the presence of a general 
economy-wide trend in M&A activity. Since all tariffs came down after 1989 this could 
again lead to a spurious correlation with tariff cuts. To address these issues, I will imple­
76 An often cited example that fits these explanations is the earlier North American Autopact of 1964 which 
liberalized automotive trade between Canada and the U.S.: no longer facing prohibitive tariffs, U.S. firms 
were able to concentrate production in their larger home market and serve the Canadian market through 
exports rather than through local production.
I l l
ment a difference-in-differences approach by controlling for both industry and time fixed 
effects.
To obtain guidance on the choice of an appropriate econometric specification, I 
turn to the theoretical model derived earlier. There, the volume of capital reallocation 
was given by T  =  ][1^ a r Mr l (equation 4.3), where \dr\ was the absolute change in 
variable trade costs, K  an economy’s capital stock, A a measure of initial trade costs 
(both fixed and variable), and a > 0 the Pareto-distribution’s shape parameter.
First consider the choice of empirical proxies for \dr | and T. In the model, variable 
trade costs r  are of the iceberg-type and thus relate to tariffs t as r  =  1 + 1 which implies 
dr  =  dt. My measure for \dr\ =  \dt\ will thus be the absolute change in tariffs from 
the pre-CUSFTA year of 1988 to the last year for which I have tariff data (1997). As 
dt < 0  for all sectors, this absolute change is \dt\ =  —dt =  tariffi988-tariffi9 97 . Because 
CUSFTA was a bilateral liberalization agreement and the treaty partners tended to protect 
the same sectors, the magnitude of U.S. and Canadian tariff cuts is very similar across 
industries. In line with previous empirical studies of trade liberalizations - which mostly 
look at unilateral tariff reductions by a particular country - I opt for domestic tariffs. 
That is, I use Canadian tariff cuts when analysing the impact of CUSFTA on takeovers of 
Canadian firms and U.S. tariffs cuts for transactions involving U.S. targets.77 As already 
mentioned, my proxy for the amount of reallocation via M&A (T) is the number of 
transactions which I denote MA. In order to smooth the data and reduce the number of 
zero observations, I aggregate numbers over the pre- and post CUSFTA-period (1985- 
1988 and 1989-1997). This yields a panel with two time periods and 140 industries. 
With these choices of proxies for \dr \ and T, I can write my specification as:
M A  =  aXK~ \dt\ (4.4)
[1 +  A] r  '
Given the multiplicative form of (4.4), one possibility would be log-linearisation and
estimation via OLS. However since the occurrence of zeros in MA is still frequent, in
particular for the cross-border merger categories, such an approach is not feasible. Also 
note that MA is a non-negative and usually small integer, suggesting that count data
77 Robustness checks using foreign tariff reductions as regressors yielded similar results which is unsur­
prising given the very high correlation of tariff cuts (in excess of 80%). An interesting area for future work 
would be to study more asymmetric liberalization agreements with sufficient independent variation in tar­
iff cuts. Such agreements would allow to separately identify the effects of import- and export-promoting 
policies on M&A activity.
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models are a more appropriate choice here. To obtain a corresponding specification, I 
rewrite the right-hand side of (4.4) in exponential form:
M A  =  exp(ln a +  In K  +  In —— ---- 1- In |d£|) (4.5)
The identifying assumption I will initially make (but later relax) is that the various com­
ponents of (4.5) besides \dt\ are either time or industry invariant and can thus be captured 
by time- and industry fixed effects, di, dWe and dpost (where dwe and dpost denote the 
pre- and post CUSFTA period, respectively) . 78 Writing (4.5) in expectations form and 
using the dummy variables just defined then yields a conditional mean exactly identical 
to the one found in fixed effect count data models:79
E(MAn\dt, d^dt) — fi^ — exp(dj -I- dp^ e “I- dPost 4  x dPost In |<Zt|^ ) (4.6)
Consistent estimates of the parameters in (4.6) can be easily obtained via fixed effects 
Poisson estimation. I opt for Poisson rather than a negative binomial model since the for­
mer has the desirable robustness property that consistency of estimates will be achieved 
as long as the conditional mean (4.6) is correctly specified - irrespective of whether MA^ 
is actually Poisson-distributed (see Wooldridge, 1999 and 2002; Santos Silva and Ten- 
reyro, 2005). Standard errors will be affected by deviations from the Poisson assumption 
but computation of variance-covariance matrices robust to overdispersion, heteroskedas- 
ticity and within-group correlation is straightforward (Wooldridge, 1999 and 2002).
Table 4.3 reports results for my baseline Poisson fixed effects model (4.6) for 
the full sample of acquirers, i.e. manufacturing firms from the same three-digit sector 
as the target, manufacturing firms from other sectors and firms with principal activities 
outside manufacturing. Line 1 shows coefficient estimates of fd and dpost for each of 
the four subgroups o f M&A (domestic and cross-border transactions) . 80 As seen, the
78 Since the parameter a, initial trade barriers A, and countries’ capital stocks K  are all constant in the 
model, this identifying assumption is consistent with the earlier theory. Obviously, various industry-level 
shocks might cause time-industry-variation in a or if ,  a point which I discuss in more detail below and try 
to control for.
79 Note that the below specification implicitly sets tariff cuts in 1985-1988 to zero. This is necessary since 
my data sources do not contain US tariffs for 1985 and 1986 and only imputed data for Canada (see appendix 
4.B). However, as shown for example in Gu et al. (2003) and also evident in my Canadian tariff data, tariff 
changes in 1985-1988 were very small both in absolute terms and compared to the subsequent cuts. Thus, 
assuming a zero-change seems to be a good approximation (also see appendix 4.B for a brief discussion of 
the very similar results obtained by using the imputed Canadian data).
80 dpre is the excluded category so that dpost gives the average relative increase of M&A activity in compar­
ison to the pre-CUSFTA period that is not explained by tariff cuts. Note that contrary to what is sometimes 
asserted in the literature, there is no incidental parameter problem with the fixed effects Poisson regressions
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strongest impact of CUSFTA seems to be on domestic Canadian M&A activity which 
is consistent with the earlier graphical analysis. As an approximation, the coefficient 
estimates suggests that each doubling of tariff cuts in a given target industry led to an 
increase of 36.5% in the number of domestic Canadian M&A transactions. Results are 
also significantly positive for U.S. domestic M&A activity, although the magnitude of 
the coefficient estimate is only about 1/5 of its Canadian counterpart.
Lines 2-3 of table 4.3 show results for two alternative measures of tariff cuts. The 
first measure uses absolute changes in tariffs, i.e. dpost x (tariffiggs—tariff]^) rather 
than dpost x log(tariffi9 8 8—tariffjggy). This gives equal weight to each percentage point of 
tariff cuts, irrespective of the overall magnitude of the reduction. The second measure is 
a binary indicator taking the value one if an industry is among the 50% of industries with 
the highest tariff cuts, i.e. dpost x 1 (dt > dt50%). This measure is thus similar to the one 
used in the graphic analysis from the last section. The results from these two alternative 
measures show a qualitatively similar picture to the baseline estimates for domestic M&A 
activity, i.e. the impact on Canada seems to have been much stronger.81 The coefficient 
estimates for the absolute change in tariffs - which is the most straightforward of all 
measures in terms of interpretation - indicate that for every percentage point decrease in 
tariffs the number of takeovers of firms in the affected industries increased on average by 
8.3%. Given that the mean decline in Canadian tariffs at the three-digit level was about 
8%, this suggests that CUSFTA increased M&A activity on average by approximately 
65%. The corresponding coefficient for the U.S. is much lower (0.98) but still marginally 
statistically significant. This again highlights the differential impact of CUSFTA on the 
two markets, in particular if one takes into account that the mean U.S. tariff decline 
was only about 4% (yielding an estimated average impact on M&A activity of just 4%). 
Taking into account all three tariff cut measures, the picture is less clear for the cross- 
border merger categories since coefficients are mostly statistically insignificant.
(see Cameron and Trivedi (1998) for a proof). That is, conditional maximum likelihood estimation (using to­
tal industry transactions M A i = J2t M A a  as the sufficient statistic) yields identical results to simple QML 
Poisson estimation with a set of industry dummies.
81 Note that according to standard model selection criteria for maximum likelihood models (e.g. pseudo- 
R2s) the theory-based based measure (log tariff changes) actually provides a marginally better fit than the 
two adhoc-measures. For (he three baseline specifications estimated here, the results for the pseudo-R2s are: 
0.87 (log changes), 0.86 (absolute changes), and 0.85 (binary measure).
Dependent Variable: Number of Takeovers
1) Canada by Canada 2) U.S. by Canada 3) U.S. by U.S. 4) Canada by U.S. Controls
Measure of tariff cuts (A) ^  ^  Qbs pUbyC dp08t 0 bs. pUbyU d ^  Obs. pCbyu <W  Obs.
(1) A = iOg( t1988-tl997) 0.365 2.887 280 0.103 1.121 280 0.068 0.752 280 0.076 1.755 280 No
(4.18)** (10.14)** (0.97) (2.81)** (3.68)** (11.17)** (0.45) (3.41)**
(2) A = tig88-tl997 8.310 1.295 280 6.940 0.448 280 0.979 0.471 280 -6.561 1.941 280 No
(3.58)** (10.04)** (1.52) (2.98)** (1.89)+ (19.45)** (1.80)+ (7.89)**
(3) A = 1 (dt>dt50%) 0.370 1.554 280 0.479 0.417 280 0.224 0.380 280 -0.250 1.681 280 No
(2.77)** (18.52)** (3.01)** (3.87)** (8.74)** (20.16)** (1.23) (11.02)**
(4) A = !og( ti988-tl997) 0.364 2.871 280 0.090 0.787 280 0.069 0.708 280 0.119 1.698 280 Yes
(4.12)** (9.15)** (0.85) (1.85)+ (3.71)** (10.07)** (0.67) (2.93)**
(5) A = ti988-tl997 8.419 1.265 280 6.885 0.137 280 1.224 0.434 280 -6.598 1.811 280 Yes
(3.57)** (7.47)** (1.53) (0.70) (1.84)+ (11.98)** (1.78)+ (7.04)**
(6) A = 1 (dt>dt5o%) 0.380 1.512 280 0.452 0.149 280 0.224 0.368 280 -0.232 1.530 280 Yes
(2.83)** (13.56)** (2.82)** (0.92) (8.72)** (13.43)** (1.14) (8.43)**
Notes: Table shows coefficient estimates from fixed effects Poisson regressions with conditional mean pit=exp(di+dpre+dpoSt+P*dpOSt*A). Figures in brackets below coefficient estimates are robust t-stats 
based on standard errors clustered at the industry level. The dependent variable (pR) is the number of takeovers of manufacturing firms per 3-digit industry and time-period (pre-CUSFTA and post- 
CUSFTA). The regressors are transformations of the absolute change in industry tariffs 1988-1997, interacted with a post-CUSFTA period-dummy (dpost*A): lines 1 and 4 use logs of absolute changes, 
lines 2 and 5 use absolute changes and lines 3 and 6 use a binary indicator (= 1 if an industry is among the 50% of industries with the highest tariff cuts). Coefficient estimates for these tariff change 
variables are listed under the first column of each M&A category (columns containing ps). The four categories included are: 1) takeovers of Canadian firms by other Canadian firms; 2) takeovers of U.S. 
firms by Canadian firms; 3) takeovers of U.S. firms by other U.S. firms; and 4) takeovers of Canadian firms by U.S. firms. All regressions also include industry fixed effects (d() and a period-dummy for the 
post-FTA period (estimates shown under the columns with the heading dpost )• The excluded ceteQory is the pre~OUSFTA period dummy dpre. Regressions 4-6 additionally contain the number of 
takeovers in the EU in the same industry and time-period (see text for details). +, * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, the 5% and the 1%-level, respectively.
Table 4.3: Impact of Tariff Reductions on Number of M&A transactions - Full Sample
Measure of tariff cuts 
(A)
1) Canada by Canada 
PcbyC dpost ObS.
Dependent Variable: Number of Takeovers 
2) U.S. by Canada 3) U.S. by U.S.
PllbyC dpost ObS. PllbyU dpost Obs.
4) Canada by U.S.
PcbyU dpost Obs.
Controls
o (1) A = l0g( tl988-tl997) 0.311 2.613 280 0.152 1.093 280 0.045 0.693 280 0.320 2.706 280 Yes
O) ® 
C
(3.21)** (7.56)** (1.40) (2.43)* (1.83)+ (8.50)** (1.74)+ (4.32)**
■o w 3 O) (2) > II i CO CO 3 8.194 1.220 280 12.156 0.031 280 0.772 0.556 280 -3.294 1.907 280 Yes
T5 o> (3.20)** (6.72)** (2.46)* (0.15) (0.99) (13.14)** (0.82) (6.05)**
W g
(3 ) A = 1 (dt>dt go%) 0,411 1,537 280 0,486 0,179 280 0,176 0,494 280 -0,144 1,781 280 Yes
CO (2.79)** (12.04)** (2.81)** (1.04) (5.97)** (15.54)** (0.67) (7.83)**
o % (4) A = !og( tl988-tl997) 0.422 2.878 280 0.045 0.741 280 0.023 0.506 280 0.246 2.365 280 Yes
1 (4.50)** (8.54)** (0.39) (1.60) (1.18) (6.72)** (1.30) (3.78)**
ca
o > - (5) A = tl988-tl997 9.135 1.021 280 5.421 0.262 280 -0.256 0.442 280 -4.733 1.919 280 Yes
.E &
TJ C (3.48)** (5.47)** (1.11) (1.22) (0.36) (11.40)** (1.19) (5.94)**
■§ .E 
x c (6) A = 1 (dt>dti5o%) 0.461 1.384 280 0.329 0.279 280 0.170 0.343 280 -0.175 1.712 280 YesUJ E (3.05)** (10.61)** (1.87)+ (1.55) (6.14)** (11.66)** (0.81) (7.45)**
(7) A = !og( ti988-tl997) 0.362 2.787 280 -0.573 -2.300 280 0.032 0.812 280 0.592 3.462 280 Yes
(2.30)* (5.05)** (1.48) (1.56) (0.94) (6.19)** (1.74)+ (3.05)**
T3 £ c o (8) A = ti988-tl997 7.385 1.223 280 24.876 -1.162 280 1.645 0.660 280 -1.135 1.706 280 Yes
a (1.78)+ (4.07)** (2.50)* (2.72)** (1.79)+ (9.39)** (0.14) (2.82)**53 Cu
(9) A = 1 (dt>dti50%) 0.384 1.521 280 0.365 -0.653 280 0.294 0.561 280 -0.602 1.950 280 Yes
(1.66)+ (7.40)** (1.04) (1.80)+ (6.20)** (10.48)** (1.61) (4.76)**
~o ^ (10) A = !og( tig88-tl997) 0.348 2.903 280 0.167 1.232 280 0.140 1.310 280 0.408 3.553 280 Yes
£TJ O (2.99)** (5.80)** (1.29) (2.37)* (5.28)** (12.91)** (1.54) (3.87)**
2 w 
~  a) (11) A = ti988-tl997 8.715 1.934 280 19.963 -0.097 280 2.518 0.731 280 3.117 2.102 280 Yes
C
a ca 
=  o. (2.52)* (7.70)** (3.42)** (0.43) (2.47)* (13.69)** (0.47) (4.64)**
3 E
5  8
(12) A = 1 (dt>dt 50%) 0.368 2.298 280 0.766 0.156 280 0.254 0.705 280 0.219 2.175 280 Yes
(1.91)+ (12.79)** (4.04)** (0.86) (6.93)** (17.75)** (0.77) (7.08)**
Notes: Table shows coefficient estimates from fixed effects Poisson regressions (see text for specifications). Robust t-stats in brackets below coefficient estimates based on standard errors clustered at the 
industry level. The dependent variable (p*) is the number of takeovers of manufacturing firms per 3-digit industry and time-period (pre-CUSFTA and post-CUSFTA). The table displays results for four different 
subsamples of manufacturing targets (see first table column and text for details). The regressors are transformations of the absolute change in industry tariffs 1988-1997, interacted with a post-CUSFTA period- 
dummy (dpost*A): lines 1, 4, 7 and 10 use logs of absolute changes, lines 2, 5, 8 and 11 use absolute changes and lines 3, 6 , 9 and 12 use a binary indicator (= 1 if an industry is among the 50% of industries with 
the highest tariff cuts). Coefficient estimates for these tariff change variables are listed under the first column of each M&A category. The four categories are takeovers of: 1) Canadian firms by other Can. firms; 2) 
U.S. firms by Can. firms, 3) U.S. firms by other U.S. firms, and 4) Canadian firms by U.S. firms. All regressions include industry fixed effects (di) and a period-dummy for the post-FTA period (dpost). All regressions 
also contain the number of takeovers in the EU in the same industry and time period (see text for details). +, * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, the 5% and the 1%-level, respectively.
Table 4.4: Impact of Tariff Reductions on Number of M&A Transactions - Subsamples
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Qualitatively, however, the estimates give a similar impression as the earlier graphs: 
Canadian acquisitions in the U.S. have gone up as a result of tariff cuts while U.S. acqui­
sitions in Canada have come down.
4.5.3 Robustness Checks 
Control Variables
I have so far relied on the assumption that tariff cuts were the only time- and industry- 
varying determinants o f M&A activity, which allowed me to identify the effect of CUS­
FTA from a simple difference-in-differences approach without additional controls. While 
M&A activity will in practice also be influenced by other time-industry varying factors, 
one has to proceed carefully when choosing appropriate control variables. First, I will 
refrain from using a number of obvious industry-level variables like employment, out­
put, the number of firms or productivity growth. Besides likely endogeneity problems, 
the common concern with these variables is that there is ample evidence that they are 
themselves strongly influenced by trade liberalization (for the effects of CUSFTA see 
in particular Trefler, 2004, and Head and Ries, 1999). Since it is indeed through their 
influence on such variables that tariff cuts change incentives for M&A, controlling for 
them would invalidly attribute less of the increase in takeover activity to freer trade. A 
similar criticism applies to a number of determinants that have been proposed in the Cor­
porate Finance literature on M&A activity, like capacity utilisation, sales growth, free 
cash flow or relative price-eamings ratios (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; Mulherin and 
Boone, 2000; Andrade and Stafford, 2004; Gugler et al., 2004). In addition, some of 
these variables are o f an inherently firm-level nature and thus unsuited for the present 
industry-level analysis.82
In the light of these difficulties, I choose to pursue a different route and try to con­
trol for time- and industry-varying factors other than tariff cuts by including the number 
of takeovers of firms in the same industry in the United Kingdom, France and (West)
82 Variables of this type analysed in the literature are Tobin’s q, free cash flow, and price-eamings ratios. 
As discussed for example by Andrade and Stafford (2004), there is no straightforward way to aggregate 
these determinants from the firm to the industry level since their impact is highly non-linear or depends on 
differences between targets and acquirers.
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Germany.83 The idea behind this approach is that these countries were largely unaf­
fected by CUSFTA and changes in takeover activity there should thus pick up any gen­
eral industry-level trends in underlying M&A determinants. Since many factors which 
might potentially influence takeover rates are highly correlated across developed coun­
tries, these trends are likely to be similar in Europe and in North America. Examples in­
clude oil price shocks, low sales growth and low capacity utilisation combined with large 
amounts of free cash flow in declining industries, or strongly increasing price-eamings 
ratios in times of stock market bubbles. Indeed, the simple correlation between the num­
ber of European and U.S. or Canadian M&A transactions per-period and industry is on 
average about 70%. Note that I exclude any acquisitions of North American firms in Eu­
rope or vice versa from the EU numbers. This avoids endogeneity problems arising from 
the fact that M&A transactions in North America could be a substitute for cross-Atlantic 
transactions in some cases.84
Lines 4-6 of table 4.3 show the results for all three tariff cut measures with the 
controls in place. I use domestic M&A in the UK, France and Germany as the control for 
the two regressions on domestic M&A activity and all cross-border M&A with targets 
in one of these three countries as the control for the cross-border categories (excluding 
acquisitions by U.S. or Canadian firms). As seen, the coefficients estimates are very 
similar to the earlier results, consistent with the idea that industry and time fixed effects 
already captured most of the influence of non-tariff related determinants of M&A activity.
Results for Different Subsamples
I perform further robustness checks by looking at specific subsamples of M&A transac­
tions. I start by excluding the acquirer SIC-code 6799 (’’Investors, n.e.c.”). As discussed 
earlier, a large fraction of this category is made up by private equity and venture capital 
firms as well as private investors, groups which do not neatly fit into the earlier theoret­
83 These are the three developed countries besides Canada and the U.S. for which M&A coverage in Thom­
son Financial is reasonably complete back to 1985.
84 A remaining issue might arise from the implementation of the European Common Market during the 
period 1986-1992. However, the impact on M&A activity through changes in manufacturing trade is likely 
to have been small. This is since much more substantial measures like duty-free trade, common external 
tariffs and many common sectoral policies had already been in place for more than a decade by 1986. A 
more novel aspect of the common market was the liberalization of cross-border capital flows. This measure, 
however, showed little cross-sectoral variation and should as such be captured by my period fixed effects.
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ical framework. However, results are basically unaffected by the exclusion of this group 
as is shown in the first three lines of table 4.4.
Next, I drop acquisitions of minority interests from my sample, i.e. transactions 
at the end of which ithe acquirer holds less than 50% of control rights or held more than 
50% to begin with. The corresponding coefficient estimates (lines 4-6) show a slightly 
stronger impact of tariff cuts on domestic Canadian M&A activity while estimates for 
domestic U.S. transactions drop somewhat and are now mostly statistically insignificant 
(except for the binary tariff cut measure).
In lines 7-9, 1 look at M&A transactions taking place within identical three-digit 
manufacturing industries. These specifications are thus closest to the theoretical model 
presented in section 4.2 which looked at within-sector acquisitions. From the regression 
results it appears that CUSFTA affected within-sector M&A activity in broadly similar 
ways to overall M&A activity. The one noticeable exception is a strong increase in the 
coefficient magnitude for U.S.-by-Canada-acquisitions when absolute tariff changes are 
used as a regressor (although this change is not repeated for the other functional forms).
Finally, I restrict my sample to include only transactions involving publicly traded 
firms. This is of interest since the following sections, which look at target and acquirer 
characteristics and the quantitative importance of M&A as a form of reallocation, will al­
most exclusively rely on data for publicly traded firms. It is thus useful to check whether 
the qualitative results found so far also apply to this particular subsample of firms. In ad­
dition, publicly traded firms tend to be bigger and are more likely to be exporters which 
suggests that CUSFTA’s impact may indeed have been different for this group. However, 
lines 10-12 of table 4.4 show that this is not the case for domestic M&A activity. The 
cross-border M&A regressions, in contrast, do show somewhat stronger results for this 
subsample. U.S. acquisitions by Canadian firms seem to be more affected by CUSFTA 
now, with coefficients mostly being significant and large in absolute magnitude. Also, 
U.S. acquisitions in Canada are positively related to tariff cuts in this subsample although 
none of the estimates are statistically significant.
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Changes in Competition Policy as an Alternative Explanation?
As the above graphs and estimations make clear, the main reaction from CUSFTA seems 
to have come from domestic Canadian M&A activity. This brings up an alternative expla­
nation for the results found so far. Canadian competition authorities might have become 
more lenient vis-a-vis domestic M&A activity given increased competition from U.S. 
firms. If this relaxation of supervision was correlated with the extent of Canadian tariff 
cuts (e.g. because the competition authorities took them into account in their definition of 
the relevant market), this could provide an alternative explanation for my results. Note, 
however, that such a policy change is not incompatible with M&A as a means of resource 
transfer: the need for industrial restructuring after CUSFTA could have been the under­
lying cause for increased M&A activity and a more lenient stance from the competition 
authorities may have merely facilitated the adjustment. One would thus need the addi­
tional argument that Canadian industries were already poised for consolidation before 
CUSFTA and that relaxation of merger guidelines then eliminated restraining regulatory 
barriers. While it is difficult to definitely exclude this possibility, documents and state­
ments published by the Canadian Competition Bureau do not show any support for this 
hypothesis.85 Also, if  a looser competition policy was responsible for the surge in M&A 
activity one would expect to see a far stronger effect for within-industry transactions 
which is not the case.86
4.6 Comparison of Acquirers and Targets
The last sections have provided evidence that CUSFTA led to an increase in M&A activ­
ity, in particular in Canada and both within and between industries. This section looks in 
more detail at the characteristics of acquirers and targets in order to determine whether 
the resulting inter-firm transfer of resources is similar in nature to the one involved in 
firm and establishment exit and contraction. The existing literature has shown that it is 
usually the less productive firms and plants that contract or exit. While it is typically
85 See http://www.compeititionbureau.gc.ca/ and in particular the revised ”Merger Enforcement Guidelines” 
from 1991.
86 A bigger increase would be expected for this category since horizontal M&A is the main focus of the 
competition authorities. According to the Canadian Competition Bureau (1991) vertical and conglomerate 
M&A transactions were rarely the object of regulatory restrictions.
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not possible to track the employment of factors of production in these studies, the paral­
lel expansion of high productivity establishments seems to indicate that they re-employ 
at least part of the freed-up resources. The question thus arises whether M&A similarly 
leads to a channelling of resources towards more productive owners. This also has im­
portant implications for M&A-induced changes in aggregate productivity since existing 
studies have demonstrated that post-takeover gains in the target’s productivity depend 
crucially on a superior efficiency of the acquiring firm (e.g. Maksimovic and Phillips, 
2001).
A simple way of comparing targets and acquirers is to regress proxies for firm per­
formance on dummies for whether a company is a target or an acquirer in a transaction. 
For this, I use data from Compustat North America and Compustat Global as described 
in section 4.4. I start by looking at net sales and the number of employees to get an im­
pression of the size differences between targets and acquirers. Next, I compare levels 
of profitability, using pre-tax income per employee and pre-tax income per net sales as 
proxies. Recall from the theoretical section of this chapter that more productive firms 
were predicted to be both larger and more profitable than less productive firms. Thus the 
above comparisons might also be seen as a first check on underlying productivity differ­
ences. Since in practice, differences in size and profitability might also be due to other 
factors, I additionally use labour and total factor productivity as more direct proxies.87 
The basic econometric specification I estimate is:
ytj =  a  +  dt +  Pi x targettj +  &tj (4.7)
where ytj  is the performance indicator of interest for company j  at time t  (where t  denotes 
the last completed fiscal year prior to the takeover announcement). The dt represent time 
fixed effects and targettj is a dummy that takes the value one if the company in question 
is a target.88 The coefficient of interest is thus /3X which gives the difference between
87 My TFP figures are calculated from a two-factor Cobb-Douglas production function under the assump­
tion of constant returns to scale (the two factors are labour and capital and I assume an elasticity of value 
added with respect to labour of 0.66). Note that since Compustat does not provide information on intermedi­
ate inputs, I use output (net sales) as my proxy for value added and assume that variations in the intermediate 
share are not systematically related to target or acquirer status.
88 Note that specification (4.7) pools all available data for targets and acquirers rather than calculating a 
target-acquirer difference for each merger and estimating the mean difference. This is necessary since for 
most mergers I do not have financial data on both parties. Note that for a given sample of mergers without 
missing data these two approaches are identical. Also, while pooling data increases the number of acquirers 
relative to targets (because data availability is generally better for larger firms and acquirers tend to be larger), 
the resulting bias is likely to work against and not in favour of finding significant differences. This is since
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targets and acquirers (which are the omitted category). Block 1 of table 4.5 shows results 
for these baseline regressions. Acquirers are found to be significantly bigger in terms 
of net sales and the number of employees (columns 1 and 2). In addition, both pre-tax 
income measures indicate that acquirers are also substantially more profitable (columns 
3 and 4). Interestingly, using estimates of a, dt and (31 for these specifications, one 
finds for most years o f the sample that targets were on average making slight losses 
prior to takeover. Finally, the productivity differences between acquirers and targets are 
also significantly positive. For labour productivity, the acquirers’ advantage is somewhat 
more pronounced than for total factor productivity (12% as opposed to 4%) which seems 
to be due to a higher capital intensity among acquirers.
My baseline estimate of is an average across all four M&A categories, i.e. 
U.S. and Canadian domestic transactions and the two cross-border categories. Next, I 
allow for acquirer-target differences to vary across these groups by estimating separate 
intercepts and slopes for all four types of M&A transactions:
ytj =  o l c a t  +  d t + f i 1 x tarUUtj +(32 x tarCCtj  +/?3 x tarUCtj  +/34 x tarCUtj  +  £tj
(4.8)
where o l c a t  are the category specific intercepts and tarUUtj, tarCCtj , tarUCtj, and 
tarCUtj are binary variables indicating whether a company is a target in one of the four 
types of transactions (for example, tarUCtj  equals one if company j  is the U.S. target 
of a Canadian acquirer). Results on the four target dummy coefficients are shown in 
block 2 of table 4.5. Target-acquirer differences for the non-productivity indicators (net 
sales, employees and the two pre-tax income measures) are qualitatively similar to the 
first specification. However, the productivity estimates reveal some interesting changes. 
First, differences in both labour and total factor productivity seem to be considerably 
more pronounced for domestic Canadian M&A transactions (acquirers are about 17% 
and 13% more productive, respectively). For domestic U.S. transactions, the productivity 
advantage of acquirers is somewhat lower (12% for labour productivity and 3.7% for 
TFP) but still highly significant. Third, estimates for acquisitions made by U.S firms in 
Canada also show acquirers to be more productive than targets, in particular with respect 
to total factor productivity. In contrast, the productivity differences for Canadian-U.S.
it is the smaller targets (hat get excluded from the sample (and since - at least in my sample - smaller size in 
terms of either net sales or employment is associated with lower profitability and productivity).
Specifi­
cation Regressors
(1) Net Sales (Mio 
1995 USD)
(2) Employees 
(■000s)
(3) Pre-tax income per 
employee ('000 USD)
(4) Pre-tax income 
per net sales (USD)
(5) Labour product, 
(logs) (6) TFP (logs)
Year
dummies?
Three-digit
industry
dummies?
Constant 970.057 11.112 9.168 0.052 4.899 3.761
(12.24)** (11.36)** (6.24)** (6.62)** (130.61)** (123.13)**
(1) Target dummy -882.693 -8.508 -14.657 -0.096 -0.120 -0.040 Yes No
(11.91)** (9.94)** (5.58)** (7.92)** (5.08)** (2.45)*
R-squared 0.14 0.09 0.14 0.12 0.06 0.04
Target CAN by CAN -656.089 -5.506 -8.483 -0.074 -0.169 -0.129
(4.51)** (2.41)* (2.51)* (5.27)** (2.90)** (3.09)**
Target U.S. by U.S. -890.943 -8.589 -14.666 -0.097 -0.119 -0.037
(11.38)** (9.50)** (5.57)** (7.60)** (5.02)** (2.25)*
(2) Target U.S. by CAN. -643.234 -6.759 -23.749 -0.147 -0.034 0.116 Yes No
(4.56)** (3.66)** (3.97)** (4.58)** (0.31) (1.35)
Target CAN by U.S. -1,182.914 -9.492 -17.714 -0.110 -0.087 -0.140
(5.78)** (5.18)** (3.06)** (4.81)** (0.85) (2.09)*
R-squared 0.14 0.10 0.14 0.12 0.06 0.04
Target CAN by CAN -484.966 -3.393 -8.743 -0.073 -0.145 -0.098
(3.03)** (1.71)+ (2.54)* (5.45)** (2.49)* (2.23)*
Target U.S. by U.S. -862.553 -8.202 -14.941 -0.095 -0.092 -0.030
(9.97)** (7.03)** (5.20)** (7.11)** (4.55)** (2.32)*
(3) Target U.S. by CAN. -506.652 -6.489 -22.165 -0.133 -0.025 0.078 Yes Yes
(3.00)** (2.92)** (3.43)** (4.25)** (0.29) (1.13)
Target CAN by U.S. -1,161.030 -9.977 -17.917 -0.113 -0.127 -0.140
(5.76)** (4.97)** (2.82)** (4.65)** (1.53) (2.37)*
R-squared 0.27 0.26 0.21 0.17 0.24 0.26
Observations 12613 9080 5566 7049 8466 7956
Notes: Table shows results for OLS regressions (robust t-values in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at the 3-digit industry level). The dependent variables are the company 
characteristics listed across the top of columns 1-6. Regressors in specification (1) include a constant and a dummy for whether a company is a target. Specifications (2) and (3) include separate 
intercepts and target dummy terms for all four M&A categories (see text for full specifications). The table shows coefficient estimates for the four target dummies: “Target CAN by CAN” (targets in 
takeovers of Canadian firms by other Canadian firms), “Target U.S. by U.S.” (targets in takeovers of U.S. firms by other U.S. firms), “Target U.S. by CAN” (targets in takeovers of U.S. firms by Canadian 
firms), and “Target CAN by U.S." (targets in takeovers of Canadian firms by U.S. firms). Also included are year fixed effects (all specifications) and 3-digit industry fixed effects (specification 3 only). +, * 
and ** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, the 5% and the 1%-level, respectively.
Table 4.5: Comparison Acquirers -  Targets
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acquisitions are both insignificant and the TFP coefficient estimate is actually positive. 
One potential explanation might be that there are gains for Canadian firms that go beyond 
a pure reallocation story where acquirers improve the target firm’s productivity (e.g. ac­
cess to superior technology in the U.S. market). For all other categories, however, it 
seems that resources are transferred from less to more profitable and productive firms.
In a last step, I augment specification (4.8) with industry fixed effects to control for 
possible variation in company characteristics across sectors. Block 3 of table 4.5 contains 
estimates for this final specification which are very similar to the results from (4.8). 
Since Pi to /34 are now identified from within-industry variation, this also indicates that 
acquirer-target differences are similar irrespective of whether transactions are of cross- 
or within-industry nature.
4.7 The Quantitative Importance of the M&A Channel
The findings so far are supportive of the view that CUSFTA triggered an increase in re­
source transfers via M&A, especially in the smaller Canadian market. It also seems that 
these transfers were in most cases from less to more profitable and productive firms, 
similar to the channels analysed in the previous literature (i.e. contraction and closure). 
A question that naturally arises from these observations is how important inter-firm re­
source transfers via M&A are quantitatively, both in absolute terms and relative to the 
two other forms of adjustment to freer trade.
While the absence of a control group of firms not engaging in M&A in the Thom­
son Financial data set prevents me from giving a definitive answer to this question, some 
progress can be made in a more indirect way. In particular, the available data allow an 
analysis of how important resource transfers via M&A are in general, i.e. not necessarily 
linked to trade liberalization. Against this baseline, the earlier estimates of CUSFTA’s 
impact on M&A activity can be judged on their quantitative importance.
To evaluate the general quantitative importance of M&A, I rely again on infor­
mation for publicly traded firms from Compustat North America and Compustat Global 
as described in section 4.4. Of the 331 Canadian and 5816 U.S. firms contained in the
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Canada United Slates Total
Firms active in part or till of 1985-1997 331 5816 61 47
Firms exiting via bankruptcy or MS A (number and 
% of active firms) 43 13.0% 1606 27.6% 1649 26.8%
■ Bankruptcy/Liquidation (num ber and % of total 
exit)
4 9.3% 287 17.9% 291 17.6%
■ M&A (num ber and % of total exit) 39 90.7% 1319 82.1% 1358 82.4%
Notes: Table shows numbers of publicly traded manufacturing firms active in all or part of 1985-1997 
and total occurrences of exit via M&A or bankruptcy among these firms.
Table 4.6: Firm Exit via Mergers and Acquisitions and Bankruptcy
Compustat sample, about a quarter exits during the sample period due to M&A or bank­
ruptcy related reasons with M&A accounting for 82% of all exits (see table 4.6). That is, 
M&A seems to be by far the most important exit form for publicly traded firms in North 
America.89
Table 4.7 delves deeper by quantifying the average annual amount of jobs and 
production (net sales) transferred through the two exit forms. In addition, I also look 
at the third form of moving resources away from contracting firms, i.e. decreases in 
employment and sales at continuing companies. The resulting figures show that while 
reductions at existing firms are the most important channel, M&A is responsible for about 
25% of job- and 30% of sales volume redeployment. These figures are very similar for 
both the U.S. and Canada and demonstrate that M&A is indeed a quantitatively important 
way of transferring resources between firms. For the publicly traded companies analysed 
here, it also far outweighs exit via bankruptcy as the third adjustment channel.90 It is 
likely that exit by bankruptcy will be more important among smaller, non-publicly traded
89 Note that one alternative to the approach taken here would be to use the Compustat sample to estimate the 
impact of trade on the three adjustment channels, e.g. using a multinomial probit model. However, this would 
only give an estimate of tfbe impact of trade liberalization on the relative incidence of the channels rather than 
the magnitude of the resource transfer involved. More importantly, there are some important limitations of 
the Compustat sample which prevent such a more detailed analysis. Most importantly, the focus on publicly 
traded firms means the number of Canadian firms is too small for the level of disaggregation used here (I 
have 140 sectors but only have exit information on 331 firms in Canada). In addition, I have no information 
on acquirers so that I cammoit perform splits into the impact of CUSFTA on cross-border and domestic activity 
which was found to be very different. Finally, there are some issues related to the timing of exit and M&A 
since the date of deletion from Compustat need not correspond exactly to the actual transaction date.
90 Note that sell-offs or closures of individual divisions or plants will show up under the "reduction at con­
tinuing firms" category (exit by M&A or bankruptcy in Compustat only occurs if  the entire firm is acquired 
or goes bankrupt). Insofar, the results for the two exit categories can be seen as the lower bound to what 
would be obtained from a plant-level analysis.
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Yearly S ample Averages 1985-1997 Canada UnitedStates Total
(1) Total employm ent (TOOs) 757.1 15570.2 1 6327.3
(2) Gross job reductions at continuing firms ('00 Os) 32.5 745.0 777.6
(3) Job reductions through bankruptcy/liquidation (000s) 0.5 11.2 11.6
(4) Job transfers through M&A ('000s) 14.3 263.3 277.6
(5) Total job transfers (OOOs) -  sum of (2)-(4) 47.3 1019.5 1 066.8
(6) Total job transfers a s  % of em ployment -  (5X 1) 62% 6.5% 6.5%
(7) M&A a s  % of total job transfers -  (4X 5) 30.2% 25.8% 26.0%
( 1 ) Total output (mill. 1995  USD) 156,764 3,017,341 3,174,105
(2) Gross output reductions at cont. firms (mill. 1995 USD) 7,159 96,636 1 03,795
(3) Output reduction via bankruptcy/liqu. (mill. 1995 USD) 101 1,374 1,476
(4) Output transfers through M &A (m ill. 1995 USD) 3,812 42,744 46,556
(5) Total output transfers (mill. 1995 U S D )-su m  of (2)-(4) 11,869 140,754 1 52,623
(6) T otal output transfers a s  % of output -  (5X1) 7.6% 4.7% 4.6%
(7) M&A a s  % of total output transfers -  (4X 5) 32.1% 30.4% 30.5%
Notes: Table shows the amount of job and output transfers via contraction at continuing firms and via exit by 
bankruptcy/liquidation and M&A. ’Total employment” and ’Total output” are obtained by summing over all 
firms active in a given year. ’’Gross job/output reductions at continuing firms” are the sum over all employment/ 
output reductions at continuing firms as compared to the previous year. ”Job/output reductions through bank­
ruptcy/liquidation” and ’’Job/output transfers through M&A” are the sum over the last available employment/ 
sales figures for firms exiting the data set in a given year due to bankruptcy/liquidation or M&A (see text for de­
tails on the sample construction).
Table 4.7: Resource Transfer via Contraction, Mergers and Bankruptcy
companies and that turnover at continuing firms will also be higher for this group (see 
Davis et al., 1996). On the other hand, it has already been pointed out that publicly 
traded firms account for over 80% of manufacturing output and employment in North 
America. Thus, the overall quantitative importance of M&A is unlikely to decrease by 
much in a more comprehensive sample. Combined with the earlier findings that CUSFTA 
led to large increases in domestic M&A activity in Canada (over 60% according to my 
estimates), these results suggest that the amount of resource transfer involved was indeed 
substantial.
4.8 Summary
This chapter examined the empirical relevance of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) as a 
channel of firm-level adjustment to trade liberalization. Guided by the insights from a 
simple theoretical model, I used the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) of 
1989 to estimate the impact of freer trade on M&A activity. I argued that CUSFTA pro-
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vided an ideal settmg for this purpose in many ways. It was a liberalization agreement 
between industrialized countries with comparatively few restrictions on takeovers; it rep­
resented a source of unanticipated and largely exogenous variation in trade barriers; and 
its main instrument - tariff cuts - was a direct and easily quantifiable trade policy measure 
with substantial sectoral variation. Implementing a difference-in-differences identifica­
tion strategy, I found a rich set of results. While there does not seem to be a robust 
link between cross-border M&A and trade liberalization, resource transfer via M&A be­
tween domestic firms is an empirically relevant phenomenon. This is particularly true 
for Canada, where I estimated a tariff cut-related increase in domestic M&A activity of 
over 60%. There also seems to have been an effect on domestic U.S. transactions, albeit 
a substantially smaller one which is consistent with the idea that CUSFTA presented a 
much less important trade shock for the large American market.
In order to compare resource transfers via M&A to adjustment via firm and estab­
lishment contraction and exit, I further presented evidence on the nature and quantitative 
importance of the M&A channel. Using a large sample of publicly traded firms, I found 
that M&A involved a rechannelling of resources from low to high productivity firms (in 
particular for the domestic transactions) and that its magnitude is likely to have been 
quantitatively important. Taken together, these results suggest that for firms adapting to 
freer trade, M&A represents an important alternative to adjustment via closure, contrac­
tion or internal expansion.
These findings are important in a number of aspects. Most importantly, they high­
light the existence of M&A as a significant but previously neglected form of firm-level 
adjustment. By doing ;so, they advance our understanding of how freer trade affects eco­
nomic activity at the firm level and thus contribute to the wider research in this area. 
As I argued in the introduction to this chapter, this is all the more so since M&A is not 
just another adjustment channel. Rather, it is likely to be qualitatively different from the 
other forms of adjustment in that it is certainly a swifter and maybe also more efficient 
form of transferring resources between firms.91 Consequently, the findings of this chap­
ter also shed new light on ways in which policy makers may influence and maybe reduce
91 Some tentative evidence supporting the efficiency of the M&A channel comes from the observation 
that M&A seems to lead ito overall efficiency gains in most periods and settings (see Andrade et al., 2001, 
for a detailed survey). In contrast, liquidation costs are usually found to be substantial, with asset values 
decreasing by over 50% (see Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2004).
127
the transitory costs associated with freer trade (like temporary unemployment and other 
costs related to bankruptcies of import-competing firms). In particular, should M&A in­
deed represent a more efficient way of adjusting to freer trade, one would like antitrust 
authorities to facilitate the functioning of this channel by temporarily reducing restric­
tions on acquisitions in the wake of trade liberalizations. Given the generally higher level 
of restrictions imposed on M&A activity in developing countries, this proposition could 
be of particular relevance there. This line of thought is reminiscent of certain strands in 
the Corporate Finance literature (in particular Jensen, 1993) which argue that takeovers 
represent a far superior way of restructuring industries than internal adjustments or bank­
ruptcy and as such should not face unnecessary legal restrictions.
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4.A Theoretical Derivations
Entry- and Export Productivity Thresholds
Recall that only those firms will become active for which the sum of discounted future 
operating profits from serving the domestic market is at least equal to the setup costs. 
That is, it will hold for the marginal firm that =  F i/  (1 — 5). Similarly,
for the marginal exporting firm we have =  Fxi / (  1 — 8). Substituting for
prices (p and px) and quantities (q and qx), we obtain the entry and exporting thresholds 
(<p* and (pi) as:
(p =
and
*
<Px =
iaF oc
~  I)*7” 1.
T^-H^FxO" 11/(<T_1)
(4.9)
(4.10)
Tip' (4.11)
P °~ X (<7 -  l)^-1 
Note that the ratio of these two thresholds can be solved for p* as:
l/(cr-l)
J
Since every firms that wants to export has to incur both the domestic setup costs F i/{  1 — 
6) and the exporting setup costs Fxi /{  1 — (5), an exporter will always also sell on the 
domestic market. That is, it will hold that <p* >  <p*.92 On the other hand, there will 
be a separation into exporters and non-exporters as long as 1. Since
there is strong evidence that such a separation is an empirically relevant phenomenon 
(e.g. Bernard and Jensen, 2004), I assume in the following that this condition is satisfied 
and that it thus holds that p* > p*. That is, exporting firms are always more productive 
than non-exporting firms.
Returning to the entry thresholds (4.9) and (4.10), I now assume that productivity 
levels follow a Pareto distribution (i.e. with density v{p)  =  a,Ka(p~(a+r) with k >  0, a > 
a  — 1 >  0, and ip > k) .  With this assumption and after some algebraic manipulations, I 
can explicitly solve for p* and <p* as:
92 This might seem puzzling in view of condition (4.11) which seems to imply that p>* < (p* for low 
enough values of and r. However, note that (p* is the export threshold for a firm that has already entered 
the domestic market (the setup costs F i/  (1 — 5) are not included in the zero profit condition determining 
¥>:).
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Capital Demand and Prices
With Pareto-distributed productivity levels, capital demand for domestic production and 
exporting at active firms can be written as: 
a
kd(<p) = 
kx (v )  =
a  —  1
^ c - X p a - X  j r F = { ( J _ p ) F ?)
(7—1
or
or — 1
IT y T - lp C -l  + F x =  Tl-<r(o. _  J)f  ( ! L  ) + F x
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Integrating over all active firms and using the solutions for ip* and ip* from the last 
section, I can determine overall capital demand for domestic production and exporting 
as:
aa — a  +
Kd =  kd (<p) Med<p =  r 1 J  + 1)
and
1 + T
- m
- i
j - i  ( a a - a  + 1K x =  kx (<p) Med(p =  i 1 I ---------------
J tp=ip* \
(4.12)
(4.13)
Finally, using the M&A market clearing condition Kd +  K x =  K ,  I can solve for i as:
i =  K
aa
Plugging this result back into (4.12) and (4.13), I obtain the results for Kd and K x pre­
sented in the main text.
4.B Linking Tariff and M&A Data
The tariff data are constructed as described in Head and Ries (1999). U.S. tariffs prior to 
CUSFTA are taken from Government of Canada (1988), Canadian tariffs from Lester and 
Morehen (1987). These publications provide tariffs for around 100 industries, roughly
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corresponding to the 3-digit level of the Canadian industry classification of 1980 (CAN- 
SIC80). Tariff reductions after 1988 are calculated by determining to which so-called 
’staging’ category an industry had been assigned under CUSFTA. The staging category 
agreed upon determined the rate by which tariff protection was being phased out. Most 
industries had their tariffs reduced in equal parts from 1989 to 1997. A smaller number 
were placed on a five year phase-out and a handful opted for immediate elimination. 
Note that the above two publications do not provide data for 1985 and 1986. However, 
Lester and Morehen (1987) does contain Canadian tariffs for 1979 which I interpolate 
to 1987 to get some impression of tariff changes in that period. As other studies (e.g. 
Gu et al., 2003), I find changes in 1985-1988 to be small both in absolute terms and 
compared to the subsequent cuts implemented via CUSFTA. In my econometric analysis 
(sections 4.5.2 and 4.5.3), I will thus set the pre-CUSFTA change in tariffs equal to zero. 
Using my interpolated data for the regressions involving Canadian tariff cuts yields very 
similar results to the ones presented in this chapter (with the exception of the binary 
measure for most-least affected industries which shows too little variation over time - 
80% of industries stay in the same group pre and post CUSFTA).
In order to link the tariff data to the data on M&A transactions, I assign each M&A 
deal to a 4-digit category of the 1987 U.S. industry classification (US-SIC87) based on 
the primary field of activity of the target company or division. In order to determine the 
tariff facing that industry, I use a correspondence between CAN-SIC80 and US-SIC87 
provided by Statistics Canada. The mapping was unique in about 70% of cases in the 
sense that a U.S.-industry was matched to a unique tariff rate. For the remaining 30%, 
I used averages of tariffs weighted according to the average number of establishments 
in the CAN-SIC80 category (this arguably captures the "M&A potential" of an industry 
better than e.g. value added or output weights would do: ceteris paribus, a transaction 
is more likely to occur in an industry with more establishments; however, using simple 
averages does not qualitatively affect my results). Finally, I aggregated the U.S.-data 
up to the 3-digit level (140 industries), again using the number of firms in a 4-digit 
category as tariff weights. This aggregation was done in order to reduce the number of 
zero-transaction industries (thus mitigating problems of an excess number of zeros in the 
fixed effects Poisson regressions) and to reflect more accurately the less disaggregated 
nature of the underlying tariff data.
Chapter 5 
Conclusions
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The three main chapters of this thesis offered substantial insights into how eco­
nomic integration influences a wide range of economic indicators at several levels of 
aggregation. These different approaches should be seen as complementing each other. 
For example, one essential feature of the first and second chapter’s analysis was its broad 
scope, both in terms of geographic coverage and the measures of trade integration used 
there. In addition, both chapters studied variables of immediate interest for economic 
policy (per capita income and levels of industrialization). In this respect, the more re­
stricted approach of Chapter 4 may at first glance seem to be a drawback. However, the 
sharpening of focus also made it much easier to disentangle the effect of a policy-induced 
increase in trade exposure from the many alternative determinants of economic activity. 
Restricting the scope of the analysis allowed me to get much more precise insights into a 
particular economy’s adjustment to freer trade. And through thus gaining a better under­
standing of more specific mechanisms, it can be hoped that the results - suitably modified 
- will carry forward to other settings.93
So what are the insights that can be drawn from the three main parts of this disser­
tation? In Chapter 2 ,1 started out from the observation that per capita income levels in 
the European Union show strong regional variations and a clear core-periphery structure. 
I then asked the question to what extent access to product markets could explain these 
patterns. To this end, I constructed and estimated a New Economic Geography model on 
data for 193 EU regions in 1975-1997 and found strong empirical support for the role of 
market access. However, its main benefits seem to come from increased incentives for 
physical and human capital accumulation and not through direct trade cost savings.
The principal contributions of this chapter are threefold. First, by using insights 
from the New Economic Geography (NEG) literature, it provided a new and empirically 
relevant explanation for regional income patterns in the European Union. It also im­
93 Indeed, authors like Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) or Besley and Burgess (2003) have argued that micro­
level approaches are die only satisfactory way in which we can obtain insights into important economic 
issues such as the effects of trade liberalization or the evaluation of different approaches to global poverty 
reduction.
132
proved on existing a-geographic approaches like traditional growth theory by being able 
to explain the particular core-periphery structure we observe in the EU. Secondly, it also 
contributed to existing empirical research in NEG by applying Redding and Venables’ 
(2004) framework to a new kind of data - using a large panel of regions rather than a 
cross-section of countries. Finally, I took a first step towards disentangling the different 
channels through which centrality in the sense of good access to product markets influ­
ences income levels,. Interestingly, the direct channel working through trade cost savings 
for more central regions seems to be only a rather small part of the overall impact of 
centrality - at least in the particular sample used here.
Turning to policy implications, the key message that emerges from Chapter 2 is 
that centrality has a positive effect on per capita income. This seems to be due to direct 
trade costs savings as well as more long-run effects through increased incentives for 
physical and human capital accumulation. Accordingly, one direct policy implication 
of these findings is to further pursue economic integration in the EU as well as other 
regional settings. Besides reducing formal and informal barriers to trade through further 
liberalization agreements, other ways of improving market access also exist. Key among 
these are improvements in infrastructure which allow peripheral regions or countries to 
access new sources of demand for their products. Ongoing projects like the EU’s Trans- 
European Transport Networks clearly acknowledge this point.
Chapter 3 shifted the focus of the analysis to the process of industrialization in 
the developing world. I argued that traditional explanations of the successes or failures of 
countries in industrializing failed to address two empirical regularities. The first of these 
was the positive impact of proximity to the world’s main markets on levels of industrial­
ization in developing countries which cannot be properly understood in closed economy 
models focusing on domestic demand only. Secondly, I argued that small open econ­
omy models that emphasise the importance of comparative advantage and are sceptical 
about the pro-industrializing effects of high agricultural productivity (like Matsuyama, 
1992) are at odds wiith a positive correlation between the ratio of agricultural to manu­
facturing productivity and shares of manufacturing in GDR By nesting elements of these 
more traditional approaches in a multi-location modelling framework with trade costs, I 
was able to obtain a theoretical explanation for the above stylised facts. I also provided
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empirical evidence on the model’s additional predictions which further corroborated the 
importance of economic geography in industrialization.
A couple of important insights arise from these findings. First, it seems that cen­
trality in the sense of better economic integration with the rest of the world is beneficial 
for industrialization in developing countries. Secondly and more subtly, economic ge­
ography also seems to matter crucially for local specialization patterns. In essence, my 
findings imply that traditional measures of comparative advantage do not do justice to the 
more complex interactions between locations - which are shaped to a large degree by the 
existence of trade costs. As the empirical results of Chapter 3 show, this is not only a the­
oretical consideration. Only when using the correct (i.e. trade cost-weighted) measure 
of comparative advantage do we obtain results consistent with theoretical predictions. In 
this sense, economic geography helps to improve our understanding of the determinants 
of industrialization and of global trade and production patterns more generally.
The insights from Chapter 3 also yield important lessons for economic policy. 
First, they provide a further argument for reducing trade barriers as a means for improv­
ing developing countries’ access to foreign markets and raising levels of industrializa­
tion.94 This recommendation holds in particular for trade liberalizations among devel­
oping countries with similar specialization patterns. Such countries could benefit from 
higher market access without suffering from the potentially de-industrializing long-term 
effects linked to a global comparative advantage in non-manufacturing sectors. In a 
slightly different vein, my results also indicate that the concerns of some economists that 
agricultural reforms might actually be counter-productive by preventing successful in­
dustrialization are probably exaggerated. In a world where neighbouring countries show 
similar specialization patterns, comparative advantage effects are less significant, in par­
ticular if agricultural reforms are coordinated across countries in a geographic region. 
To the contrary, by raising income above subsistence levels they not only alleviate rural 
poverty still widespread in many parts of the globe but generate the demand for manu­
facturing goods necessary for a successful industrialization.
94 Note that no value per :se is attached to industrialization in my theoretical model. However, the generally 
acknowledged importance of industrialization for development leads me to treat it as a desirable outcome 
in this conclusion and before. Indeed, it would also be conceptually straightforward to obtain welfare gains 
from industrialization in my model. One way of doing so would be to incorporate leaming-by-doing effects 
in manufacturing which over time would lead to stronger increases in productivity and welfare in the more 
industrialized countries (see Matsuyama, 1992).
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Chapter 4 approached the question of the impact of economic integration through 
freer trade from a slightly different perspective. Rather than inquiring what the poten­
tial long-run benefits could be (as the essentially cross-sectional approaches in Chapters 
2 and 3 did), this chapter tried to improve our understanding of how the adjustment 
process to these long-run outcomes takes place. More specifically, I asked the question 
of whether mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are used by firms as an additional form of 
adjustment to freer trade in addition to firm-internal adjustment or exit by bankruptcy. 
Using the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement of 1989 as a natural experiment, 
I could indeed show that trade liberalization led to increases in M&A activity, in par­
ticular in the smaller Canadian market. I also provided evidence that resources were 
transferred from less to more productive firms in the process and that the magnitude of 
the overall transfer was quantitatively important. Taken together, these results suggested 
that M&A is an important alternative to the previously studied adjustment channels of 
firm and establishment closure and contraction.
These findings are important in a number of aspects. Most importantly, they high­
light the existence of M&A as a significant but previously neglected form of firm-level 
adjustment. By doing so, they advance our understanding of how freer trade affects 
micro-level behaviour and thus contribute to the wider research agenda in this area. Sec­
ondly, they also shed new light on ways in which policy makers may influence and maybe 
reduce the transitory costs associated with freer trade (like temporary unemployment 
and other costs related to bankruptcies of import-competing firms). In particular, should 
M&A indeed represent a swifter and more efficient way of transferring resources be­
tween firms, one would like antitrust authorities to facilitate this adjustment channel by 
reducing restrictions on acquisitions in the wake of trade liberalizations. Given the gen­
erally higher level of restrictions imposed on M&A activity in developing countries, this 
proposition could be of particular relevance there. This line of thought is reminiscent of 
certain strands in the Corporate Finance literature (in particular Jensen, 1993) which ar­
gue that takeovers represent a far superior way of restructuring industries than internal 
adjustments or bankruptcy and as such should not face unnecessary legal restrictions.
Besides contributing to the wider research agenda on the effects of economic in­
tegration, the three main chapters of this thesis also suggest a wide range of interesting 
topics for further research. Starting with Chapter 2, a key objective for future work
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should be to consider competing hypotheses that could similarly explain the spatial in­
come structure in the European Union - the most relevant probably being technological 
spillovers. Another important extension would be to quantify in a more precise manner 
the significance of the different channels of influence of market access, going beyond 
the simple inclusion of additional regressors performed in Chapter 2. While a number of 
studies have by now shown that market access does indeed matter, we understand much 
less clearly the precise mechanisms through which it operates.
Turning to Chapter 3, several extensions to both the theoretical and empirical parts 
seem promising. On the theory side, an important step would be the inclusion of addi­
tional factors of production, capital and land in particular. As is well known in inter­
national trade theory, having more than one production factor introduces relative factor 
abundance as a second determinant of comparative advantage besides technological ef­
ficiency. Also, allowing for capital accumulation and decreasing returns to scale in food 
production would limit specialization in agriculture (compare Echevarria, 1995). On the 
empirical side, an important area for further research would be the attempt to disentan­
gle the relative quantitative importance of institutions and supply-side factors on the one 
hand, and demand-based explanations of industrialization on the other hand.
Finally, more work is also needed to understand the importance and relative ef­
ficiency of M&A as a means of firms-level adjustment to freer trade. For example, it 
would be of interest to replicate my results for trade liberalization episodes in developing 
countries where different regulatory environments, a lower stock market capitalization 
and more severe credit constraints might imply a different and possibly more restricted 
role for M&A. Another promising area for future research would be to investigate in 
more detail how M&A compares to the alternative adjustment channels of exit and in­
ternal expansion or contraction. Besides looking at how firm and industry characteristics 
influence the choice of adjustment strategy, I would be particularly interested in provid­
ing evidence on the relative efficiency of the different channels. Using certain exogenous 
restrictions on M&A (ownership structure, legal barriers to acquisitions etc.), it should in 
principle be possible to compare the performance of firms and industries that were able 
to use M&A as an adjustment mechanism with other firms and industries that had to rely 
on other forms of adjustment.
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